Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama
has predictably denied that the government’s decision to
withdraw from the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002 had
anything to do with appeasing the JVP and the JHU. Given the
voting on the budget at both the second and third readings, it
is obvious that the support of these parties with a hard-line
approach to the National Question is essential for the
administration’s survival in parliament. This is arithmetic that
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, an adroit mover of pawns on the
political chessboard, well understands. As long as his
government was not at risk, he ignored the rhetoric of both his
red brothers whom he freely admitted helped elect him president
and the Buddhist monks. The budget voting made the risk he faces
glaringly obvious and Rajapaksa has done what he believes he had
to do. From the country's perspective, the sad aspect of this
development is that political expediency continues to
subordinate the national interest.
The CFA has been a dead letter for the
past many months with neither the government nor the military
heeding their obligations under a deal put together by the
Norwegian facilitator when Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe was prime
minister during the Chandrika Kumaratunga presidency. After
maneuvering CBK into a minority in parliament, the UNP forced an
election it won. Thereafter it was important to demonstrate a
peace dividend to the voter and that was what was done through
the CFA. After many long years of war, the country benefited
hugely both on the `feel good’ factor as well as from the
economic spin-off. Roadblocks were removed, there was free
movement to all parts of the island and people from the south
began visiting Jaffna in large numbers. In the peninsula itself,
decades of scarcity and privation ended. The north and the east
began contributing to the national economy and Wickremesinghe,
unarguably an able administrator with a vision for the country,
started doing some of the many things necessary to put the
nation on an even keel and on the road to realizing its
undoubted potential.
But everything was not lovely in the
garden. The LTTE slowly but surely began exploiting the many
advantages that was theirs in terms of the hastily cobbled CFA.
Provision for unarmed Tiger cadres to move into
government-controlled areas, ostensibly for ``political work,’’
opened wide doors to reverse military gains such as control of
the Eastern Province. Moreover, the East provided Prabhakaran a
whole new recruiting ground which was avidly seized. Moving men
and war material to the southern and central areas became easy
in the demilitarized climate of the day and the Tigers, who have
never seriously contemplated any solution short of separation to
the National Question, began preparing the ground for a war at a
time of their choosing. Ominously, the Trincomalee harbour was
being encircled as the then ex-Foreign Minister Laskhman
Kadirgamar tirelessly tried to sock into the national psyche. He
also conveyed this message to his friends abroad.
The weaknesses of the CFA and the
advantages it conferred on the LTTE, always intent on the
separatist goal at the cost of the blood of its own people and
that of the adversary, became self-evident. It is not only Ranil
Wickremesinghe who can play chess. CBK, licking her wounds in
the presidential palace she occupied as the country’s executive
head, was not content playing second fiddle to a prime minister
who enjoyed real power despite the muscle vested in the
executive presidency by JRJ. She made her own moves. The first
of these was the takeover of some key ministries – defence,
interior (responsible for the police) and media. She then
prorogued parliament and using the power of the presidency that
Jayewardene clothed himself with, dissolved the legislature and
called an election ensuring that the JVP would fight on her
side. Her calculations proved correct and she had both the
presidency and the parliamentary majority under her belt. The
JVP too gained more seats than it could have won on its own
steam and with it a balance of power capability.
Kumaratunga did not willingly choose
Mahinda Rajapaksa as her prime minister. She also did not reckon
that the Supreme Court would abbreviate her second term she had
expected to extend through a self-serving provision JRJ, the
twentieth century fox, had written into the constitution for his
own benefit. If the Bandaranaike dynasty could not continue
through brother Anura, many observers believe that Chandrika
would have preferred a Ranil Wickremesinghe presidency to that
of the yokel from Meda Mulana. But Prabhakaran did not
want Wickremesinghe and for reasons that yet remain unclear, he
facilitated Rajapaksa’s election by ensuring that a large number
of Tamils in areas he controlled or influenced did not vote.
Rajapaksa as president and C-in-C is now gearing to take the war
to the Wanni in the coming weeks, building up to a big putsch
that will surely be bloody and cause more misery for the poor on
both sides of the lines. Remember it is the poor who join the
army for lack of any other employment and it is the poor who are
coerced into Tiger forces. It is the poor also who swell the
ranks of the IDPs.
The CFA served no purpose for a long
time and both the government and the LTTE knew that very well.
Both sides did their own thing reducing the Nordic Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, emasculated to just Norwegians and Icelandic
monitors by the Tigers following the EU ban on them, to a mere
recorder of violations. But neither side wanted to use the
provision to withdraw from the CFA until the question of a
parliamentary majority forced the president’s hand. The
repercussions were predictable. Influential international
players whose friendship is important to Sri Lanka have slammed
us in diplomatic language. India has not publicly shown her hand
but has conveyed her feelings to the government. Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh will not be here for 60th Independence
Anniversary celebrations. Diplomats are ferreting around to find
out if there are any other reasons than the JVP for what the
government has done. So far they have drawn a blank.
It is crystal clear that the big
putsch would be possible with a dead CFA existing only on paper.
The government did not abrogate it when Lakshman Kadirgamar was
killed; nor did Prabhakaran when the SLAF got Tamilchelvan.
Colombo’s decision was taken with the full knowledge of
international displeasure – a clear case of political expediency
overriding the national interest. What price we will pay remains
an open question.