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by Foxwatch
Having invited all and sundry to "help" we now spend much of our time hanging on the lips of our "saviours", chief among them being those who nurtured, funded, trained, and armed the LTTE terrorists, and help them to this day.The charitable interpretation of the craven cry for help is that it was based on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief. But more likely it was in keeping with the overall Alice in Wonderland scenario - a reckless political solution to an undefined problem; the elevation of this solution to the miracle cure which will bring peace, although the Tamil parties and their godfathers abroad rate our solution as no more than a "basis" for further negotiations; fighting to capture the north and east while simultaneously drafting a new Constitution under which the army would have to quit the north and east; calling on youth to join the army and simultaneously mounting an anti-war campaign; pleading for peace talks in the knowledge that the LTTE’s pre-conditions for such talks amount to surrender, rejecting Eelam but failing to reject the proxies for Eelam-Thimpu principles and confederation; and, to come full circle, shamelessly pleading for help from the country which has exploited our weaknesses like a chess champion demolishing an amateur.
Euphoria
Whichever it is, the deed is done, and there are statements galore, many of them generating considerable euphoria. The big powers, we believe, are with us. Have they not affirmed (though with discordant voices from our neighbour) their commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and their opposition to Eelam? So can we all get on peacefully with the serious business of cricket?
The Dixit/Palmerston doctrine
But, as in cricket, things are not what they seem And unlike in the noble game, the principles were laid down long ago, and chillingly enunciated by two masters of statecraft, Indian High Commissioner Dixit and British Prime Minister Palmerston.
Their two classical statements on the nature of international relations should be required reading for politicians and citizens of every country. In his book "Assignment Colombo", Dixit, in a rare moment of philosophising on the ethics of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, wrote:
"The question whether [Mrs. Gandhi] was right or wrong is a different matter...inter-State relations...are usually determined by considerations of realpolitik {rather] than ethical norms. The Indian approach...was a reaffirmation of the unpalatable political reality that politics and diplomacy remain an amoral phenomenon." (Emphasis added).
Much earlier, the British statesman Palmerston formulated this classic tenet of international relations more blandly: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."
So let us wake up to the reality that international relations are amoral, and that each nation’s actions are determined by its own self-interest. Each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.
Applying the Doctrine
Applying the Dixit-Palmerston dicta to the unfolding scenario suggests yardsticks by which to assess comforting words emanating from abroad. We have to keep in mind that —
1. A statement can be a deliberate lie.
2. A statement can be kite-flying, to elicit responses from various parties.
3. A statement may be made to gain time and lull suspicions, while preparing for contrary action.
4. A statement can be true at the time but liable to change as interests change.
5. No statement will be valid for all time. As the man said, there are no eternal allies and no eternal enemies, only compelling self-interest.
6. Words should be tested against deeds.
7. Every big power operates covert intelligence agencies to carry out their real objectives, while the official organs of governments make soothing noises.
8. No country reveals its hand fully or immediately - except Sri Lanka, whose plans are bared for all to see.
Indian Self-Interest
Take the statements emanating from India, original sponsor of the LTTE, now rather apprehensive of its creation. Consider India’s interests. First is India’s fundamental though unstated conviction that the entire sub-continent is rightfully India’s domain. Related to this belief is a determination to insulate India from destabilising changes originating in neighbouring countries. Within the overall suzerainty concept is a subsidiary belief that Sri Lanka is vital for the security of India Within this broad framework are a range of fluctuating impulses, whose importance varies with the prevailing structure of government, (especially the dependence of the centre on Tamil Nadu), existing trouble spots within and bordering India (Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Jaffna), and international political and commercial considerations.
Tamil Nadu
The Tamil Nadu factor is particularly important because it is one of the largest (130,000 sq. km.) and most populous Indian states (pop. 60 million), has about a third of India’s eastern seaboard, was the first Indian state to try to secede from India, is believed to continue to harbour secessionist tendencies, and can make or break central governments. The Tamil Nadu views on the Sri Lankan problem range from reluctant official conformity with the central government policy of not supporting Eelam to fervent support for Eelam by powerful individual parties and politicians. One outcome of conflict in northern Sri Lanka which worries both centre and Tamil Nadu is the potential influx of thousands of refugees, to add to about 100,000 already in Tamil Nadu. AB Chief Minister Karunanidhi put it with the delicacy of a bulldozer, "Find a political solution and stop the war by following any model. Do not send refugees to Tamil Nadu and give us trouble. Let peace prevail in the backyard of India."
International and Regional Ambitions
Superimposed on the domestic factors are India’s ambitions of a seat on the Security Council and the strengthening of its regional superpower status, which demand both the appearance of rectitude and the occasional strong-ann tactics. As the regional superpower, it may also have two scores to settle -one with Sri Lanka a and one with the LTTE Sri Lanka secured the withdrawal of the IPKF, and the LTTE assassinated a former Indian Prime Minister and badly bruised the IPKF. The mills of God may grind slow, but they grind exceeding small.
Calibrated Response
With this background, consider India’s responses to Sri Lanka’s cries for help when Jaffna came under attack. There were initial jibes at those (especially the Buddhist priests) who once wanted India to keep out but were now frantic for India to save Sri Lanka But the scorn was tempered by an emerging worry - the realisation that the LTTE, nurtured by India to cripple Sri Lanka, were showing signs of developing into a Frankenstein monster which could destroy not only Sri Lanka but India as well. The Indian response would have to be fine-tuned so as a) not to upset the LTTE’s patrons in Tamil Nadu; b) to curb the LTTE’s potential to destabilise India; c) to maintain the LTTE’s useful capacity to weaken Sri Lanka; d) to be seen, as regional superpower, to respond constructively to an appeal from a small neighbour for help against a dangerous terrorist group; e) to do all this without placing the Indian army at risk; and f) to take overall control of the unravelling Sri Lankan muddle.
Walking the Tightrope
The Indians have walked this tightrope skilfully. The first response was to decide against sending Indian troops to Jaffna, but to offer humanitarian aid and hint at supplying weapons and evacuating troops if asked. Karunanidhi, on behalf of the Tamil brethren, lost no time in reading the riot act to the central government on the weapons issue, and the government quickly retreated. Since then, evacuation of troops has also been ruled out External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh announced that "India will work to mitigate the hardship inflicted upon civilians by the conflict, taking such humanitarian measures as become necessary.." (Does anyone remember today that India described its air-drop over Jaffna in June 1987 as humanitarian relief to civilians?)
Pushing Norway Out
At superpower level, India has firmly edged out Norway, which intruded into its regional turf, and recent Norwegian noises acknowledge that any deal facilitated, mediated, whatever, would need Indian approval. To reinforce the point, India has secured the support of the USA, another power sensitive to the concept of zones of influence. An AFP report datelined New Delhi, May 18th quoted Karl Inderfurth, Asst. Sec. of State for South Asia as saying, "We believe that India is the key outside power and that any action taken by the international community must include India."
Comfort Zone
Those responses looked after the terms of Indian assistance, in a way which protected the Indian army and the sensitivities of Tamil Nadu, and established India’s predominant status as the regional superpower. Now to Sri Lanka. Most pleasing to Sri Lanka has been the assurance, dating from Indian PM Vajpayee’s statement at an all-party meeting on May 8th, that India was not for a separate Eelam, and that it favoured a settlement within the framework of Sri Lanka’s unity and territorial integrity. At the time of writing, the Sri Lanka-India joint statement of June 12th issued after Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant’s discussions with government and opposition has confirmed this position by referring to "...the continued commitment of the Government of India to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka." But a small voice whispers, "Hasn’t the government of India always been committed to our unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, even while promoting acts calculated to undermine them?" Time then to scrutinise more critically.
The 64,000 Dollar Question
And there is indeed a massive contradiction in India’s current stand. It is ostensibly opposed to Eelam, but simultaneously for "a peaceful resolution of the crisis within the framework of the Sri Lankan constitution," which is the code for the devolution package, which, as India well knows, is the last stepping stone to Eelam. The question is why, since India also knows that a rampant Eelam under Prabhakaran could be a serious destabiliser of India, it is nevertheless determined to lay the legal groundwork for its establishment.
Riddle Explained
The answer lies in the question itself. Eelam under the uncontrollable Prabhakaran would be dangerous to India, but not, probably, Eelam minus Prabhakaran. A puppet Eelam would kill several birds with one stone and be wholly advantageous for India Tamil Nadu would be satisfied and reassured that their brethren in Sri Lanka would have their Eelam without any danger of making waves in TN; India could exert pressure at will over Sri Lankan through an Indian-controlled Eelam complete with India-friendly Chief Minister, and the western powers and their Norwegian puppet would be foiled in their hopes of destabilising India through Eelam.
"Advice" plus Special Envoy
This scenario could explain why India, after a period of apparent cool detachment, has suddenly turned on the pressure to have the package implemented - even to the point of considering the appointment of special envoy ‘`to engage the Sri Lankan polity in thrashing out a consensus on a devolution package." India would graciously "provide advice" and "the parties would be in constant touch with the Indian mission in Colombo." Here too is a demonstration of how the regional power has deftly assumed control over the overall situation, through a special envoy dispensing advice, or, to dispense with the euphemisms, through a special envoy who will issue orders.
Mission Accomplished
All the objectives mentioned in the section above headed "Calibrated Response" would have been achieved if India manages to complete its tightrope walk. The last and vital operation would be to neutralise Prabhakaran, thereby removing the threat to India but maintaining the terrorist groups’ capacity to destabilise Sri Lanka
Package
Vital to the entire exercise is the package. Its importance to the backers of Eelam lies in the one-sided arrangement which has been brainwashed into gullible Sri Lankans as a "fair" settlement. Arms are being twisted to persuade Sri Lanka to grant "maximum autonomy" to a north-eastern Tamil Region, in exchange for the LTTE abandoning its objective of Eelam. The absurdity is that the "maximum autonomy" is expected to be granted through a new Constitution whose abdication of vast Regional powers would be impossible to undo if things go completely wrong. But the terrorists could decide at any time to reinstate Eelam as their goal. Sri Lanka is therefore at great risk of making an irreversible constitutional transformation in exchange for a mere pledge which could be renounced at any moment. Sri Lanka’s concessions would be engraved in stone, while the LTTE’s concession would be written on water. Nowhere in conflict resolution has one party been prepared to trap itself in irreversible concessions while the other retains the freedom to go back on its undertakings at any time.
In the current situation, the adoption of a new Constitution resembling the October 1997 constitution would be the final tightening of the noose, the end of the sovereignty, unite and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
The mills of God would have completed their work.
LEGAL WATCH
Interim Council: clarifying the issuesby Nayana
"Let us say what we feel and feel what we say; let speech harmonize with life" — SenecaThis seldom happens in Sri Lankan politics and at the moment secrecy seems to the blessings of both Government and Parliamentary Opposition.
Last week this column set out the history of the attempts to administer the Northern and Eastern Provinces since 1987 and discussed the provisions of the Emergency Regulations issued by the President last November which allowed for the setting up of an "Advisory Council for the Northern and Eastern Provinces".
Subsequent news reports have indicated that the "Interim Council" presently under discussion is likely to be somewhat different, although neither its exact nature nor purpose have been publicly defined.
Three main questions arise for consideration regarding this proposed body: What will be its constitutional/legal status; its powers and functions; and its composition. It is logical to consider these three issues in this sequence, although we do so in the knowledge that logic and principle are not necessarily the main forces operating on the present constitutional discussions.
As far as its legal status goes, such a body could be created either by Emergency Regulations or by an Act of Parliament or as part of the proposed new Constitution.
If created by Emergency Regulation, it will in effect supersede the earlier Gazette of last November but it is difficult to see how such a body could be anything other than an "Advisory" Council. Emergency Regulations can override any law other than the provisions of the Constitution, but the Constitution itself now contains the Thirteenth Amendment. Thus such a body could not exercise the legislative or revenue-raising powers of a Provincial Council, nor could it exercise executive powers which are vested in the Provincial Governor.
Prime targets
Hence its functions could not differ substantially from what was already envisaged in last November’s Gazette, namely: To advise the Governor with regard to the restoration of civil administration and the maintenance of law and order in the two Provinces; to submit proposals for development; to advise appropriate authorities as to the areas to which priority should be accorded for the purpose of development and allocation of resources; to advise on ways and means of raising revenue within the two Provinces; and generally to liase between the people of the two Provinces and the Government.
In such a case, the membership should be small and comprise persons familiar with the ground conditions in the area. The irony is that if such persons started doing a useful job and effecting real improvements to the lives of the people, past events indicate that they would become prime targets for assassination by the LTTE.
The second way in which an Interim Council could be created is by Act of Parliament. If its functions were to extend beyond advice and co-ordination, it may be held to be inconsistent with the Thirteenth Amendment and require passage by a two-thirds majority in Parliament. However this would not present a difficulty if such a Council were created by consensus between Government and Opposition.
Article 84 of the Constitution provides for the passage of Bills that are inconsistent with the Constitution but are not intended to amend it. This would seem to be the most suitable provision under which to pass such a Bill, since there could then be no accusations of indirectly trying to do away with the Thirteenth Amendment provisions for elected Provincial Councils. Such a Bill requires a two-thirds majority to be passed but only a simple majority for its repeal.
Transitional provision
The third possibility is for the Interim Council to be incorporated into the new Constitution as a transitional provision to administer the Northern and Eastern Provinces for a fixed period, e.g. five years, or until ground conditions permit the holding of elections to a Regional Council. However, if tied to the new Constitution, the chances are that it would have to await not only a two-thirds majority in Parliament but also a vote in a national referendum before it could become operational. If the Council is intended as an interim measure designed to bring some immediate improvement to the administration of these Provinces, then this lengthy procedure would defeat the purpose.
Shortcomings
This brings us to the second question we raised, namely the purpose of the Interim Council. If it is to better administer and coordinate development activity within the two Provinces, then it would be necessary to study the shortcomings of the present system and consider carefully how, if at all, such shortcomings will be remedied by having an Interim Council.
For instance, if the system is flawed due to lack of understanding or co-ordination with the people of the area, then there may be justification for such a Council provided it is staffed by persons familiar with the problems. On the other hand, if the drawbacks are due to logistical problems such as transport, a Council may not be able to do much beyond restating the problem, and the operation of such a Council would only divert state resources which could be put to more direct use.
On the other hand, if the purpose of the Interim Council is to give voice to the aspirations of the people of those two Provinces pending the restoration of conditions in which elections can be held, then the selection of Council members requires different criteria to what might be needed for a purely administrative body. The mere appointment of MPs of the area would be redundant since such persons already have their forum at national level, and the question arises whether a selection imposed from the top can be a meaningful substitute for representatives elected by the people.
Representative democracy
It is a matter of concern that neither Government nor Parliamentary Opposition has seen fit even to disclose the purpose of the proposed Interim Council. Not only is such disclosure required in terms of basis principles of "representative democracy" referred to in our Constitution but also in terms of basic principles of logic: How are the people to judge whether the powers, functions and composition of the proposed Council are likely to serve their intended purpose, if that purpose is not disclosed?
The third issue mentioned at the commencement of this column is the composition of the Council, which of course should be geared to its purpose and functions. However there is no lawful purpose or function that could justify the inclusion of the LTTE in its present form, i.e. as an organization waging war against the State and officially classified by a number of foreign countries as a terrorist organization.
It defies logic as to how Sri Lanka could, at one and the same time, ask other nations to proscribe the LTTE as a terrorist organization and halt its fund-raising activities, and at the same time contemplate giving that very same organization a say in the running of any part of this country.
Lack of self-confidence
This is certainly not the way Britain treats the IRA or India treats the LTTE, and it is a measure of the hypocrisy of these and other foreign powers who urge the Sri Lankan government to do what they themselves would never do and what they know their own electors would never countenance. It is also a measure of the lack of self-confidence and commitment to principle of Sri Lanka’s present generation of parliamentary politicians that they do not have the courage of their convictions to give a fit reply to their would-be mentors.
There is also the fact that the LTTE is presently a proscribed organization in this country. Presumably that proscription was ordered for good cause. Therefore the Government could not be expected to lift the proscription unless there was some tangible change of character on the part of that organization. It should be remembered that the only response of the LTTE to the latest round of peace moves which began in the latter part of 1999 was to escalate the war in the North and stage a number of terrorist attacks against civilians elsewhere in the country.
The President is the only one of the political leaders involved in the present constitutional discussions who recently stated that the LTTE would not be allowed a place on the Interim Council unless they stopped their war against the State and showed willingness to enter the democratic process. However the most recent news reports on the subject seem to indicate that in the face of near unanimous demands from parliamentary opponents and allies, the Government is now back-tracking and agreeing to allow "all parties to the conflict" to have a place on the Council.
This brings us once again to the question of the purpose of the intended Interim Council. If it is to run the Northern and Eastern Provinces AS A PART OF SRI LANKA, then there can be no place for an organization that is waging war against the Sri Lankan State. The inclusion of the LTTE could only be justified (in terms of logic) if the purpose of the Council is in fact to create an interim arrangement which changes the status of those two privinces into something which is compatible with present LTTE demands.
Therefore those politicians who support the inclusion of the LTTE in the Council should state to the public of this nation (who pay their wage bill) what exactly is the purpose of the Interim Council.
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