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Sri Lankan crisis: Sort out the mess before it affects India
by Maj-Gen Ashok K, Mehta (retd)

NATIONAL Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan’s uncharacteristic and unprecedentedly blunt message to Sri Lanka over seeking military supplies from China and Pakistan was aimed equally at them. After his meeting with Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi last month on the security of the Tamil Nadu coastline and Indian fishermen, in an interaction with the media, he reminded Lanka that "we are a big power in the region. We don’t want the Sri Lankan government (SLG) to go to Pakistan or China. Whatever be their requirements, they should come to us". He added that India would determine the needs and supply only defensive weapons.

Pakistan spokesperson Tasneem Aslam was quick to note India’s "hegemonistic tendencies" and failure to respect sovereign equality of the countries in the region. Compared to Sri Lanka’s subdued official response, there was an uproar in Colombo among the Sinhalese parties and retired service chiefs. Former Army Commander Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe said: "Pakistan and China have helped us in critical times. India should not tell us they created the LTTE."

This is the first time an Indian official has publicly ticked off Sri Lanka over what is apparently a country’s sovereign right — to choose and purchase weapons from outside. In an interview with Business Standard last week, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said: "When we are prepared to help Sri Lanka, why is there talk of going to others for help ?"

In 1988, Nepal had dared to skirt an MOU with India on arms purchase by importing anti-aircraft guns from China clandestinely. This led to an economic blockade by India which triggered the movement for the restoration of democracy. While acknowledging India as "our closest friend," the public reaction in Colombo amounted to telling India not to dictate terms. The message was clear: we will transact with countries that meet our requirement. It hinted that while Delhi periodically reiterates its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, it does not entirely meet its obligation.

Ever since the fall of Elephant Pass to the LTTE in 2000, New Delhi has been ambivalent about military support to Colombo. The situation in May 2000 in the Jaffna peninsula came to such a pass that the Sri Lankan government pleaded for military assistance in the event its military garrison had to be evacuated. But India gave no assurance. Instead of providing tanks, guns and aircraft as sought, India agreed to provide economic aid and a line of credit for $100 m. The compulsions of coalition politics denied New Delhi any credible option in defusing the crisis.

Sri Lanka was forced to turn to Pakistan for the crucial multibarrel rocket launcher which saved Jaffna from being overwhelmed by the LTTE. Sri Lanka refers to Pakistan as a friend and saviour. It is the reflection of our diplomacy that after helping Sri Lanka in crushing a JVP insurrection in 1971, Colombo permitted the Pakistan Air Force to refuel its aircraft en route to East Pakistan prior to the showdown.

The India-Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) has been in the pipeline for six years. Many Defence Secretaries and Chiefs of Defence Staff from Colombo have had countless discussions with their counterparts in South Block but the DCA was allowed to die a natural death. Lanka, though, has not stopped asking for tanks, guns and aircraft and India has not budged from its policy of providing only defensive weapons like radars, mine protection vehicles, body armour and offshore patrol vessels. The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo has repeatedly told the Sri Lankan government that only defensive weapons are on offer and Colombo should keep off China and Pakistan.

Events leading to the present episode began with Mahinda Rajapakse assuming presidency in 2005. On his first visit to New Delhi in 2006, he gave Prime Minister Manmohan Singh a list of military requirements.

As there was no response from the PMO to the President’s wish list, Mr Rajapakse rang up Dr Singh and sent his brother, Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse, at least twice to Delhi where he met the usual lineup — the Defence Secretary, the Service Chiefs, the Defence Minister and Mr Narayanan. It appears he could not obtain a clear response to the President’s list. It was, as is usually the case, neither yes, nor no though Delhi had indicated through its High Commissioner in Colombo some difficulty in supplying offensive weapons. Yet President Rajapakse, during his second meeting earlier this year with Dr Singh, reminded him of the list he had given him.

Back in Delhi, in the wake of last month’s Tiger air attacks and amphibious assault on Delft Island, Mr Gothabaya Rajapakse met Mr Narayanan and reportedly told him that his country needed weapons "other than defensive" urgently — a request he and his President had made several times over — failing which they would be forced to approach China and Pakistan, an option they had exercised earlier. According to Sri Lankan sources, Defence Secretary Rajapakse explained the LTTE’s air threat as well as the latest amphibious attack on Delft Island and appealed for Indian intelligence inputs as well as a naval blockade for sea denial of the LTTE. This extraordinary request and an ultimatum to buy weapons from China and Pakistan rattled Mr Narayanan and led to his plain-speaking not from Delhi but Chennai.

Over time, the activation of the Delhi-Chennai-Colombo network has assumed a familiar pattern. Refugee arrivals from Lanka and casualties among Lanka Tamils in the East or Indian fishermen in Palk Straits raise the political temperature in Chennai. Mr Karunanidhi reacts by first calling Dr Singh and then travelling to Delhi to make the right noises with the top leadership, including Mr Narayanan. This is followed by Mr Narayanan going to Chennai and meeting Tamil Nadu leaders. When the situation warrants, the Foreign Secretary travels to Colombo, invariably making a reaffirmation of India’s commitment to Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While sticking to the pattern this time, Mr Narayanan deviated from the script by circumscribing Sri Lanka’s autonomy. Among other things, he said, "we will give whatever (weapons) we think is necessary", and added: "We are not involved in Sri Lanka’s war but we are deploying assets for our own security." There is considerable confusion still over coordinated patrolling between the Sri Lankan and Indian Navies. Defence Minister AK Antony said in Singapore last week: "India has made no commitment for coordinated patrolling at this stage" though Mr Narayanan has favoured establishing a unified command. All these problems, including the threat to India from Sea and Air Tigers, was discussed at a high-level security briefing last week chaired by the Defence Minister.

India’s advocacy of defensive weapons is designed to discourage a military solution which Sri Lanka is pursuing in the guise of fighting terrorism, since many Sinhalese contend there is no ethnic conflict any more. They believe it is imperative to weaken the LTTE militarily before engaging them in any talks. This is a myth being perpetuated by the Rajapakse regime.

As India has underwritten Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has the moral responsibility to sort out the mess in that country which endangers its own security.  (Courtesy: Tribune India)

 

 

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