By Our Defence Correspondent
As the country celebrated the first anniversary of the Ceasefire Agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, the Tigers themselves remained conspicuously silent regarding the anniversary.

In fact, in the last two weeks, the LTTE has gone out of its way to directly criticize the Ceasefire Agreement, charging that the government has not kept its part of the agreement and has not implemented several aspects of it.

Both the Voice of the Tigers and Tamilnet have not made much mention of the anniversary, which is a key indication the LTTE’s change in attitude towards the Ceasefire Agreement, and also towards the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which has been highly critical of the LTTE’s role in recent incidents, namely the Delft boat, Manipay belts, and Mullaitivu firing incidents. The LTTE is not happy that it was the SLMM which discovered the hidden weapons on board the boat at Delft.

The government has chosen to ignore the warning signs that the LTTE has begun sending out. It does so at its peril, and the country’s peril.

The pattern that the LTTE is setting is very similar to that of March 1995. At the time, the LTTE leadership launched a strong publicity campaign criticizing the peace talks, and pointing out that nothing substantial had been achieved. During the first two weeks of April 1995, the LTTE went silent, and then on April 19, launched an all out war.

However, with the international situation being what it is, there are no indications that the LTTE is contemplating resuming the war in the near future. What is clear is that the Tigers are presenting the peace talks with many stumbling blocks, which are aimed at toughening their own stand and softening up the government. Velupillai Prabhakaran is playing poker with the peace talks and waiting for the government to back down.

The key strategy of the Tigers is to have continuous rumblings of dissatisfaction, by creating minor incidents and then blowing them out of proportion. Last week’s incident at Manipay, where a simple matter of wearing LTTE belts became a major clash involving hundreds of police, soldiers, LTTE cadres and civilians, is the best example. The incident was clearly orchestrated by the Tigers.

This week’s incident of the Sea Tigers conducting live firing exercises off Mullaitivu, in full view of the Navy and monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, is another case in point. It is simply not necessary for the Sea Tigers to conduct such exercises, or they would have done so regularly during the last year, which they have not. The incident was clearly intended to put further pressure on the peace talks, by showing the LTTE to be assuming a more war-like posture.

Other recent incidents include the LTTE ban on the ceremonial opening of the Jaffna Library, which also put pressure on the TULF, which is the most popular political party in Jaffna.

The Tigers in fact regard the beginning of the ceasefire to be the 25th of December 2001, which was when they began their unilateral ceasefire, which was reciprocated by the government. This ceasefire was extended twice, and led into the official Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed in the presence of Norwegian government officials.

With one year of peace having gone by, it is pertinent to take a look at what exactly has been achieved between the two sides during this time.

The Ceasefire itself has held, mainly due to the fact that neither side wants war at this time. Incidents have taken place regularly, and there have been isolated deaths of soldiers and LTTE cadres, although no Tigers have been killed by armed forces actions. However, the incidents have been contained within a few days. However, there has been no real betterment of the situation, as compared to a year ago.

The situation at sea, in contrast to that on land, has deteriorated sharply in the last few weeks, with the SLMM refusing to search LTTE vessels intercepted by the Navy. In the present context, the next LTTE boat sighted by the navy could even be fired upon if it refuses to stop. No instructions have been given by the Defence Ministry or Navy Headquarters on how sailors are to search LTTE boats, since going close to such boats runs the risk of the Tigers blowing up themselves and the navy boats.

The LTTE has completed most of their re-arming, with several shiploads of weapons and ammunition having being brought in. But the massive recruitment of new cadres, which Intelligence has reported to the President has reached 10,000 but other reports suggest is somewhat less, has caused a problem of training and dilution of fighting skills and experience among the LTTE’s rank and file. The Tigers need at least another six months to make the majority of these cadres fully operational, and it may actually take almost a year. What this means is that the LTTE is not likely to think of going back to war in 2003.

The armed forces, for their part, have become dangerously lax in their preparedness. Complacency is the order of the day. In operational terms, the Sri Lanka Army is almost completely unprepared for a new conflict. During the surprise attacks by the Tigers in 1990 and 1995, the army took up to six months to go from its defensive posture into an offensive one, reeling under the hammering it was receiving at the time from the LTTE attacks. The same can be expected in the future.

In contrast, the LTTE has completed its planning for any attack, and it is most likely that, unlike on previous occasions, the initial wave of attacks would mainly be carried out by Black Tigers targeting economic installations in and around Colombo and key political leaders. This is likely to be followed up with massive assaults on key military camps in the Northeast, leading to the ultimate prize of capturing Jaffna.

With almost all checkpoints outside the Northeast having been dismantled, and no proper intelligence-gathering activities in and around Colombo, the army and police would have to divert massive resources to stem the Black Tiger attacks in Colombo, leaving few troops to reinforce those already in the Northeast.

The Air Force and Navy are also in a situation of complacency. But both would react much faster than the Army and Police. The Air Force would be ready for offensive action within a few days, while the Navy would take several weeks.

However, one area that has not been looked at is the political fallout of a resumption of hostilities. President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga would most likely move to take immediate control of the situation, and judging by her strained relations with Defence Minister Tilak Marapana, would almost certainly remove the Minister and appoint a new one. What role the Prime Minister would be able to play in such a scenario is not at all clear, but the entire UNF government would be in danger of being dismissed by the President.

The significant aspect of the last one year has been that little has been achieved in terms of progress towards a permanent solution to the problem. The government has proposed devolution of powers, but the LTTE has not given a concrete reply, either accepting or rejecting the proposals. This situation has been swept under the carpet by both sides repeating that a long-term solution will take much time to negotiate, and that the immediate requirement is to make living conditions in the Northeast better for all civilians living there. The living conditions themselves have become much better, mainly thanks to the opening of road links which has allowed traders to bring goods overland. The reconstruction of the Jaffna A9 road is expected to be completed early next year, and would facilitate this even further.

However, the key issue of LTTE taxes on goods keeping prices high in the Northeast, has not been addressed at all. The Tigers won’t budge on the issue, and the government has no clue how to pressurize the Tigers to stop taxing traders.