The government’s ministerial delegation to the
Geneva round will meet President Mahinda Rajapakse for a full
debriefing today before addressing the media on the results of
this much-awaited confab, official sources said.
Meanwhile, a delegation source reveals that the
atmosphere on the first day of deliberations had been strained
and almost hostile. "The first day was a little tough and
strained," he said. "Nevertheless, it worked out well."
The two sides did not meet at common receptions
but were regularly "bumping into each other". This had helped
improve relations. "We met in corridors and all that," the
source noted. "There was mixing around. Some people know the
LTTE delegation from before. Later, Anton Balasingham and Adele
presented copies of their books to members of the government
team."
"This was a new team under a new government,
meeting for the first time," he continued. "Earlier, there had
been six rounds of negotiations and the two parties had measured
each other up. The first day was difficult but things improved."
Despite trepidation over the president’s choice
of negotiators, the team that met the LTTE at Chateau de Bossey
had been "very much better prepared than the LTTE," the source
claimed.
"Only two subjects were taken up for discussion
but we were ready for more than eight," he said. "We were
equipped with an enormous amount of data and had prepared for
over one-and-a-half months. We had also agreed among ourselves
how each item would be handled."
Main issues aside, logistical matters had also
cropped up. The government had fielded a large support team
outside of the core group. As the talks progressed, the LTTE had
expressed some concern about the number of officials in the
room.
Earlier rounds of talks had seen the
participation of just ten members apiece (six main negotiators
and four in the second tier) and the LTTE had stuck to that
formula.
However, the Tigers later felt uncomfortable
with the large government team and had said so. They pointed out
that they, too, had eminent experts that they could have
involved.
"We told the Norwegians that we want the number
that we want," the source said. "Our contention was that we took
the talks seriously and that it was up to the LTTE to include
the experts that they preferred."
The talks started off with both sides "staking
theirs claims very clearly". "Our statement was not harsh but it
was strong and factual," another government source said. "If the
LTTE had wished to challenge our facts, we were prepared to give
credence to what we were saying."
At one stage, Nimal Siripala de Silva, head of
the government delegation, had read out details of LTTE
ceasefire violations complete with statistics. The LTTE had not
responded. "Had they done so, Inspector General of Police
Chandra Fernando was ready with further information," he
elaborated.
Most of the first day was spent on the inaugural
speeches and the issue of child soldiers. Towards close, LTTE
chief negotiator Anton Balasingham had said they wanted to take
up "paramilitaries" but agreed to postpone it till the next day
as there as no time.
When the question of "paramilitaries" was taken
up the next day, the government maintained the position that
they did not support any armed elements in areas under their
control. The LTTE responded that they had information to the
contrary. The government said they did not allow anybody other
than the army to be armed in those areas.
"Naturally, the two parties looked at the
subject in different ways," the source said. The final statement
saw the state agreeing to "ensure that no armed group or person
other than government security forces will carry arms or conduct
armed operations" in regions under their control. The government
also maintained the stance that they were not responsible for
any such activity in areas under LTTE-control. "We cannot go
after them (armed elements)," the delegation had stressed.
The LTTE had steadfastly resisted any efforts to
change the ceasefire, although the government had suggested it
and tried to clinch agreement. They even had specific proposals
for change, having prepared for any eventuality.
"Of course, we had known the LTTE’s position
earlier," one of the sources averred. "They stuck to their
stance that the ceasefire agreement was not up for amendment."
Agence France Press quotes Balasingham as saying that the
government had backed down only after the LTTE threatened to
walk out of the talks. The source put this down "to a bit
psychological warfare by Balasingham". It wasn’t possible to
independently verify this information.
There had been discussion, also, on the many
claymore mine and other attacks staged by the LTTE since
December. To this, Balasingham had cryptically responded: "In
war, yes, we kill soldiers. Our soldiers kill your soldiers in a
state of war." He didn’t explain the statement or why the
attacks had heightened during the past one-and-a-half months.
The LTTE undertook to stop the assaults as part of their renewed
adherence to the ceasefire agreement.