By Jehan Perera
There has been some doubt as to whether the British government will ban the LTTE under its new anti-terrorism legislation.

There has been speculation that Britain might not ban the LTTE for two reasons of its own self-interest.

One is that such a ban will deny the British a mediatory role in helping to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.

The other reason is that the British government is dependent on Tamil votes in several marginal constituencies and would not wish to tip the balance against them by banning the LTTE.

But reading this past weekend's political analyses in the newspapers, it appears that the trend of opinion is that the British decision is likely to result in the banning of the LTTE.

The LTTE's international spokesman, Anton Balasingham has levelled a threat that a British ban would lead the LTTE to pull out of the peace process entirely. Despite his erudition in articulating the Tamil Eelam cause, it appears that Dr Balasingham has not been able to transcend the traditional LTTE practice of seeking to coerce others to bend to its will.

The language of threats is unlikely to work with a country that has larger interests at stake than the fate of the Sri Lankan peace process. For instance, in a country such as Britain, it is unlikely that important policy decisions with national and international implications are taken on the basis of winning a few more parliamentary seats. Further there is a separation of powers within the more democratic countries.

While the British foreign office may wish to mediate in Sri Lanka, the British home office which has to make the banning decision is more likely to give weight to the credibility and implementation of British law.

Besides whether the British ban them or not, the LTTE is unlikely to abruptly pull out of the present peace process. Only a few weeks ago, when the LTTE's first month of ceasefire was ending without a governmental response, the LTTE threatened that the ceasefire would not be renewed. But it was. The LTTE's extension of its one month unilateral ceasefire has been a heavy investment in the peace process. It has cost the LTTE a great deal of the Jaffna peninsula. It is unlikely that this investment will simply be thrown away. The LTTE's ceasefire has also led to a great build-up of expectations amongst the war-weary people of the north-east, sections of whom are now mobilising for what they believe is an LTTE peace initiative.

For instance, the Jaffna university students have been demanding that the government should reciprocate the LTTE's ceasefire. Now the Catholic Church too has announced its intention to launch a countrywide peace campaign that will commence before the end of the LTTE's present ceasefire. Given this gathering tide of popular sentiment in favour of a continued ceasefire and peace talks, the LTTE will be unable to pick up the peace process and then drop it as if it is a hot potato just because they are banned by the British.

Unofficial ceasefire

There is another reason why the LTTE is unlikely to go back to war. For the time being at least neither the government nor the LTTE appears to have the capacity or the will to fundamentally alter the military landscape. With the exception of the Jaffna peninsula, in which there has been some limited fighting over the past couple of weeks, the rest of the north-east has been militarily quiet. The army has not conducted any major military operations outside of the Jaffna peninsula.

Visitors to Mannar and Batticaloa at the two ends of the north-east reported that there appeared to be a mutual even if unofficial army LTTE ceasefire. Neither side seems to wish to upset this equilibrium On the part of the government it is certainly not for want of armaments. After the debacle at Elephant Pass, the government went on a massive buying spree of the most sophisticated military equipment . The cost of these weapons contributed in large measure to wiping out the foreign currency reserves of the country, and necessitated the devaluation and free float of the rupee.

But these weapons are most effective for fighting on flat and open lands such as in the Jaffna peninsula. They are less effective in the LTTE-strongholds of the Wanni and also in the east, where the mixed population composition restricts the ability to use conventional weaponry. It is in the terrain of the guerilla that the limits of conventional military power become apparent.

At the present time, therefore, for different reasons it can be seen that neither the government nor the LTTE is keen to go back to all out warfare. They seem to prefer the unofficial ceasefire that prevails outside of the Jaffna peninsula. Most of all, the people of the north-east would wish the ceasefire to continue and to become a permanent one. They have seen enough of the waxing and waning of the military fortunes of the two sides. Even if the LTTE is banned by the British, there will likely be considerable pressure from the people of the north-east to ensure that the LTTE stay within the peace process.

Fundamental question

However, depending on which way the British decision goes, the bargaining strengths of the two sides will undoubtedly be affected, positively or negatively for the two sides. But here too there are limits beyond which neither of the two sides can push each other, whatever may be their bargaining strengths. Constitutional Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris acknowledged this point in a recent speech delivered to a think-tank group of his ministry.

He is reported to have said that the essential problem was this. "The proposals must have sufficient content to be of interest to the LTTE, but it must also be capable of being sold to the people in the South of the country. If it goes too far, then the Sinhala people will reject it. If it does not go far enough then the LTTE would not look at it in earnest at all. How do you reconcile these two elements? That I think is a very fundamental question." It is not only the government that realises the predicament that they are in. The LTTE too would realise the same. They know that however weak their bargaining position gets, there is a bottom limit beneath which they cannot and will not go. This was the situation at the Paris Talks of 1971 between the United States and North Vietnam. Despite their weak bargaining position, the North Vietnamese did not budge from their minimum position. It was the United States that eventually did.

In other words, if the government is unable to come up with an offer that meets with their minimum position, the LTTE may choose to revert to warfare. But they do not need to revert to warfare merely because the British ban them and their bargaining position gets weakened. Besides there is evidence that the LTTE's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire was not solely prompted by the looming threat of the British ban. Sources report that this decision to enter into a political process to resolve the ethnic conflict was taken some time ago, even before the British ban became a major issue. Apparently, two years ago the LTTE appointed a task force to inquire into its lack of success in winning the hearts and minds of the international community. The vicious internet and newspaper attacks launched by LTTE-controlled media against peace organisations in Sri Lanka was apparently identified as being one of the reasons for the alienation of the international community. The findings of the LTTE-appointed task force were confirmed in April last year when the LTTE came right up to the very outskirts of Jaffna city. When Jaffna was on the verge of being taken by the LTTE and Tamil Eelam proclaimed, the international community was forced to take a stand, and the stand they took was against the LTTE. At the time of the Sri Lankan army's darkest hour, there was open international support for Sri Lanka's unity and concern about the troops trapped in Jaffna.

When victory seemed so close at hand, the LTTE learned the limits of military power. They got neither Jaffna nor the sympathy of the world. This is likely to be the larger context in which the LTTE has decided on entering into a peace process and re-considered its approach to achieving its objectives. This context will not change merely because of an adverse decision taken by the British government.