| Politics |
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| Tamil National Question Are we ready for a negotiated solution? by
Amrit Muttukumaru It is also hoped that the 1994 blunder of sending relative greenhorns for negotiation will be avoided this time. It is apparent that the developing consensus for a negotiated settlement has more to do with the dire economic and social consequences of the conflict than a genuine desire to acknowledge and remedy the largely inferior status of the Tamils in this country. If not why have less contentious issues such as the implementation of the official language policy, inequity in public sector employment, general harassment of Tamils by the security forces due to draconian legislation such as the PTA and terrible human rights violations not yet been addressed? Why also was the proposed Equal Opportunity Bill summarily jettisoned? Unless we get the motives correct, the success of the peace initiative could be compromised. Due to the war fatigue, there is all round general euphoria as a result of the governments positive response to the LTTEs unilateral cease fire which is expected to be renewed and the dismantling of the forbidding barricades which gave the country an image of perpetual siege. The governments "concession" to the Tamils through the relaxation of the heartless embargo even on basic necessities to the war torn areas in the north and east is a step in the right direction. These are the easy parts. The nature of the conflict being such, particularly in the strong emotions it elicits due to misinformation and mistrust on both sides of the divide in the context of powerful vested interests who exploit such emotions, the question arises as to whether the country is ready for what it will take to resolve the crisis. Is the country prepared? It is apparent that the country is largely unprepared not only for what it will eventually take to resolve the crisis but also for the preliminary steps necessary even to commence talks. Just consider all the hullabaloo even on the question of de-proscription, which essentially at least in the context of Sri Lanka, means very little in practical terms. Even in respect of the nature of the State, we have even influential political, business and professional sections still fantasizing on a solution within the narrow confines of a "unitary" state. The only charitable explanation is that some of them may be ignorantly equating a "unitary" state with a "united" state! It is very clear that a solution within a "unitary" structure is an impossibility. Only an advanced "federal" set up subject to the unity and integrity of the country which will be inviolable seems practicable. It is imperative that the international community should guarantee the sanctity of both the "federal" and "unity" aspects. Even in regard to the unit of devolution, emotions are still highly charged even among influential sections on the question of a unified north and east even irrespective of a somewhat reduced east. What is conveniently forgotten or at best down played are the implications of state sponsored colonisation which has drastically changed the complexity of the ethnic composition in the east. It is disappointing that the UNP while in opposition does not seem to have at least internally determined its stance on de-proscription as well as the broad parameters of a negotiated solution and obtained a consensus on the same at least within the senior echelons of the party. If at least this was decided upon, the government instead of groping for a solution to emerge from protracted negotiations, could have immediately commenced truthfully "educating" people at different levels in society on the nature of the problem and realistic responses on the premise of the guarantee by the international community that the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka will never be compromised. The broad parameters we have in mind are in respect of (a) the nature of the state (b) unit of devolution and (c) the extent of devolution. The LTTE as a point of departure have either the goal of Eelam or the Thimpu Principles. The Thimpu Principles enunciated by Tamil groups at the negotiations held in Thimpu in 1985, although superficially appearing to be separatist, could be subject to varying interpretations which include a united Sri Lanka. As a collaborative Sri Lankan Tamil articulation not necessarily underpinned by secession, it could serve as a starting point for negotiations. We could view this either as issues to quarrel over or as opportunities to forge national unity. In fact the LTTE have reportedly indicated that they are willing to drop the demand for a separate state subject to the just "aspirations" of the Tamils being met. We are still not aware of the point of departure of the Sri Lanka government. People Power It is felt that in the absence of a reasonable degree of southern consensus at least in terms of the broad parameters of a realistic solution, the government has basically put the cart before the horse vis-a-vis the Norwegian "facilitation". It also seems clear that any appropriate third party involvement has to be on a higher plain than mere "facilitation". Why are we still playing games even at this late critical stage? The people of this country are intelligent. They are also decent and reasonable. The problem lies with sections of their leadership who have their own agendas largely based on power and corruption. Even today, if things are explained to them honestly and rationally in the mass media and through other appropriate communication channels at the rural level, on the premise that they will be the ultimate beneficiaries and that the unity and integrity of the country will never be compromised, they have it in them to accept a just solution. Such a solution must be guaranteed by the international community. This is a far superior alternative to making ultimately suicidal political horse deals with opportunistic politicians. The LTTE too must accept such a solution which must ultimately be predicated on the rule of law, fundamental rights, good governance and democracy. However, the credibility of such a proposition is hinged on the prevalence of such a state in the south. This, as we all know through bitter experience, is far from a reality. Even the promises of the 17th Amendment were not fulfilled as we learnt from the abuses and malpractices witnessed at the recently concluded general elections. The absence of accountability also raises doubts on the maturity and fairness of a future "federal" government. Hence, it is clear that much more preliminary thought and action must necessarily precede any further moves towards third party facilitated negotiations. It is a lack of sincerity and professionalism in dealing with the problem and the mistrust of the people that could ultimately stymie a negotiated settlement. There are enough of opportunistic and irresponsible politicians and others of their ilk who will manipulate events and feed on the ignorance of misinformed people to torpedo peace talks. This is the reason why it is vital that the government must take the people into their confidence without any hidden agenda. It is felt that even within the UNF parties inclusive of the UNP, there may be elements that could join forces with anti-peace vested interests. Nature of the crisis The ethnic crisis and its implications can never be wished away unless the underlying issues are acknowledged and realistically addressed. These issue are based on the real discrimination and insecurity experienced by the Tamils of this country which translates into real fear and an inferior status in the political, social and economic life of this country. The failure of the state to resolve the same through several negotiation attempts has resulted in its unfortunate militarisation. The events that ultimately broke the camels back were the blatant injustice and discrimination in the areas of education and employment which adversely impacted on the Tamil youth. Although it is 19 years since the 1983 pogrom against the Tamils, there has never been any transparent inquiry and commensurate punishment meted out to the perpetrators. In more recent times, we have had the Bindunuwewa massacre, the alleged Chemmani mass graves and other horrible violations again without any convincing and timely inquiry to date. If we had the mechanism of a credible "truth commission" at least approximating the same in South Africa, we would have been in a better position to resolve this complex and emotional issue. The real tragedy of this country is our largely unassertive and servile civil society particularly the influential sections who have made no serious attempt to demand accountability from those (mis) governing us. It is largely from such people that members are to be appointed to the crucial "Constitutional Council" and the other "independent" commissions! This has a critical bearing on the fairness of a future "federal" government and hence on its credibility. Although there are indications that at least some of the grievances of the Tamils are being acknowledged, it is clear that the country at large and more particularly influential sections of our political, religious, professional and business community still do not fathom the extent of the real discrimination, the resultant fears and their implications. Because if they did appreciate this, the country would have at least attempted a more realistic and timely solution. Conclusion Although the country at large seems conditioned for the objective of ethnic peace and for the permanent conclusion of the military confrontation, it is not yet ready to accept what it will realistically take to resolve the same even though it will be within the unity and integrity of the country. This is mainly due to a lack of understanding of the real nature of the problem. Only when this is understood that there will be the possibility of "marketing" a realistic solution. After all, a durable solution will only stick when there is a sense of ownership. In the absence of this, it will be a field day for the powerful vested interests to whom a settlement is anathema. The largely unilateral method currently been pursued is fraught with serious danger for the reasons already mentioned. There does not appear to be a consensus even within government ranks! Even prior to getting to the negotiation stage, we seem to be struggling even over the relatively meaningless de-proscription issue (at least in its application to Sri Lanka) which is being exploited by vested interests. Such are the dangers of the modus operandi currently being pursued. In brief, the steps being recommended are: At least have a consensus within the UNF and with other political parties to the extent possible, in respect of: * Nature of the problem * De-proscription issue * Broad Parameters of solution: * nature of the state * unit of devolution Truthfully "educate" in a highly professional manner the various segments of the population through appropriate communication channels on the nature of the problem, de-proscription and the broad parameters of a possible solution within the unity and integrity of the country. Ultimate third party "mediation" (initially it can be "facilitation") will only be useful subsequent to substantial progress on (1) and (2). Specific time frames should be established for each of the stages. Underpinning all the above, is the assumption of a highly professional, dynamic and mature team with integrity to spearhead this most arduous task. Some of the questionable appointments made by the new government to even key institutions casts serious doubts on the judgement of those making such appointments. It must be appreciated that the unity of the country can in reality be only guaranteed by forging a truly Sri Lankan identity. It will be suicidal to equate this with the tyranny of the majority. The role of civil society, particularly the influential sections, is critical to this entire enterprise. |
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