On several previous occasions the LTTE has shown the sheer tenacity and ingenuity needed to overcome military adversity and claw its way back to a position of strength. Hence, I concur with the majority of international and many local commentators who insist there can be no military solution; the pendulum today swings the way of the government’s forces, in the coming months it may swing the other way. Arguably, a decisive factor is, if despite its logistical setbacks and supply chain disruptions, the LTTE manages to acquire surface to air missiles; denied total command of the air, the army may be immobilized.

Nevertheless, what’s the point of a military resurgence if the LTTE’s political programme and vision never evolve beyond the groove it was born into thirty years ago? People say, quite rightly, GoSL will get nowhere if it does not evolve a new political vision, crucially however, nothing could be truer of the LTTE as well. The problem of the LTTE, notwithstanding today’s military setbacks, is not the martial side, it is its politics. Can it evolve a political vision appropriate to the present circumstances and needs of the Tamil people, and aligned to 21st Century global and Lankan realities? Whether one likes it or not, the fact is that it is the LTTE that will have to be the principal participant on the Tamil side in reaching any meaningful political solution.

Locating the LTTE correctly

In the eyes of the government and the chauvinists, the LTTE is the terrorist devil and the objective is to wipe it out. This is not the mindset for a political solution and will not change unless there is a military reversal or a prolonged stalemate. More interesting is a serious misunderstanding, among progressives, of the role the LTTE will have to play in any eventual political solution. Take for example the following statement extracted from an article in last week’s Island. It matters not who the author was; the point is that it is a widespread view among people searching for a political solution. I quote, having conflated two passages into one for convenience.

"Last but not least, the only measure initiated by the president that could lead to the final defeat of the LTTE - the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) process to formulate proposals for political reform - has been delayed and sabotaged time and again by none other than the president himself and his party, the SLFP. . . The two biggest parties need to listen to the former service chiefs, and make it a priority to arrive at and implement democratic political reforms that address the legitimate grievances of minorities. Once this is done, the LTTE leadership will lose support very quickly, and the war can be ended".

The issue is not the statement itself but the aside, the prospect of marginalising the LTTE. The thought process seems to be that if the government implements certain worthy deeds, then the LTTE will be automatically rendered irrelevant, or even defeated, and a solution to the national question arrived at without even requiring its involvement. To say the least, this is naive. Many people, such as the author of these remarks, are appalled by the LTTE’s assassinations, oppression and child recruitment, and that is entirely justified. However, make no bones about it; the principal entity with which the Sinhalese and the State will have to negotiate a settlement of the national question is the LTTE; if not who else – Douglas, Sangaree and Alice in Wonderland? A settlement that the LTTE buys will very likely be bought by the Tamil people, but a formula that is concocted without LTTE participation will, almost certainly, be rejected by most Tamils. Whatever one thinks of the LTTE (or the ANC, or the IRA, or Hamas, or the PKK) such is reality.

Reading the Heroes Day message correctly

Most analysts look for the wrong pointers when scrutinising Mr Prabaharan’s annual broadcasts; they pore over the text to ferret out what military tactic, or what attack on southern targets may be in store. Others search for diplomatic nuances and interpret tactical moves. However, the factor on which the future of the LTTE and the Tamil people will hinge is if the LTTE can be seen to be taking new political initiatives. Therefore the most important reading of the text should be to search for such leads. The post-modernists have thought up some humbug about how one ‘reads the text’; I never thought that there would be an occasion when I would enjoy pirouetting with their gimmicks, but here goes.

There are two points in the message that are as expected; let me mention them quickly. The Sinhalese, as a "nation", that is in their near totality, have not and will never recognise the just rights of the Tamil "nation", that is the rights of the Tamil people; secondly, the Mahinda Rajapakse government is bent on total war to the finish. It is true that a chauvinist mood is sweeping the south and the SLFP, UNP and JVP are marching to this drum beat. However, the contention that that all Sinhalese are enlisted in the cause of racism is untrue. The LTTE knows that there is a sizable and active anti-chauvinist movement among the Sinhalese, and such statements are evidence of a ritualistic-nationalist mindset. On the war issue, that GoSL is committed to all out war is no secret; the President and his brother, the Defence Secretary, have vocalised this explicitly as a matter of policy. Hence the declaration that the LTTE too will fight back with equal ferocity comes as no surprise.

However, to my mind, it is not any of this that is striking about this year’s Hero’s Day message. The significant departure, and possibly the beginning of a new direction, is the focus on the international community.

The appeal to the international community (IC)

The core and substance of this year’s message is that it is aimed at the IC. There is an expression of bitterness at the conduct of the IC and an explicit appeal to this community. A sense of isolation, betrayal and abandonment, pervades the message, and I have observed that this is shared by Tamils here and abroad, whether pro-LTTE or not. The IC talks peace but supports and arms the State and hounds Tamil activists in the diaspora, the term terrorist is applied one-sidedly, and so on. A Tamil website, a week ago, expressed the same sense of bitterness thus: "The international community's strategy has made any rights the Tamils secure depend entirely on the outcome of the war". I guess it is fairly accurate to say that the Tamils will get only what they can get through war, and no more, and if the LTTE comes out second best in the military conflict, well its tough luck for the Tamils. The IC is not going to do much about it.

However, the more crucial element in the message is the appeal to the international community. These two sentences are worth reading with care: "Our people firmly expect that at least from now on the international community will take a new approach in relation to our freedom struggle. On this sacred day it is the hope of our people that the international community will cease giving military and economic aid to the Sinhala regime and accept the right to self determination and the sovereignty of the Tamil nation". Forget the reference to sovereignty, he knows the IC is not going to take that bait, but the impassioned plea for international assistance is a remarkable departure. Stated though it be in rather turgid terms, an appeal it is.

Sure, the reasons are well known; the proscriptions, arrests and freezing of bank accounts are hurting, the supply chain is disrupted, and the government’s access to new equipment, including airpower, has led to a shift in the battlefield. This has brought home to the LTTE that international influences are decisive in this century of globalisation; the Tamils will not get very far unless they can break their isolation. The prospects look bleak, but this is where there is an opportunity for a breakthrough. Will the LTTE be prepared, as quid pro quo, to make concessions to the IC and express its agreement to a ‘less than Eelam’ package? A unilateral statement to this effect, with substantial international support, may be just what is needed to throw back Sinhala chauvinism. This together with a mea culpa pledge, faithfully upheld, to renounce terrorism (without renouncing the armed struggle) will be a vital breakthrough.

There are hordes of naysayers who will reject this reading in the light of the recent bomb blasts in Colombo. They will read these attacks as an intensification of hostilities, perhaps a reply to Tamilchelvan’s killing or the claymore mine explosion in which several schoolchildren were killed, allegedly by the State’s forces, in Kilinochchi. However, I read these incidents quite the other way round. To my mind the message is entirely political and goes rather like this: ‘If you isolate us and label us, one-sidedly, as terrorists, well what else but hit back using all available means; but if you include us and deal with us too, then there are benefits to be had’. This message is aimed, initially if not principally, at the international community, and should be read in the context of Prabaharan’s broadcast.