by Sumanasiri Liyanage
Developments that have taken place since the third round of peace talks between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) held in Oslo may raise serious doubts about the future of peace negotiations in Oslo, the LTTE expressed its readiness to explore the possibility of a federal solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. This raised hopes; and the analysts read this as a definite turning point in peace negotiations. However, things began to change after the Oslo talks. Two events are of great importance in the analysis of recent developments. First, the withdrawal of the LTTE from the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN), and the second, the incident in which three LTTE cadres blew up themselves and the boat they were travelling in after they were allegedly found smuggling arms, ammunition and communication equipment. Although the GOSL and the LTTE gave little publicity to both these events, one might wonder about what the repercussions would be. What would be their implications for future talks and for the peace process in general? This article intends to look at these developments and partially answer those questions.

Two incidents

Prior to the fourth round of talks held in Thailand, a tension between two conflicting parties engaged in the negotiations to find a political solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict began to mount. The growing tension between the GOSL and the LTTE was reflected in the decision of the LTTE to move out from the SDN that is supposed to deal with the issue of High Security Zones (HSZs). The LTTE demanded at the SDN deliberations that the GOSL security forces should withdraw from Valikamam area that was converted into HSZs, and thus facilitating the resettlement of about 100,000 internally displaced people (IDPs). This is a justifiable demand from a humanitarian and rights based perspective. As I have discussed elsewhere, ways and means have to be devised as soon as possible so that these IDPs can return home and start their normal lives. However, it is natural for the security forces to raise their concern that the withdrawal of the security forces from those areas would be strategically disadvantageous for the security forces in case of the resumption of armed hostilities. So Major General Sarath Fonseka at the request of the Ministry of Defence prepared a detailed report in which he presented the case of the security forces, their fears and concerns and suggested that any withdrawal of the security forces from the HSZs should be linked to a decommissioning of long range weapons possessed by the LTTE. The LTTE responded angrily saying that it is not even prepared to consider any form of decommissioning. Anton Balsingham, the chief negotiator of the LTTE stated on January 9, 2003 that "disarming of our cadres or decommissioning of our weapons at this stage without a permanent settlement is suicidal on our part because military power is the bargaining power of the Tamils". Both parties can easily justify their positions.

The matter was not resolved; but both parties agreed to begin rehabilitation first outside the HSZs. The GOSL said it would get an expert opinion on the subject and reconsider its position in the light of the expert advise. Following this, the GOSL sought the advice of a retired Indian Army Commander, Sathis Nambiar. It was reported that he would present his report in couple of days. Joseph Pararajasingham Tamil National Alliance MP has already questioned Nambiar’s impartiality. Nambiar’s report may not lead to an amicable solution to the issue at stake. So this will remain a contentious issue in future talks. It will be an issue that the two conflicting parties cannot avoid discussing, not because of its humanitarian dimension (I doubt that the two parties have serious concerns about humanitarian issues) but because of its strategic importance to both.

The second incident seems to be more serious; and if we look at past experience, it is a kind of event that had preceded the collapse of peace processes in the past. Just before the commencement of the fifth round of talks in Berlin, the negotiators and Norwegian mediators had to deal with an incident that had taken place in the Sri Lankan territorial waters near Delft. Three Tamil Tiger cadres blew themselves up destroying their boat, after they were allegedly found trying to smuggle an anti-aircraft gun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition into Sri Lanka. Two members of the SLMM escaped narrowly by jumping into the sea before the boat was blown up. From the Intercontinental Hotel in Berlin, Norwegians, on behalf of the two parties, issued a carefully worded statement; and both parties stated that the incident would not derail the ongoing peace talks.

Imminent collapse?

Will these two incidents lead to an imminent collapse of the ongoing peace talks? My answer is ‘no’ for two main reasons. First the way in which the two parties responded to the events show that both parties do not want to, under the prevailing circumstances, withdraw from the process. Moreover, both parties seem to think that it is to their own advantage to keep the process going on for some time. A survey has revealed that the LTTE obtained Rs 3 billion from ‘taxation’ alone. The GOSL seems to believe that peace is the only hope for economic recovery in the country; and its peace record is the only positive thing it can talk about in its one year in office. The LTTE knows that in the light of information released by the SLMM to the international press, it is on a bad wicket over the second incident. Scandinavian monitors on Sunday rejected denials by Tamil Tiger rebels and said they had been caught smuggling arms and ammunition into Sri Lanka in violation of a cease-fire brokered by Norway. So I do not believe that the two events had not disrupted the peace process because of the trust the two parties had built in the past. Trust-building in conflict resolution is a highly exaggerated phenomenon. The success of any peace process depends on ground realities and the pressures of the situation. The current ground situation, nationally and internationally, does not allow the parties to resume military confrontation even if the talks are temporarily brought to a halt. Nationally, the continuation of the talks and the process give certain political and financial advantages to the two parties. One, the resumption of war may be difficult given the current world situation. Secondly, the presence of a common enemy; in this case the president of Sri Lanka. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s United National Front and the LTTE know that they have to face a formidable opposition. Under the 1978 constitution, the president has enormous power that can be exercised if she wishes to do so. The way the president has acted with regard to the second incident shows that she does not want to be seen as a party that caused the collapse of the peace process. Her instructions as a commander of the Sri Lankan security forces to the Navy commander says that the LTTE cadres be released after written assurance. In her words:

"This is developing into a very serious situation. Your instructions regarding action to be taken on the present issue are as follows:

1. Take into custody all weapons/ammunition and military sensitive equipment together with the boats.

2. In view of the ongoing efforts at negotiations between the government and the LTTE, the LTTE cadres may be released after obtaining from them a written agreement that they will not engage in such activities in the future."

Process dynamism

My analysis leads me to believe that the process will not collapse in the immediate future despite some of these adverse developments since the third round of talks. However, the process seems to have lost its momentum after the third round in Oslo. The Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vidar Helgessen, had to accept this when he summed up the deliberations in these words: "It hasn’t been a historic meeting in parallel with the Olso meeting last month, but history is in the making and that requires a lot of hard work in a very constructive manner." V S Sambandan in Frontline wrote;

Yet, for the first time in four months of negotiations in the latest attempt to find peace in the war-torn island, Colombo and the LTTE made public certain differences of opinion. In the run-up to the fourth round, held in the riverside resort of Nakorn Pathom in Thailand, the "federal compromise" that was agreed upon in December 2002 at the Oslo round was overtaken by serious differences of opinion between the Army and the LTTE over what is often a sensitive issue in any conflict resolution process—the disarmament of rebels.

The way in which issues were taken up in the last three rounds of talks appears to be unsatisfactory. Of course the issues of federalism (Oslo talks), gender participation (Thai talks), human rights and child soldiers (Berlin talks) were taken up not in a substantive manner but in a cosmetic fashion. The burning issue of the Muslim question seems to have been shoved under the carpet. It seems to be that the two parties are in agreement over the idea that the process should project not substantive issues but attempt to satisfy the donor community. The communique issued after the Berlin summit also stressed the need of international assistance. "The parties once again appealed to the international Community to make funds available for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation need", the joint statement said. "Sri Lanka’s peace process is a refreshing example to the world and we appeal with one voice for aid to rebuild the country," government chief envoy Gamini Lakshman Peiris said. In this sense talks scheduled to be held in Japan would be important.

The other adverse development is that the parties have started blaming each other for the sea incident. Although Anton Balasingham realised the need to tread softly at the present conjuncture, the LTTE political office issued a strong statement about the incident. The Voice of Tigers in its broadcast said. "Failure of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to handle the incident in a fair and responsible manner, and the provocative, belligerent conduct of the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) have resulted in three of our cadres taking their own lives."

The dynamism of the process does not show positive signs although the two parties have reassured that they are committed to the process. Although I don’t foresee a collapse in the immediate future the continuation of the process leading up to a transformation of the conflict have now become more problematic.
(Dr. Liyanage is a senior lecturer in economics)