by Neville Ladduwahetty
Talks have started in Thailand. Of all the issues that would be addressed at the talks, the most critical would be the political solution that would determine the future structure of the Sri Lankan state. Widely expressed opinion has it that the primary cause of the conflict that has resulted in two decades of war is majoritarianism of the Sinhala dominated Governments. If majoritarianism is to be accepted as the cause, the creation of two regions of ethnic concentration one with a Sinhala majority and another with a Tamil majority, each with its own mix of minorities, is not a solution because it only duplicates the problems of majoritarianism.

If the primary cause for the current conflict has been Sinhala majoritarianism, it must follow then that adequate safeguards to protect minorities from the excesses of Sinhala-led Governments did not exist, do not currently exist, or what exists is not to the satisfaction of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. Whatever the case may be, the solution sought by them is not to create a homogeneous region for the Sri Lankan Tamils only, but to create a region in which they are the majority, with other minorities. The presumption then, is that Sri Lankan Tamils have the capacity to prevent minorities in their region from being subjected to the negative effects of majoritarianism, while the Sinhalese are incapable of doing so nationally.

The Sri Lankan Tamils sought a federal solution in 1949 long before they encountered any effects of Sinhala majoritarianism. Over the years this evolved into a demand for a separate state in 1977. A separate region for Sri Lankan Tamils would mean freedom from Sinhala majoritarianism only for those within that region. The rest who live outside such a region, who today amount to more than half the Sri Lankan Tamil community, would still be subjected to Sinhala majoritarianism. Notwithstanding this anomalous situation, the focus of the discourse has been on the nature of the regional arrangements as a solution to Sinhala majoritarianism.

Regional approach

A single region consisting of the Northern and Eastern provinces would result in a Sri Lankan Tamil majority of 65% and a minority mix of 35% (1981 census). What of this 35% minority in such a region? Would they not be victims of Sri Lankan Tamil majoritarianism? The issue of whether the Sri Lankan Tamils have a claim, legitimate or otherwise, to such a single region has no relevance. What is relevant is whether adequate institutional and structural arrangements would be formulated and implemented by the Sri Lankan Tamils to protect the minorities in the region. If measures to protect minorities can be instituted in one region, it should be possible to implement them nationally so that all minorities anywhere could benefit from such measures. Based on this rationale, there is absolutely no justification for creating a majority region for only part of the Sri Lankan Tamil community.

If the Northern and Eastern provinces are separated, the Sri Lankan Tamils would be a majority of 86% in the Northern province. However, even here, they are not uniformly distributed. The impression of a near homogeneous character is a distortion. For instance, the Sri Lankan Tamils are a bare majority of 51% in the district of Mannar, and they are 57% majority in Vavuniya. Therefore, in the regional context of a province, the minorities would be submerged and the majoritarianism of 86% would prevail. The issue of protection of minorities has not lost its relevance because the size of the unit has changed, or because they have become manageable.

There may be other territorial configurations under which the Sri Lankan Tamils would be a majority. However, since they cannot be 100% homogeneous under any configuration, how can the negative effects of majoritarianism on minorities be avoided? Many academics, analysts, and concerned citizens have offered solutions that result in regions of concentration for Sri Lankan Tamils as a solution to Sinhala majoritarianism, without addressing how minorities trapped in those regions could protect themselves from the excesses of Sri Lankan Tamil majoritarianism.

Central power

The creation of two regions of concentration, one for the Sinhalese and one for the Tamils, leaves minorities in each region victims of majoritarianism. Each region would address minority issues as it deems fit, unless central power has the authority to intervene. Uniformity of policies relating to minorities can only be realized by addressing these issues at the center. Even if such policies are centrally formulated, variation in the interpretation and implementation of central legislation would result in minorities in different regions undergoing varying experiences.

Under these circumstances, it is only a strong central Government that can enforce uniform policy, a fact recognized by federally constituted states such as the United States and India. "The two most successful multi-multi democracies, India and the United States, both rely on very strong central government powers, and it is difficult to envision a Europe in which a European central government could emulate the civil rights actions of Eisenhower in Little Rock or Kennedy in Alabama, or, as in India, dismiss an elected state government and proclaim a period of direct rule". (Harvard International Review, Summer 2002, Vol. XXIV. No.2, p61).

Since the Sri Lankan Government’s intention is to grant maximum devolution to a region of Sri Lankan Tamil concentration, as stated by Minister G.L. Pieris in Thailand, the Government in Colombo would not have the authority to intervene about the plight of minorities or to enforce its writ in the event of preferential treatment being given to local applicants over those from outside regarding employment or allocation of land, or any other constitutional violations. The result would be to freeze ethnic concentrations. In this regard the experience of Yugoslavia is relevant. The unravelling of Yugoslavia started "...when several republics defied the federal constitution in order to deny equality of rights to and actively discriminate against Yugoslav citizens from other republics"(Ibid).

The consequence of extreme devolution to a region of Sri Lankan Tamil concentration would be to weaken its relationship with the center. The natural outcome would be the emergence of two linguistic regions. Whether they evolve into two sovereign nation states is not material to the inhabitants of the two regions. As far as their daily lives are concerned their activities would be confined to each region - a divided country to all intents and purposes. This is what is in store for Sri Lanka judging from the unfolding of events.

Identifying regions

It was the Sri Lankan Tamil elite and political leadership who sought a regional approach as a solution to Sinhala majoritarianism. Instead of attempting to negotiate arrangements that would mitigate the effects of Sinhala majoritarianism they sought an approach that would transform them from a national minority to a regional majority. Knowing that the issue involved had more to do with ambition and their place and role in the politics of the country, successive Governments attempted to accommodate Tamil demands within the concerns of the Sinhalese. Consequently, no alternative approach that would address the issue of majoritarianism was ever sought. Thus the problem remains unsolved to this day.

The approach pursued presumes that by creating two regions of concentration, one for the Sinhalese and one for the Tamils, the problems of majoritarianism are automatically solved. The fact that problems of minorities trapped in each region would simply be duplicated does not seem to concern anyone in particular, least of all those who profess to be advocates of Human Rights. From a Human Rights standpoint the emphasis over the last two decades should have been on the fate of minorities arising from the excesses of majoritarianism, and not in finding solutions to satisfy the imaginations of a few.

Since the solution sought involves the creation of a region where the Sri Lankan Tamils are a majority, the identification of such a region becomes germane to the issue. For instance, such a region should not be identified on arbitrary or historical claims and counter claims. Nor should it be determined on the basis of agreements reached at negotiations. Instead, it should be based on the democratic principle of the consent of the people involved.

In the past, parties to negotiations have attempted to identify regions in which the Sri Lankan Tamils could exercise political control. Decisions based on such elitist approaches should be abandoned for more enlightened concepts that demand that vital decisions that affect the lives of all the Peoples within as well as outside such a region, are based on their expressed will. The Government and in particular those associated with the negotiations have the responsibility to ensure that the region in which the representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamil community, elected or not, are to exercise political power whether on an interim or on a permanent basis, should be based on the expressed will of the people at a referendum in the Northern and Eastern provinces pursuant to the provisions in the Provincial Councils Act, No.42 of 1987. Furthermore, the powers to be devolved should be negotiated ONLY after having established the region to which the powers apply.

Conclusion

The claim that majoritarianism was the cause for the conflict in Sri Lanka is not valid because the Sri Lankan Tamil leadership had sought a political arrangement wherein they would be a majority as early as 1949, many years prior to the introduction of any majoritarian policies by Sinhala-led Governments. Furthermore, at no time have attempts been initiated by them to counter the effects of majoritarianism. Instead, from the outset they looked for ways to transform their political status. "Without a federal system the Tamils, Chelvanayakam asserted, would remain ‰Û÷a voiceless minority’ living ‰Û÷in an atmosphere of inferiority’ with their self-confidence weakened..."(Wilson, "S. J. V. Chelvanayakam" 1994, p 31).

It is understandable that the Sri Lankan Tamils should attempt to retain their pre-Independence position of influence and privilege in the changing political landscape of independent Sri Lanka. Sharing political power on an equal basis (50/50) between 75% Sinhala majority and a 25% collective minority was one such attempt. Since these attempts were not based on principles of democracy, human rights, and other universally recognized norms they had no moral validity. Claiming territory on the basis of longevity of domicile at some point in history also loses validity in the light of counter claims based on other points in history. Therefore, the only legitimate basis for establishing a Sri Lankan Tamil majority region is with the collaboration and consent of those who wish to be identified with such a region. Under no circumstances should such a region be established on the basis of arbitrary claims or deals struck by past or present elites.

The powers to be devolved should be negotiated ONLY AFTER defining the region to which the powers should apply. Therefore, the Government has the duty and the responsibility to the Sri Lankan nation not to delay any further the determination of the boundaries of the respective regions to which powers are to be devolved. Furthermore, no transitional arrangements should be introduced until these boundaries are democratically established.