The Sri Lanka Air Force suffered its worst ever defeat during this week's attack on the Anuradhapura Air Base.

Although the official statement said only eight aircraft were destroyed, it is now quite clear that this is not the correct picture. A total of 17 aircraft were destroyed and one damaged, as was confirmed by announcements by the Opposition UNP on Thursday.

The attack did far more destruction in terms of aircraft lost, than the similar assault on the Katunayake SLAF base in July 2001.

However, Air Force Chief Air Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke was correct when he said that this raid does not affect the SLAF's main offensive capabilities. The SLAF's fleet of jet bombers is not based in Anuradhapura, and is therefore unscathed. The jets carried out several raids on LTTE targets in the days following the Anuradhapura attack.

In fact, the destruction at Anuradhapura would not have been so serious except for an unhappy coincidence. Suspecting a possible LTTE attack on the Hingurakgoda air base that night, the SLAF took the correct decision to rapidly move its fleet of MI17 transport helicopters to other bases. Several MI17s were sent to Anuradhapura, swelling the number of aircraft there.

The decision to move the choppers out of Hingurakgoda was in fact the correct one, given the suspicion that the base might come under attack. They certainly could not have been kept there, given the danger. The fact that they were moved to Anuradhapura, which then came under attack, is a failure on the part of intelligence and the officers at Anuradhapura.

In hindsight perhaps, it would have been better to move the choppers further away from the Northeast. Yet, Anuradhapura should have been much safer than other bases such as Katunayake, Ratmalana, Katukurunda, Sigiriya, Vavuniya and Kalpitiya. In fact, the ancient capital of Sri Lanka is very much a military city, with a huge presence of armed forces' personnel and police. It should have been the safest place, but this proved to be far from being the case.

The attack does heavily affect the SLAF's pilot training operations, with the loss of five PT6 training planes, and a K8 trainer.

In addition, the SLAF's fleet of MI24 helicopter gunships was particularly hard hit, losing three choppers and having another damaged. This may lead to some loss of close support for ground troops in operations. However, the MI24s have taken a somewhat less important role in Eelam War IV, due mainly to the danger of LTTE Surface to Air Missiles (SAM). This has not had an effect on ground operations, due to the vastly increased capabilities of the jet bomber squadrons, which have increased their level of accuracy in bombing. The jets are too fast to be downed by the small SAMs.

The loss of three Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is again a serious one, sharply reducing the SLAF's reconnaissance capabilities.

However, the SLAF and Ministry of Defence are already making preparations to replace all these aircraft, although this will take several months.

By far the most important loss, in the light of ongoing ground operations in the Wanni, is that of the Beechcraft. This aircraft had played a crucial role in the SLAF's success in Eelam War IV, flying high in the skies and guiding jet bombers successfully to their targets.

This system, similar to the American system of using an Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) aircraft, was a new development introduced under the helm of Air Marshal Goonetilleke. It considerably increased accuracy of bombing, and ensured that the jets did not run the risk of being shot down, being able to go straight to the target guided by radio commands from the Beechcraft, drop their bombs, and come straight home. In the past, pilots had to find their targets themselves, from information supplied by intelligence or ground troops, which was often too vague. The Beechcraft itself stayed high above the ground, too far for the LTTE to shoot down, with sophisticated equipment for reconnaissance, and also armed with the latest intelligence from the UAVs and other sources.

Although the Beechcraft is not a particularly expensive plane, its absence from the skies until it is replaced, may hinder the SLAF for some weeks. However, SLAF headquarters is moving to replace this with other existing aircraft for the time being, until another Beechcraft arrives.

The manner in which the Black Tiger suicide squad easily entered the SLAF base is clearly some very sloppy work on the part of the base's officers.

Reports have spoken of security being weak due to ground personnel having parties at the Gajaba Super Cross races over the weekend, and having stayed up very late partying once again that night while watching the Sirasa Superstar show on TV. However, if the investigation finds that this was indeed the case, it is completely unpardonable.

The modus operandi appears to have been similar to the attack on Katunayake six years ago, which makes it all the worse. Anuradhapura is a 100% military air base, with no civilians allowed. So there is no restriction on the SLAF's capabilities to set up complete defences. The fact that the Black Tigers so easily penetrated to the hangars, the very heart of the base, speaks volumes of the incompetence of the base's officers. Even if the attackers had inside information, as is now being probed, there should not have been such glaring gaps in the defences.

The aerial bombing by the Air Tigers did little damage to the base, as the Black Tigers had already caused much destruction anyway. However, once again, the LTTE aircraft escaped unchallenged, despite the fact that it was detected on radar well in advance. Of course there was no question of them being intercepted by aircraft from Anuradhapura. But there are other SLAF bases at Vavuniya, Kalpitiya, Hingurakgoda, and Sigiriya, each just a few minutes flying time from the route between Iranamadu and Anuradhapura.

The shooting down of a Bell helicopter which had been sent from the SLAF base in Vavuniya, shows once again that there is virtually no co-ordination between ground troops manning anti-aircraft defences, and pilots. A similar situation prevailed during the LTTE's attack on Colombo on the night of the Cricket World Cup Final, when ground units threw a patchy umbrella of fire into the skies, which prevented the interception of the Tiger aircraft by SLAF gunships.

Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara, the controversial Military Spokesman, put his foot in his mouth again this week when he denied that the armed forces had displayed the naked bodies of the Black Tigers. But his story was not in keeping with the fact that the President Rajapakse has ordered an inquiry into the allegation!

The Brigadier, who is known for his outbursts against journalists seems to be on tricky ground. Since he has already said that the incident didn't occur, it will be very peculiar indeed if the inquiry finds that it did happen! Government's senior defence spokesman, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella, attempted some damage control at Friday's news briefing reporting that there appeared to have been an uncovered load of naked bodies in one tractor-drawn trailer. The president has ordered an inquiry and its outcome is awaited.

It would be wise for the top brass to seriously consider replacing the Brigadier with another officer. He is doing immense damage to the reputation of both the armed forces, and the country, with his antagonistic attitude towards the media. His shameful attacks on our colleague Iqbal Athas were completely uncalled for, and did much damage to the image of the forces. Media handling skills are a necessary attribute of the military spokesman.

He is there to disseminate information to the public and world through the media; and thereby uplift the image of the armed forces. If a story in the media is incorrect, it is his duty to correct it. But nowhere does this give him the authority to attack the media in general or specific journalists in particular.