Media reports from America talk of fresh negotiations between Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and the US that would enable American forces to resort to covert counter-terrorist action in Pakistani territory and lead to more aggressive action by Pakistani army against jehadis in tribal areas, once the elections are held. It has been reported that Washington is of the view that Musharraf and the Pakistani army are facing the most dangerous crisis since 9/11 and will have no option but to accede to the American demand.

Earlier, the US had planned a dispensation after the elections with Musharraf as president and Benazir Bhutto as prime minister, providing a democratic facade in Pakistan and a commitment to action against the terrorists. However, the assassination of Benazir has made the election and its outcome quite uncertain.

Musharraf has already ignored the US demand to hold elections in early January. Washington had hoped that the sympathy wave following Benazir's assassination would have produced a majority for the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Presumably, Musharraf had different plans. He postponed the elections by six weeks and that is likely to diminish the Benazir sympathy wave. Since former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's party - the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) - and the PPP have agreed to collaborate in contesting the elections, Musharraf faces the possibility of the two parties together having a large majority in the National Assembly and in the provincial assemblies of Punjab and Sindh.

If that were to happen, the newly elected assemblies might not confirm Musharraf as president. The PPP has accused the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of plotting to rig the elections during counting by adding new ballot boxes with stuffed ballot papers in favour of Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam) candidates who are backing Musharraf. This tradition of rigging elections during counting goes back to the days of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and has been resorted to in all subsequent elections in Pakistan. It was once said by a former Pakistan army chief that voting in Pakistani elections is free and fair and the 'angels' intervene during the counting stage.

In other words, there is a high probability that the ISI may rig the elections in favour of candidates of PML(Q), MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Majlis) and forestall a combination of PPP and PML(N) attempting to secure a majority in the new National Assembly. The question is: Will the US be in a position to denounce Musharraf rigging the election or will he make US endorsement of the rigged election a condition for cooperating with the new US plan to permit US operations on Pakistan soil?

If one goes by the record of the last five years, Washington has invariably been taken for a ride and Musharraf always had the better of the bargains struck between him and the US. Can the US afford to let down Musharraf and denounce rigged elections? They did not do so in 2002 and their position today vis-a-vis Musharraf is no stronger than it was then. That both PPP and PML(N) have accused ISI of plotting rigging of elections shows that the new Pakistan army chief, at least at this stage, appears to be going along with Musharraf and PML(Q). He and his corps commanders can change their minds if and when they conclude that Musharraf is unwanted baggage and that dumping him would serve the corporate interest of the Pakistani army.

There is also the question whether Musharraf can get away with rigging within Pakistan? Recent events in Kenya would indicate otherwise. The Pakistani situation is far more explosive. Al-Qaida and Pakistani jehadis are bound to take advantage of the turbulence that would follow a rigged election. So far PPP and PML(Q) have taken care not to criticise the army but only Musharraf and the ISI. In these circums-tances, the two major political parties and the army have more options than Musharraf.

The army may have no problems in allowing a free and fair election and accepting a new prime minister on that basis. They can revert back to a modified version of the arrangement between 1988 and 1997 which would give the army chief a decisive say in all major policies, inclu-ding relations with the US and action against Al-Qaida and jehadis. That would, of course, require Musharraf's departure from the scene.

The choice before the US is either to support Musharraf or enlist the cooperation of the two mainstream political parties in Pakistan in the war on terrorism. If Musharraf had not completely messed up the Benazir assassination case and behaved in such an insensitive manner, there was a possibility of winning over Benazir's husband Asif Zardari. But with widespread suspicion of the involvement of ISI in the assassination, that possibility does not exist any more.

Whether it was China in the late 1940s, Vietnam in the 60s and 70s, Iran during the Shah's rule, Saddam Hussein in the 80s or Pakistan since 80s, the common problem for US policies was the cronyism that developed between the US intelligence, diplomats and service personnel and their counter-parts in the authoritarian regimes. Such cronyism inhibited the US administration from developing effective policies that would suit American national interests and not those of the dictators. Pakistan is a crucial test case for US demonstrating its genuine commitment to democracy.