By Our Defence Correspondent
The Sri Lanka Navy became the laughing stock of the whole country this week, as its Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, held a special press conference to heap praise on several senior officers whose careers had been ruined after he falsely accused them of being corrupt or incompetent.

The press conference was organized after Sandagiri came under fire following President Chandrika Kumaratunga giving him an unprecedented three-year extension of service, when he turns 55 later this month, which will see him staying on as Commander until August 31, 2005! This followed a newspaper campaign which had blackened the names of no less than five of the most senior officers in the navy, including Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema, who would have succeeded Sandagiri two weeks from now on the 1st of September 2002.

"They are loyal and experienced officers," the Daily Mirror quoted Sandagiri as saying of the navy’s six Rear Admirals, including Rear Admiral Wijewickrema and Rear Admiral Nandana Thuduwewatte, both of whom he had recommended be disciplined, along with three other very senior officers, Commodore A. V. Abeysena, Commodore D. C. I. Kariyawasam, and Commodore J. H. M. Abeykoon Banda, for recommending the purchase of a warship from a Chinese government shipbuilder, which the last Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, approved for purchase.

Incredibly, Sandagiri’s complaint against the officers had come AFTER a high-ranking Defence Ministry committee which included another former Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Asoka, had cleared the officers of any wrongdoing.

What most people don’t realize is that this particular warship deal, which was highly advantageous to the navy, never took place anyway. The ships were never bought! Plus, the committee of enquiry cleared all officers of any wrongdoing! Such was the strangeness of Sandagiri’s complaint.

Interestingly, Sandagiri used the press conference to heap praise on President Kumaratunga for giving him such an extension, but made no comment regarding the Prime Minister or Defence Minister, giving those present the impression that there was some political partiality over his extension.

The press conference also followed several written demands by the five officers that he withdraw his letter. Almost simultaneously to the press conference, the five officers finally received a tersely worded reply from Sandagiri, to the effect that he had taken action to amend his earlier letter to the Ministry of Defence in which he had recommended that they be disciplined. However, none of the officers received a copy of Sandagiri’s alleged corrective letter to the Ministry of Defence.

Sandagiri’s extension is unprecedented in the annals of Sri Lanka’s military and naval history, since it disqualifies almost an entire intake of officers from an opportunity of being appointed to the top spot in the service. None of the six Rear Admirals in the Navy, all of whom are in the batch lower to that of Sandagiri’s would have a chance of becoming the commander, as things stand.

Sandagiri’s appointment is unprecedented in the fact that officers in any service or the police had earlier been given only 3-months, 6-months, or 1-year extensions, when they reached 55 years. It robbed the next six officers in line of seniority of a shot at becoming the commander. They are Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, Rear Admiral Sarath Rathnakeerthi, Rear Admiral Nandana Thuduwewatte and Rear Admiral Daya Dharmapriya.

In contrast, only a few weeks ago, the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Lionel Balagalle, received a mere 3-months extension of service. He had earlier received a 1-year extension upon reaching 55 years.

Sandagiri further asserted at his press conference that he would recommend that the six Rear Admirals’ terms be extended when they reached their maximum time in the rank of Rear Admiral which is three years.

But this promise is laughable. Sandagiri only has the power to recommend extensions. He has no powers to make the actual decision, which can only be made by the President. In any case, it would also be extremely unusual for these Rear Admirals to receive such huge extensions. For example, Rear Admiral Wijewickrema and Rear Admiral Karannagoda must retire on the 7th of March 2004. For them to stay on past Sandagiri’s new extension date of August 31 2005, would require that they be given extensions of nearly two years, on top of the maximum 3-years that they can serve as Rear Admirals. Rear Admiral Weerasekera and Rear Admiral Rathnakeerthi would have to be given extensions of at least nine months. Rear Admiral Thuduwewatte and Rear Admiral Daya Dharmapriya would also end their terms in the rank of Rear Admiral before Sandagiri retires.

Sandagiri was right regarding one point. These officers are indeed most distinguished and experienced. They have been in the forefront of battle against the Sea Tigers for the past decade and a half, and each of them has about thirty years of service. To have all of them retire before the age of 55 would be a tragedy for the entire country.

So how is it that Sandagiri has angered not just all of his Rear Admirals, but also several other senior officers as well? This is a most pertinent question, since the fate of the navy rests with all of these officers, who form the majority of the navy’s senior leadership now, and who will continue to do so for a few more years. This is not just a question of internal politics within the navy, since the public needs to be certain about whether the Commander of the Navy has the respect of his senior officers, as well as the entire navy. Should the war restart, it is these officers who will protect the country under the leadership of the Navy Commander. Discord among them would spell disaster for the entire country.

The sad story of Sandagiri’s extension came into the public eye three weeks ago, when a newspaper published a letter which Sandagiri had sent to the Ministry of Defence, in which he asked that the entire Committee of officers who had been asked by former Commander Vice Admiral Tissera be disciplined. The direct insinuation is that this committee was either incompetent, or that they all conspired to try to rob the country of hundreds of millions of rupees by enriching themselves through this deal.

Strangely, Sandagiri’s letter did not recommend any action against Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, who took the ultimate decision to purchase the warship. The insinuation was that Tissera was gullible enough to be hoodwinked by his officers, which is an insult to the former Commander.

These officers on the committee were Rear Admirals Wijewickrema and Thuduwewatte, and Commodores A. V. Abeysena, D. C. I. Kariyawasam, and J. H. M. Abeykoon Banda. Our readers will understand just how serious this charge is when one considers that Commodore Abeysena is the Director of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Commodore Kariyawasam is the Director of Engineering, and Commodore Abeykoon Banda is the Director of Naval Supply & Secretariat. These are all the major branches of the Navy, which means that Abeysena is the most senior Electrical & Electronic Engineer, Kariyawasam is the most senior Engineer, and Abeykoon Banda is the most senior Supply & Secretariat Officer. Thus, the fact that Sandagiri’s charges cannot be taken lightly. If all of these officers conspired to try to rob the country, then action must be taken.

If they did not, then Sandagiri should never have asked for disciplinary action. For him to do so, AFTER the Ministry Committee, which was chaired by a very senior civil servant, Secretary of the Ministry of Public Affairs, Home Affairs and Administrative Reforms M. N. Junaid, cleared the officers of wrongdoing, means that he must have unearthed some more evidence which the Junaid Committee had not had. Otherwise, Sandagiri’s letter was an insult to the Junaid Committee. For the record, the other members of the Junaid Committee were Vice Admiral De Silva, Deputy Treasury Secretary S. B. Divaratne, and Defence Ministry Senior Assistant Secretary A. N. R. Amaratunga. Not people of the calibre who can be fooled easily. So how did Sandagiri say they are wrong?

This is definitely not a matter which can be settled by Sandagiri now saying that his original letter has been amended. He must give reasons for this. The navy owes the country an explanation. Apart from the injustice which has been done to the five officers, there has now been a tremendous loss of public confidence in the navy.

Lest we be misunderstood, let us say at the outset that we are not accusing Sandagiri of leaking his letter to a newspaper. In fact, following the publication of that letter, Sandagiri personally telephoned the editor of a newspaper to say that he had not leaked the letter himself. However, it is clear that whoever did so had much to gain from Sandagiri being given a massive extension. The Navy is like the army, police and air force, where officers band themselves into various camps, and there are certain officers in the navy who would benefit from either Sandagiri being given a massive extension or from Rear Admiral Wijewickrema being kept away from the top post.

But there is no denying the fact that Sandagiri was the biggest beneficiary of the campaign that smeared the reputation of Rear Admiral Wijewickrema. There is therefore a strong suspicion that his letter was leaked by someone in his group of supporters. There had been speculation that one of the six Rear Admirals had leaked the story to the newspaper in the hope of undercutting Wijewickrema and bettering his own chances of some day becoming the commander. But Sandagiri’s 3-year extension has put paid to the chances of any of them becoming commander.

Actually, the biggest beneficiary is the LTTE. We are sure that Velupillai Prabhakaran must be jumping for joy over the politics at Navy Headquarters, since his cadres now have to face an extremely disgruntled lot of senior officers whose morale is extremely low.

And now, to the gunboat deal itself.

In late 1999, with the fleet in urgent need of major warships to curb the Sea Tiger menace of weapons shipments coming in, mostly by cargo ships that came in and unloaded off the coast of Mullaitivu. The navy’s Dvora attack craft are too small to operate in the high seas, being built to essentially patrol coastal areas. The navy needed larger warships to cope with the LTTE’s new strategies.

It was also realized that warships needed more advanced Fire Control Systems than the ones on the existing gunboats. The present guns are loaded, aimed and fired by hand, and it takes many shots to hit a target.

In modern Fire Control Systems, an operator sits in a secure location such as the bridge and tracks targets through the use of a computer system which uses radar, infra-red devices, etc., and move a warship’s main guns in an appropriate manner. Factors such as the target’s speed and movements are calculated and tracked by the system, which means that once the operator locks on to the target once, the system will stay with the target no matter what evasive action the quarry takes. Factors such as the warship’s own movements and speed, and the prevailing sea conditions, are also taken into consideration by the system. All that the operator needs to do is to give one order and the system will fire a series of shots.

In modern warships, the Fire Control System is the most important part. In fact, one often hears of warships of the US Navy being identified as "Aegis-armed missile cruisers," "Typhoon-armed destroyers," etc., which are the main missile and fire-control systems on board these ships. Although other factors such as a ship’s speed, endurance, draught, and size, do still matter, the ability to track and hit a target as fast as possible, in the shortest time as possible, has never been more important.

Another important factor is that Sri Lankan warships often face swarms of LTTE boats, including suicide boats which manage to get close enough in the general melee to blow up the warship. Guns operating manually are just too slow to fight them off. In contrast, a computer-based Fire Control System not only destroys targets much faster, but has the ability to track multiple enemy boats, decide which is nearest and therefore the biggest threat, and fire at it while continuing to track the other boats. When the first boat is destroyed, it is ready to begin firing on the second one, and then the third, etc.

What China Xinshidai Company, which is owned by the government of China, offered was a large Fast Gunboat (FGB), which would have just such a system, which none of the navy’s other large gunboats had. Anyone who knows anything about modern weapons knows that the cost of this system alone would be in the range of three million dollars. The Junaid Committee said so in its report. The cost of the entire FGB was nine and a half (9.6) million dollars.

It is very significant that the offer was made directly to the Ministry of Defence, and was passed on to the navy. This was not a deal brought in by any officer or group of officers. If there was a fraud involved, then the government of China, the Ministry of Defence, and diplomats on both sides were also involved.

Vice Admiral Tissera appointed the 5-member committee to look into the suitability of the ships. The committee took its time, deliberating and evaluating for some six months before making the recommendation. Tissera, who had attended several meetings with Chinese officials, was satisfied and recommended that the ministry purchase the vessel. In the end, the deal was signed in Beijing by our High Commissioner, the much respected Bernard Gunatilleke. Tissera signed another part of the agreement in Colombo.

On January 1, 2001, Tissera retired and Sandagiri was appointed Commander. Within fourteen days, he ordered that the deal be scrapped, together with every other major warship deal which Tissera had set in motion. Sandagiri said publicly that the former commander had kept him in the dark, although he had been the Chief of Staff. This is not at all correct, since The Island is in possession of documents which show that Sandagiri was indeed involved in such matters. One deal which Sandagiri scrapped was the setting up of an Air Wing in the Navy. Yet, while he was Chief of Staff, he had given an interview to the well known magazine Flight International, where he spoke at length on the navy’s grand plans for an Air Wing.

It is clear from this, and various other comments made by Sandagiri, that he was not on the best of terms with Tissera, and his actions were influenced by this strained relationship.

It is also strange that Sandagiri, who claims he was not kept informed, managed to evaluate the Chinese deal within a matter of only fourteen days of taking office, amid the many duties of taking over ceremonies and having a war going on.

In scrapping the deal, Sandagiri drew parallels with gunboats bought by the navy from China in 1993, which cost 3.7 million dollars. This was entirely incorrect. In fact, the actual total cost of these vessels was six million dollars.

The 1993 vessels did not possess a modern Fire Control System. The new ship also included a devastating new weapon, a 130 mm Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL), which would fulfil a huge need in the navy the ability to bombard shore positions from a 10 kilometre range. Current naval guns fire their shots in a flat or straight path, which means that the enemy only has to duck behind a small hill or sand dune, and he is safe. Worse, he can then rain artillery and mortars over the hill on to the ships. The MBRL fires over such obstacles and rains down on the target. Aircraft could let the warships know if the firing is accurate. The MBRL had an Italian Fire Control System of its own.

A devastating weapon indeed, which the navy needs for gunfire support for the army. In addition, navy warships cannot operate close to the shore now because of the threat of mortars and artillery, which the MBRL could neutralize. The Mullaitivu coastline, now dominated by the LTTE in the manner in which the armed forces dominate Galle Face Green, would become a very unsafe place for the Tigers.

The 37 mm main guns were also fully automatic, as opposed to semi-automatic in the old vessels. This is a further vast improvement in firing speed.

The new boat also has the capability of night-fighting due to its many systems. This is vitally important, since the old manual weapons systems were at a huge disadvantage at night, and warships were extremely vulnerable to LTTE attack in the darkness, a fact which the Sea Tigers fully exploited.

The engines themselves are German, with American generators, as against the unreliable Chinese ones in the old ships. Simply put, the new FGB’s would break down far less often, and the engines would last for many more years. There was also an Italian navigation radar system.

A complete set of spare parts was also offered for the new boats, which the old boats didn’t have.

When Sandagiri cancelled the order, all these facts were communicated to the Defence Ministry and to Sandagiri by China Xinshidai Company itself, which noted: "Nobody will regard them as similar vessels." The company categorically denied paying commissions to anybody.

Also impressive was the payment plan, which saw the payment phased out over a 5-year period. This is extremely significant, since the country was already going bankrupt due to the war. Warships were needed, for which we could pay later. The old gunboats, in contrast, were 100 percent cash down.

Finally, there is the cost of inflation, which makes a vast difference between 1994 prices and year 2000 prices. The cost of the easy payment scheme would also be an additional increase.

Total up the cost of everything that is different from the 1994 boats and the year 2000 ones, and one comes to definitely more than nine million dollars.

The Junaid Committee, which also interviewed Tissera and Sandagiri, as well as the officers whom Sandagiri accused, came to the conclusion that each warship would cost 8.525 million dollars, which is about one million dollars less than the actual price. This is a far cry from the 3.7 million dollars that Sandagiri compared the new vessels to.

But the clincher is in the last line of the Junaid Committee report.

Referring to the charge that the officers responsible for consenting to a higher price than the price deserved by the company be identified, the Junaid Committee states: "Does not arise."

The Island has in its possession a vast range of documentation on this matter, which clearly exonerates the officers. Most important is the Junaid Committee report, which is dated July 12th 2001.

Given the fact that the alleged controversy was first brought up by Sandagiri in January 2001, and that the Junaid Committee dispelled all doubts by July 2001, the mudslinging against the senior officers more than a year later was clearly a calculated one. The question that remains unanswered is by whom it was done. The beneficiaries of the mudslinging, on the other hand, are in plain sight for all to see.