NATIONAL Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan’s
uncharacteristic and unprecedentedly blunt message to Sri Lanka
over seeking military supplies from China and Pakistan was aimed
equally at them. After his meeting with Chief Minister M.
Karunanidhi last month on the security of the Tamil Nadu
coastline and Indian fishermen, in an interaction with the
media, he reminded Lanka that "we are a big power in the region.
We don’t want the Sri Lankan government (SLG) to go to Pakistan
or China. Whatever be their requirements, they should come to
us". He added that India would determine the needs and supply
only defensive weapons.
Pakistan spokesperson Tasneem Aslam was quick to
note India’s "hegemonistic tendencies" and failure to respect
sovereign equality of the countries in the region. Compared to
Sri Lanka’s subdued official response, there was an uproar in
Colombo among the Sinhalese parties and retired service chiefs.
Former Army Commander Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe said: "Pakistan
and China have helped us in critical times. India should not
tell us they created the LTTE."
This is the first time an Indian official has
publicly ticked off Sri Lanka over what is apparently a
country’s sovereign right — to choose and purchase weapons from
outside. In an interview with Business Standard last week,
Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said: "When we are prepared to
help Sri Lanka, why is there talk of going to others for help ?"
In 1988, Nepal had dared to skirt an MOU with
India on arms purchase by importing anti-aircraft guns from
China clandestinely. This led to an economic blockade by India
which triggered the movement for the restoration of democracy.
While acknowledging India as "our closest friend," the public
reaction in Colombo amounted to telling India not to dictate
terms. The message was clear: we will transact with countries
that meet our requirement. It hinted that while Delhi
periodically reiterates its commitment to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, it does not entirely meet
its obligation.
Ever since the fall of Elephant Pass to the LTTE
in 2000, New Delhi has been ambivalent about military support to
Colombo. The situation in May 2000 in the Jaffna peninsula came
to such a pass that the Sri Lankan government pleaded for
military assistance in the event its military garrison had to be
evacuated. But India gave no assurance. Instead of providing
tanks, guns and aircraft as sought, India agreed to provide
economic aid and a line of credit for $100 m. The compulsions of
coalition politics denied New Delhi any credible option in
defusing the crisis.
Sri Lanka was forced to turn to Pakistan for the
crucial multibarrel rocket launcher which saved Jaffna from
being overwhelmed by the LTTE. Sri Lanka refers to Pakistan as a
friend and saviour. It is the reflection of our diplomacy that
after helping Sri Lanka in crushing a JVP insurrection in 1971,
Colombo permitted the Pakistan Air Force to refuel its aircraft
en route to East Pakistan prior to the showdown.
The India-Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) has been in the pipeline for six years. Many
Defence Secretaries and Chiefs of Defence Staff from Colombo
have had countless discussions with their counterparts in South
Block but the DCA was allowed to die a natural death. Lanka,
though, has not stopped asking for tanks, guns and aircraft and
India has not budged from its policy of providing only defensive
weapons like radars, mine protection vehicles, body armour and
offshore patrol vessels. The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo
has repeatedly told the Sri Lankan government that only
defensive weapons are on offer and Colombo should keep off China
and Pakistan.
Events leading to the present episode began with
Mahinda Rajapakse assuming presidency in 2005. On his first
visit to New Delhi in 2006, he gave Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh a list of military requirements.
As there was no response from the PMO to the
President’s wish list, Mr Rajapakse rang up Dr Singh and sent
his brother, Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse, at least
twice to Delhi where he met the usual lineup — the Defence
Secretary, the Service Chiefs, the Defence Minister and Mr
Narayanan. It appears he could not obtain a clear response to
the President’s list. It was, as is usually the case, neither
yes, nor no though Delhi had indicated through its High
Commissioner in Colombo some difficulty in supplying offensive
weapons. Yet President Rajapakse, during his second meeting
earlier this year with Dr Singh, reminded him of the list he had
given him.
Back in Delhi, in the wake of last month’s Tiger
air attacks and amphibious assault on Delft Island, Mr Gothabaya
Rajapakse met Mr Narayanan and reportedly told him that his
country needed weapons "other than defensive" urgently — a
request he and his President had made several times over —
failing which they would be forced to approach China and
Pakistan, an option they had exercised earlier. According to Sri
Lankan sources, Defence Secretary Rajapakse explained the LTTE’s
air threat as well as the latest amphibious attack on Delft
Island and appealed for Indian intelligence inputs as well as a
naval blockade for sea denial of the LTTE. This extraordinary
request and an ultimatum to buy weapons from China and Pakistan
rattled Mr Narayanan and led to his plain-speaking not from
Delhi but Chennai.
Over time, the activation of the
Delhi-Chennai-Colombo network has assumed a familiar pattern.
Refugee arrivals from Lanka and casualties among Lanka Tamils in
the East or Indian fishermen in Palk Straits raise the political
temperature in Chennai. Mr Karunanidhi reacts by first calling
Dr Singh and then travelling to Delhi to make the right noises
with the top leadership, including Mr Narayanan. This is
followed by Mr Narayanan going to Chennai and meeting Tamil Nadu
leaders. When the situation warrants, the Foreign Secretary
travels to Colombo, invariably making a reaffirmation of India’s
commitment to Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
While sticking to the pattern this time, Mr
Narayanan deviated from the script by circumscribing Sri Lanka’s
autonomy. Among other things, he said, "we will give whatever
(weapons) we think is necessary", and added: "We are not
involved in Sri Lanka’s war but we are deploying assets for our
own security." There is considerable confusion still over
coordinated patrolling between the Sri Lankan and Indian Navies.
Defence Minister AK Antony said in Singapore last week: "India
has made no commitment for coordinated patrolling at this stage"
though Mr Narayanan has favoured establishing a unified command.
All these problems, including the threat to India from Sea and
Air Tigers, was discussed at a high-level security briefing last
week chaired by the Defence Minister.
India’s advocacy of defensive weapons is
designed to discourage a military solution which Sri Lanka is
pursuing in the guise of fighting terrorism, since many
Sinhalese contend there is no ethnic conflict any more. They
believe it is imperative to weaken the LTTE militarily before
engaging them in any talks. This is a myth being perpetuated by
the Rajapakse regime.
As India has underwritten Sri Lanka’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has the moral
responsibility to sort out the mess in that country which
endangers its own security. (Courtesy: Tribune India)