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- More on India’s interests in Sri Lanka
'Colombo - India’s first line of defence'- Legal Watch
Administering the North and East
More on India’s interests in Sri Lanka
'Colombo - India’s first line of defence'by Stanley Jayaweera
A former Indian Foreign Secretary, Eric Gonsalves, in his piece appearing in ‘The Island’ of May 31, raised the question what his country’s interests in Sri Lanka are.Kuldip Nayar, one of India’s foremost and perceptive journalists, who was also, at one time his country’s High Commissioner in London, has given a direct answer to that question, when he says, "Colombo is India’s first line of defence" in his own piece "What Delhi must do", appearing in "The Island" of June 5.
This has been so from the time the Western colonial powers came to this part of the world. It is so even now, for the simple reason that our immediate neighbour, giant though she be or precisely because she is a giant (all giants, whether they be human beings or nations, live in fear because they feel insecure) knows fully well what the position would be if Sri Lanka, a mere sprat living side by side with a huge whale, should permit China or Pakistan to establish a foothold on her soil.
In her foreward to the 1980 edition of her father’s "Discovery of India", Indira Gandhi has written that Nehru’s Autobiography "is not merely the quest of an individual for freedom" but that it affords "an insight into the making of the mind of new India" and "The discovery", she writes, delves deep into the sources of India’s "national personalty".
‘New India’
It is of this "new India" and her "national personality" that Nehru wrote on October 2, 1949, to the chief ministers of the states, "India has much to give, not in gold or silver or even in exportable commodities, but by virtue of her present position. It is well recognised today all over the world that the future of Asia will be powerfully determined by the future of India. India becomes more and more the pivot of Asia" (Jawaharlal Nehru - a biography by Sarvapalli Gopal - Vol II). China may disagree, but all the same, this "pivot of Asia" is little Sri Lanka’s immediate next door neighbour, separated by only a little more than 20 miles of sea.
And it is of this little neighbour that Nehru has written in his "Autobiography", after his visit to the island in 1939 to sort out the friction that had arisen between Indian residents and the then government of Ceylon "in any future order Ceylon and India must hang together".
On an earlier occasion when he visited the island in April 1931, on his way back at Cape Comorin, Nehru has written something more pregnant with foreboding - "sitting at the feet of mother India and watching the Arabian sea meet the waters of the Bay of Bengal, I imagined that both were paying homage to India". It is difficult to imagine that the tear-drop at the southern tip of India was not part of the picture, India’s first Prime Minister and foreign policy mentor had in mind.
Dovetail into such assertions, Nehru’s view that "the small national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit (The Discovery of India), and one gets a fair idea of what India’s interests in Sri Lanka are.
Indo-centric
Many people, even at the time of independence, imagined that India’s concern over events in Sri Lanka began with the citizenship might of Indian plantation labour. Her interest went much deeper and backward in time. As far back as 1945 Nehru was enunciating the thesis that since culturally, racially, and linguistically, Sri Lanka was as much a part of India as any province of the subcontinent, the island should join the Indian federation. (Studies in Indian foreign policy - Surendra Chopra 1983).
She perceived South Asia as an Indo-centric region and herself as its dominant power. Some like Sardar K. M. Panikkar, accordingly, went so far as to suggest a common defence for India and Sri Lanka.(Ibid). India being central to South Asia, geographically, it has to be more than ordinarily interested in what happens in her neighbouring countries, for the simple reason that events in her adjoining lands have repercussions on her own domestic politics. From this is born India’s sub- continental obsession. From here, intervention in the domestic affairs of its neighbouring countries, whether the reasons are ethnic spill - overs or strategic considerations, is but a short step.
While spearheading the country’s epic struggle for freedom, the Indian National Congress had had its own special unit for studying external relations and formulating what the country’s foreign policy will be after independence. Nehru was its chairman.
Promulgating the Asia Monroe Doctrine, India’s future Prime Minister had declared, at the Jaipur session of the Congres" our foreign policy is that no foreign power should rule over any Asiatic country" (B. R. Nanda - Indian foreign policy - the Nehru years). He had already asserted that "India, constituted as she is, cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not at all. No middle position attracted me. Nor did I think any intermediate position feasible," (The Discovery of India).
When at midnight on August 14th, 1947, Nehru, in a moving speech, in the constituent assembly, referred to India’s "tryst with destiny", he was making known to the world that, as an independent nation, India was going to play a dominant role in world affairs.
On joining the interim government in September 1946, Nehru made it clear that India would develop an active concern in world affairs, pursuing an independent policy compatible with her own national interests. In a speech to the constituent assembly on 8th March 1949, Nehru declared "what does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy. Once foreign relations go out of your hands into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent". (Quoted in Sarvapalli Gopal’s - Jawaharlal Nehru - a biography).
As Walter Crocker, Australia’s High Commissioner in India over two periods between 1952 and 1962 has written "Nehru’s special contribution to the Nationalist Movement had been his unflagging demand, firstly that the Nationalists think about the kind of India they wanted after they got independence, and secondly, that they think about a foreign policy! (Nehru — a contemporary’s Estimate).
The foreign policy of a country that has emerged to freedom after centuries of colonial domination does not fall from the skies. It is not born overnight. It has to be built up brick by brick.
But, there is no evidence to show that, here in this little island, those who agitated for constitutional reforms that would ultimately lead to Dominion status, had ever given thought to a possible role for their country in world affairs, or more fundamentally, to some basic principles which they would follow in international relations.
This is surprising for a land, small as it was, that had had diplomatic, cultural and trade relations with powerful countries over a period of 2000 years till the British occupied it in 1815.
The saddest part of the story is that even till many years after independence, successive governments had not given thought to formulating an India policy for the country — And that despite the fact that at Ministerial level there were some who had developed close personal links with Indian leaders. One of them was the late President J. R. Jayewardene.
He accompanied by two others, attended the Ramgarh Session of the Indian National Congress in March 1940. They went as delegates of the Ceylon National Congress. They had spent a few days with Nehru in his house, "Anand Bhavan" at Allahabad and had had long discussions with him. "Like all other youths of our generation throughout the British Empire, we hero-worshipped Jawaharlal Nehru and his leader, Mahatma Gandhi. The friendship thus formed enabled me to correspond with him," the former President has written. (Men and Memories — Autobiographical Recollections and Reflections — J. R. Jayewardene — Vikas Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd. — 1992).
J. R. also attended the historic session of the Indian National Congress Committee in Bombay in August 1942 when the "Quit India" Resolution was passed. At the request of the delegation from Sri Lanka, Ceylon too was included by Mahatma Gandhi in the resolution demanding freedom for Asiatic nations. (ibid).
In his letter dated 20th July 1940, to Pandit Nehru, J. R. has written "Events are moving with such rapidity in the World today that a slave India and Ceylon may be free tomorrow, without a struggle. The possibility of India passing into the hands of an armed invader is remote. The jealousy of the great powers alone will prevent this.
What of Ceylon? If nothing else happens, is it possible that she may be bartered away by a peace treaty? This is a question that is troubling many of us in Ceylon.
Some of us — the number is increasing — think that our future lies with India and we are endeavouring to arrange for the sending of a representative deputation from Ceylon to meet the Indian leaders.
Would it be possible for the Indian Congress to meet a deputation from the Ceylon National Congress some time this year? Federation or closer union between a free India and a free Ceylon would certainly be a subject we wish discussed.
To this, Pandit Nehru replied on August 1st, 1940, "Ceylon is too small a political and economic unit to stand by itself in the future world. I quite agree with you that there might be danger ahead for Ceylon under these circumstances. It will, therefore, be highly desirable to discuss the future relations of India and Ceylon, so that our minds may be clear and we should know what we are aiming at. Your proposal, therefore, is a welcome one.
In the same letter Nehru has written, "Personally, should like India to be closely associated in a future order with China, Burma and Ceylon as well as other countries which fit in" (Men and Memories).
Nehru became Prime-Minister of free India in 1947. J. R. Jayewardene took office as Finance Minister in the first Cabinet of independent Ceylon in 1948. Yet in 1962 I discovered, quite by accident, that even by then we had not given thought to evolving a clear-cut India policy.
It happened this way. In 1962, I was moved to the Foreign Ministry in Colombo from Madras (now Chennai) where I had been resident Head of Mission from 1960, by the then Foreign Secretary, N. Q. Dias, on the instructions of the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, with whom I had had intensive discussions on Indo-Sri Lanka relations, during her brief stop-over there in 1961 on her way to Buddha Gaya on a pilgrimage, at the invitation of Pandit Nehru, then Prime Minister of India.
Our office in Madras had been raised to diplomatic level by the late Gunasena de Zoysa, then Foreign Secretary; in 1960, whom I had been able to persuade, during the period I worked under him from 1954 to 1958, that of all our Missions abroad, Madras should be rated as of the highest importance. He gave our visa issuing office in Madras diplomatic status in 1960 and moved me from Singapore and directed me to take charge of it in March that year.
Back in Colombo in April 1962, I was directed by Mr. Dias to handle Indian affairs and when I asked him in what particular division of the Ministry the subject was dealt with, I discovered to my horror that there was no particular section as such, but that I should take charge of what was then known as the citizenship division and be designated Assistant Secretary (Citizenship)!
This division of our Foreign Ministry had earlier been in the charge of officers from the then Civil Service, but in 1962, Mr. N. Q. Dias decided, quite rightly, that the Indo-Ceylon problem as it was then referred to, should be assigned to a diplomatic officer. All that the Assistant Secretary in charge of the Citizenship Division had been doing from the time the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs was set up at the time the country was given Independence was to oversee the grant of citizenship to foreigners (the large majority of whom were Indians) who had a claim to it, and to issue deportation orders to illicit immigrants and visa-overstays!
So much for our concern for our interests in India!
I looked for some evidence (at least a brief document) of an in-depth study having been made of what our interests in India should be. There was none. Accordingly, I sent for the late Dr. Shelton Kodikara and suggested to him that the University should interest itself in this all-important subject and asked him to remedy the situation, promising to make available to him whatever official documents I could lay my hands on.
My own modest contribution towards answering my own question — what is our interest in India — was later set out in the cabinet paper which I wrote indicating the guide-lines and the parameters for solving the problem of the citizenship status of stateless persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. The document became the basis for the negotiations between the two countries which led to the signing of what is called the Sirima-Shastri Pact.
The then Foreign Secretary, N. Q. Dias, made the following endorsement on it, if I remember correctly, when submitting document to Mrs. Bandaranaike:-
Hon. P.M.
This is an excellent survey of the Indo-Ceylon problem. I have nothing to add to it. We may send copies of it to all our Missions abroad.
The Prime Minister directed that this be done and I was further instructed by her to take copies of it, personally, to every one of her cabinet ministers and explain to each of them, in detail, its contents and of course, to ensure that I brought back with me every copy. I remember the late Dr. N. M. Perera, then Finance Minister exclaiming, after having read the cabinet paper carefully, "My God, Stanley, from where did you get all these details. We never knew all this".
The cabinet approved the document in toto and Mrs. Bandaranaike left for New Delhi armed with its support. I showed the document to the late Mr. Dudley Senanayake too, then Leader of the Opposition, and obtained his approval also, before we left for the talks.
What I have done, in the foregoing, is to show, by reference to speeches and observations of India’s foreign policy mentor, Nehru and other analysts, where India’s interests in Sri Lanka lie.
A sine qua non for Sri Lanka in formulating an effective India policy is for us to understand where Indian interests in us lie principally, they are rooted, as President Premadasa pointed out in his manifesto at the Presidential election of November, 1988, in the geopolitics of the region. (quoted in "Men and Memories" — J. R. Jayewardene). Kuldip Nayar was absolutely right when he wrote that "Colombo is India’s first line of defence".
Equally it is our huge and solitary immediate next door neighbour who can protect and guarantee our own sovereignty. President Premadasa’s manifesto states in unambiguous language that the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed "to obtain India’s assistance to restore peace, law and order in the North and East." And it is a fact that peace and order were restored in that region until the LTTE broke the agreement in October, 1987, and fought Indian troops till they left at our request, in March 1990 — the protector of terrorism having become the hunter of terrorism. India became both part of the problem and part of the solution.
India’s interests in Sri Lanka had involved her in a dilemmatic relationship with us. For our part, Sri Lanka must learn the art of maintaining her own identity and asserting it whenever the need arises without giving cause for her giant neighbour to feel that the island is trying to sever its links with the mainland. That calls for skilful diplomacy by both politicians and professional diplomats.
(The above article should be read in conjunction with the writer’s "Understanding Indian Foreign Policy" which appeared in the "Sunday Island" of May 14).
Legal Watch
Administering the North and Eastby Nayana
The greatest irony of the 13th Amendment is that it is not operative in the area it was chiefly designed to benefit, namely the Northern and Eastern Provinces.Passed as a result of the Indo-Lanka "Accord" of 1987, this constitutional amendment made provision for the establishment of a Provincial Council in each of the nine administrative provinces of Sri Lanka "on such date or dates as the President may appoint by order published in the Gazette".
It was expressly provided that different dates may be appointed in respect of different provinces. As there had been no demand for Provincial Councils or indeed any kind of "devolution" in the areas outside the North and East, one wonders why the President did not make use of this discretion vested in him to postpone the creation of such councils in areas where there was no demand for them.
The Government could then have given its undivided attention to creating conditions conducive to the smooth functioning of the Provincial Council system in the only part of the country that wanted it.
A feature of the Thirteenth Amendment was the provision for asymmetrical devolution by allowing any two or three adjoining provinces to form one administrative unit with one Provincial Council. However the decision to effect such a merger was placed exclusively in the hands of the President. There was no mechanism for pressure for such a merger to emanate from the people.
Interestingly, the Provincial Councils Act of 1987 that accompanied the Thirteenth Amendment expressly required that the President should NOT make a proclamation linking the Northern and Eastern Provinces unless satisfied that:
"Arms, ammunition, weapons, explosives and other military equipment which on 29 July 1987 were held or under the control of terrorist, militant or other groups having as their objective the establishment of a separate State, have been surrendered to the Government of Sri Lanka or to the authorities designated by it, and that there has been a cessation of hostilities and other acts of violence by such groups in the said Provinces."
The failure on the part of the Sri Lankan and Indian governments to adhere to this requirement - there was no more than a token surrender of weapons - virtually sealed the fate of the North-East Provincial Council.
Elected under the gun barrels of the Indian Army in a poll that lacked credibility, and constantly harried by a well-armed and active LTTE, the members of the EPRLF-dominated Council were eventually goaded into making a unilateral declaration of independence and fleeing to India. In the face of this "UDI" the Sri Lankan Government had no option but to dissolve the Council under the sovereign powers left to it by the Thirteenth Amendment.
As a result, the de-linking provisions of the same law were never tested. In terms of Section 37(2) of the Provincial Councils Act, a poll was required to be held "not later than 31 December 1988" to enable the electors of each Province to decide whether they wished to remain linked as one administrative unit. If the majority of voters in any one of the linked provinces voted to form a separate unit, de-linking had to take place.
However, the same section gave the President a seemingly unrestricted discretion to postpone such a poll by issuing Gazette notifications to that effect. As a result the Northern and Eastern Provinces remain linked to this day, with an appointed Governor but no elected Council.
Yet despite the bungled manner of its implementation, the Thirteenth Amendment scheme for the establishment of Provincial Councils had certain merits over the confused and controversial ideas presently being discussed.
The units of devolution (to borrow the current phrase) were based on accepted administrative provincial divisions which had been handed down from Independence and were devoid of communal overtones. While provinces which felt they had sufficient affinity could be allowed to merge their administrations, that affinity had to be based on the consent of the majority of their pre-existing population. There was to be no artificial excising of communities out of one province or into another so as to artificially create ethnically homogenous areas, and the principle of democratic choice was recognized even if its implementation was flawed.
By Gazette Extraordinary No. 1104/9 dated 2 November 1999, the President, in the exercise of her powers under the Public Security Ordinance, issued an Emergency Regulation for the setting up of an "Advisory Council for the Northern and Eastern Provinces".
This Council is to consist of not less than eleven and not more than seventeen members appointed by the President. It "shall be constituted so as to give adequate representation to every administrative district in the Northern and Eastern Provinces". The President may at any time remove a member of the Council.
In terms of clause 3, the President shall assign one or more members of the Council to every administrative district in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. It shall be the duty of such members to bring to the attention of the Council, the Governor and other appropriate authorities, the needs and requirements of such administrative district and to coordinate the executive and administrative functions of such district.
Clause 4 of the Regulations deals with the functions of the Chief Secretary and the meetings of the Council. The President is empowered to appoint a Chairman from among the members of the Council, but in the absence of the Chairman, the members elect a pro-tem Chairman.
Clause 5 declares that "it shall be lawful" for the Governor to consult the Council the exercise and discharge of his powers and functions.
Clause 6 sets out the functions of the Council as follows: To advise the Governor with regard to the restoration of civil administration and the maintenance of law and order in the two Provinces; to submit proposals for development; to advise appropriate authorities as to the areas to which priority should be accorded for the purpose of development and allocation of resources; to advise on ways and means of raising revenue within the two Provinces; and generally to liaise between the people of the two Provinces and the Government.
In an idea strongly reminiscent of the Executive Committee system under the Donoughmore Constitution, clause 7 empowers the President, on the recommendation of the Council, to appoint a five member Board of Management from among Council members to assist the Governor. They are to be assigned the following groups of subjects: (a) law and order, public administration and local government; (b) finance, industry, infrastructure development, transport and highways; (c) education, culture, youth affairs and sports; (d) environment, agriculture and lands, fisheries and cooperatives; and (e) health, housing, women’s affairs, social services and rural development.
The Council is empowered to add subjects to each group but not, apparently, to increase the number of Board members.
The term of every Councillor and every member of the Board of Management is initially limited to one year. His/her letter of appointment may even specify a shorter period. On the other hand the President is empowered to extend the term of office of the Advisory Council or of any member thereof.
The Gazette states that the Council will stand dissolved upon the revocation of this Regulation or the establishment of a Provincial Council or Councils for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. It will in fact also stand dissolved if the State of Emergency is allowed to lapse. In any event no such Council has yet been appointed.
With ground conditions clearly not conducive to elections in the North and many parts of the Eastern Province, an un-elected Council, if made up of dynamic and dedicated individuals, could achieve some pragmatic results. Given the undistinguished record of elected Provincial Councils elsewhere in the country and the mini-battles that have sometimes passed for elections, the war-weary people of the North and East may well accord priority to a system that brings tangible improvements to their quality of life over mere electoral politics for its own sake.
The question is whether a Council appointed under the above Regulations can deliver. The calibre of the persons appointed, and the ability of the Council members and the Governor to cooperate with each other will be crucial. One notes that it is merely "lawful", not mandatory, for the Governor to consult the Council, although they, apparently, can offer unsolicited advice.
However, it is the manner of appointment and dismissal of Council members that gives most grounds for disquiet. It is axiomatic that the wider the discretionary power, the more room for abuse. Everything from the number of Councillors (anything between 11 and 17) to the period of appointment (may be one year, may be less, may differ from member to member) is variable. The President may chose to dissolve the whole Council, or extend its life, or extend the appointments of selected members.
While flexibility is always an asset in administration, certainty is also necessary in such basic matters as the term of office of the Council, its composition and size. A few good members will not want to break their backs over the job only to find themselves outvoted by a bunch of political cronies added to the Council at a later date.
In the absence of any provision for remuneration of members, it must be presumed that their services are to be given in an honorary capacity. This might have been an interesting idea, particularly when serving an area whose people have known many years of hardship, but the fact that Council members can be tossed aroma like autumn leaves in the matter of appointment and dismissal is hardly likely to encourage persons of quality to come forward.
It is not certain whether the idea of an interim council which is presently being discussed between the parliamentary parties is going to be based on this Gazette, but the points raised in the foregoing discussion will be of relevance to whatever type of body is contemplated.
We will refrain from entering into the question of LTTE representation (which raises an entirely different set of issues) since the Government has for the time being assured the nation that such a thing will not be allowed unless that organization halts its violence and shows willingness to enter the democratic process.
All we will say for now is: Learn from past mistakes but also respect past endeavours in so far as they had some merit; and base the exercise on a solid foundation of principle rather than ad hoc expediency.
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