By Tisaranee Gunasekara

"Self-closed, all-repelling: what Demon
Hath form’d this abominable void
This soul-shuddring vacuum?’’
— William Blake (The First book of Urizen)

At the beginning it seemed like a yet another low comedy characteristic of current Sri Lankan politics, one more silly fracas between an infantile president and an equally infantile pair of ministers. And then came a sudden inexplicable change; the juvenile spat became a serious political conflict, threatening the fragile politico-economic stability of Sri Lanka.

Dr. Theodore Stephanides, one of the most memorable characters in Gerald Durrel’s "My Family and Other Animals," would follow his fantastic anecdotes about life in the Island of Corfu with the phrase "here in Corfu, anything can happen...." The same I think goes for Sri Lanka, especially concerning things which are bad, inane, and counterproductive. Given the prevailing politico-economic-military conditions, no sane person would think twice about the advisability of a political civil war between the two major democratic formations, the UNF and the PA. Sri Lanka does not need, cannot afford another election, not now, not next year, not for a considerable time. Nor does she need a vicious conflict between the president and the regime and the resultant constitutional crisis.

An important lesson from our recent history is that instability in the South can have a more devastating effect on the democratic system and the economy than the war in the North. A political civil war between the UNF and the PA can be far more damaging to the country and the economy than all the bombs of the LTTE. But this is Sri Lanka and nothing stupid, insane or suicidal is alien to our political class.

Logically it is hard to see how an election in the foreseeable future can bring about greater stability. Given the prevailing political situation it is almost certain that a snap poll will return a parliament which is even more fractious, making the two major parties more dependent on the whims and fancies of smaller parties. After all neither the UNF nor the PA has performed satisfactorily since December 2001 election. The last few months have seen the denting of the UNP’s reputation for efficiency; the growing consensus is that the UNF administration is almost as inefficient as the PA. Consequently there is less hope of an improvement in the economy and in the living standards of the people, the kind of rapid advance the country witnessed in 1977, under JR Jayewardene and in 1990 under Ranasinghe Premadasa. There is also widespread opposition to some of the intended privatizations, particularly of the Insurance Corporation, the Banks and the CEB while the pruning of pro-people programmes such as President Premadasa’s free school uniforms programme has created a great deal of sullen discontent among a sizeable segment of the electorate. Moreover, according to the latest polls, there is a considerable decrease of Southern support for the peace process. The PA is embroiled in internal problems while the president is obviously supportive of the economic policies of the Wickremesinghe administration (hardly surprising given that the UNF is continuing with the neo-liberal strategy the PA adhered to during its seven year rule).

There are other reasons why another election will only serve to compound the country’s problems. Given the state of our economy an election costing billions of rupees will exacerbate the financial crisis - and will result in more burdens being heaped on the populace afterwards. And for the duration of the election the two major parties would be focusing on each other to the exclusion of all else, including the situation in the North and the East. Historically elections times have been the favourite hunting seasons of the Tigers and they may well decide to deal the knockout blow to the Lankan state knowing full well that its capacity of defence would be at a minimum during an election period. Equally unhelpful to the country, the people and the economy would be a constitutional crisis because it would usher in a period of legal wrangles, constitutional debates, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations - in other words a time of extreme political instability and uncertainty. Once again the focus would be on Southern politics giving the LTTE an even freer run than it has now in the North and the East, thereby further helping the ongoing process of creeping Eelamisation.

The LTTE’s game

That the conflict that is taking shape will only benefit the LTTE should be clear even to the meanest intelligence. The LTTE would obviously know that given the nature of the Sri Lankan constitution and the prevailing political balance any attempt (election/constitutional amendment/impeachment) to get rid of the president or curtail presidential powers would not have a quick resolution. It will give rise to a protracted politico-constitutional deadlock cum battle which would weaken both the major combatants and make them even less capable of dealing with the serious challenges facing the country. It would also impact disastrously on the democratic system, the economy and the capacity of the Lankan state to defend itself. Consequently such a political conflict would do half the job of the LTTE for it, by seriously undermining the capacity and the willingness of Sri Lanka to resist the ongoing attempts by the Tigers to set up their own separate state. The LTTE strategy of getting the Lankan state to create the conditions for its own decapitation is similar to the "Trojan horse policy of eroding Austrian independence and undermining the Austrian state from within" the Nazis followed so successfully.

No wonder the LTTE is a firm opponent of consensual politics and a vocal advocate of an all out confrontation between the president and the regime. The line was first articulated by Mr. Pirapaharan at his justly famous press conference: "We do not think that Ranil Wickremesinghe is capable of addressing the core issues and offer us a permanent solution at this stage; because the executive powers of governance are vested with the president and his powers are limited to parliament ... But we wish to insist that Ranil’s government is not politically stable or authoritative or powerful enough to take up the core demands of the Tamils and offer us a permanent solution." In the last few weeks this line was brought to the fore and turned into a conditionality for the ``success’’ of the peace process by LTTE propagandists. For example according to the Tamil Guardian of August 7, 2002 "Mr. Wickremesinghe’s government is now in a fight for its survival and the longer term future of the peace process depends undoubtedly on the UNF’s absolute command of Sri Lanka’s governance" (emphasis mine).

The Wickremesinghe administration’s sudden conversion to confrontational politics is thus one more attempt to appease the LTTE at any cost by doing its bidding. After all the Wickremesinghe administration commenced its rule with unreciprocated giveaways - from the removal of checkpoints to the sabotaging of the Army’s highly successful Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), even before the signing of the MoU. These first acts of the new regime indicated its very essence - that it would base its survival not on improving conditions in the South but on keeping the LTTE happy. In the last 8 months there has been no discernible improvement in the South - either politically or economically or socially. In fact the South is in the same state of stagnation it was under the seven year PA rule. The focus of the regime has been on the North, with absolute priority accorded to keeping the LTTE happy by acceding to any and all demands. And in this regard the Tigers are like the Nazis: "one concession from a yielding opponent must lead quickly to another." (The Rise and the Fall of the Third Reich - William Shirer).

The latest act of capitulation concerning the LTTE’s demand for a free sea lane would doubtless be followed by more demands and more capitulations. The current hardline of the Wickremesinghe administration with its potential for self-destabilisation thus can be understood only in the context of the LTTE’s agenda and the regimes determination not to hinder that agenda for fear of antagonizing the Tigers.

Permanent instability

Let me digress a bit and go back in time to what the LTTE did in the last week of April 1993. The then SLFP-DUNF Opposition’s anti-Premadasa campaign had reached new heights in the context of the Provincial Council elections. Suddenly Lalith Athulathmudali was killed; and as was the practice during that time the Opposition immediately blamed President Premadasa. The fact that the body of the assassin was discovered a couple of days later (he was injured and committed suicide by taking the usual cyanide capsule) did not matter. The polarization in the South escalated making President Premadasa feel that he had to attend the UNP’s May Day rally of the UNP despite the security warnings. This enabled the long time LTTE plant Babu to kill him. By using and indeed exacerbating the dissension among Southern democratic politicians the LTTE made two perfect hits.

The Tigers have always made a practice of fishing in troubled Southern waters. Since Southern politics are habitually polarized along party lines the LTTE has infinite opportunities to engage in this practice.

This is clearly what the LTTE is trying to do now. The end result would be permanent instability in the South, with predictably devastating effects on politics, the economy and civil life. The impact on a still weak economy would be particularly severe, especially given international economic trends such as the spreading of the Argentine contagion to Brazil and the possibility of a double-dip recession in the US. The resultant generalized weakening of the South would certainly be in the interests of the LTTE. The Tigers would also be able to continue with their military preparations unhindered, unheeded, as the attention of every major player, from the political and military leadership to the media is focused on the South. So while the two major democratic forces battle it out like two inane juvenile delinquents in the South, in the North the LTTE can make the final preparations for the coming war and the setting up of its separate kingdom.

And when that task is done, the continuous Southern political civil war would give the LTTE the perfect excuse to exit the peace process, with minimum international opprobrium. Given the preoccupation of the Lankan leaders, the LTTE would be able to wreak havoc in the North and the South with minimum resistance and maximum effect. Even after such a devastating blow, the bitter hatred between the UNF and the PA leaders would mean that our capacity for effective politico-military resistance (let alone a counter-attack) would be at a minimum. As Mr. Pirapaharan’s juggernaut subjugates the North and the East, the blame game would continue in the South. The president would focus on using the situation to get rid of the UNF (and making her brother the PM) while Mr. Wickremesinghe would focus on keeping governmental power and/or hanging on to the party leadership. Meanwhile an Eelam would be in the making.