The split in the JVP has now more or less solidified. When the JVP politburo met last week, they deliberately refrained from discussing the split. Indeed they had nothing to discuss because as far as the JVP politburo and central committee were concerned, this was old hat. The problem however is rending this once monolithic party from top to bottom with some provincial level leaders also siding with Weerawansa who had been charge sheeted by the JVP politburo, on February 26. He had answered all the charges and had wanted an inquiry held. If he was guilty, he would submit to any penalties, like being demoted in the hierarchy. If he was found innocent, he would like to be kept on in the same positions and additionally, if he was found not guilty, he had wanted the two or three ``conspirators’’ who had been plotting against him hauled up before a disciplinary committee.

JVP quest for power

The inquiry had been held, but Weerawansa had not received any communication from the party about it. Weerawansa believes that Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Tilvin Silva are prominent among those against him in the party. It was mentioned by Nandana Gunatilleke, the JVP politburo member who left earlier, in an articles to the Divaina, that Dissanayake was trying to push Weerawansa out and step into the slot himself. The grand plan actually seems to be to push Somawansa Amarasinghe, the aging leader of the JVP, out and for Tilvin Silva to take over the leadership while Dissanayake becomes the general secretary of the party. The grand plan is to revive the JVP’s still-born plan to have a broad front against the government and to get organizations like the SLMC and Vasudeva Nanayakkara’s party to support them, with the UNP joining the grand coalition eventually. The story floating around is that the JVP’s role in the east is not to win any seats at the PC election, but to attack the government so that it helps the UNP/SLMC coalition.

The JVP hopes to first bring the UNP into power so that with the loss of power, the PA/SLFP will go into terminal decline and then the JVP will become the main opposition party, with the possibility that they would get elected to power after the UNP. This kind of a path to power is something that the JVP has always looked at. A dynamic that has always run through the JVP is the single minded quest for political power. In the early, 1980s, Wijeweera himself had the dream of becoming the main opposition party first and then capturing power through the ballot. This dream failed to materialize because the SLFP failed to fade away as expected. There is an influential group in the JVP that does not want their party to become a permanent appendage of the PA/SLFP, after the fashion the CP and LSSP, and they want to one day assume power in their own right.

That is what the JVP was formed for. From the very beginning Wijeweera’s preoccupation was with the revolution. When forced by circumstances to acquiesce to democracy, the JVP continues to pursue their aim of capturing power within that framework. And when in a democratic set up, they dream of eliminating the SLFP from the fray. Why the SLFP one may ask, and not the UNP which stands for exactly the opposite of what the JVP stands for? The reason for always wishing the SLFP dead is precisely because of the proximity between the SLFP and the JVP. The JVP can take over and represent the SLFP base whereas they can never do that with the UNP base. In order to further their interests as a political party they have to get rid of the SLFP whereas the UNP would become an enemy only in a situation where there will be a direct and decisive struggle for power between the UNP and the JVP.

The main focus of the JVP at last week’s politburo meeting was the eastern elections. The JVP will be holding a rally in Ampara today and another rally in Kantale on Tuesday. At the last local government elections held in 2006, the JVP contesting alone, got something like 14% in the Ampara urban area and about 20% of the vote in the Kantale area. However, at a decisive election like the forthcoming provincial council elections, it is unlikely that the JVP will get the same proportion of votes. There were other places where the JVP got a substantial number of votes as well such as Padavi-Siripuara in the Trincomalee district, where they got 17% of the vote, and Padiyatalawa in the Ampara district where they got 20%. At local government elections, the criteria that sways the voters is as much personal as it is political, and independents and the candidates of smaller parties have a much better chance at local government elections than at major elections.

In the areas where the JVP did well at the local government elections, it is unlikely that they will do as well at the forthcoming provincial council polls. The JVP split will also have its effect on the ability of the party to attract votes. It is more likely at a major election for people to think that a vote cast for the JVP is a vote wasted. Given the fact that Muslim and Tamil votes predominate in both the Trincomalee and Ampara districts, even if the JVP does manage to get substantial votes in the Sinhala areas, it is highly unlikely that they will get enough votes in both those districts to win a seat on the council. In the Batticaloa district, the JVP has no chance at all because it is a Tamil majority district. So the probability is that the JVP will end up without a single seat in the EPC, and would join the ranks of the ‘also rans’ at this election.

Eastern Tamil regionalism

When the UNP boycotted the Batticaloa district local government elections held in February, the UNP national organizer S.B.Dissanayake, who is well known to speak his mind, stated publicly that the UNP should have taken on the government in Batticaloa without giving the Pillaiyan group a free run of the district. Dissananayake’s contention was that the UNP has always had a base among the Tamils and the Muslims and that they would have been able to mount a significant challenge to the government which was aligned to the Pillaiyan group. Dissanayake pointed out that at the presidential elections in 2005, Ranil Wickremesinghe had polled around 121,000 in the Batticaloa district with Mahinda Rajapakse getting 28,000, thus giving the UNP a huge majority of over 92,000 votes. At that election, the preferred candidate of the Karuna-Pillaiyan group was not Wickremesinghe but Rajapakse. Yet the Tamil people of the district gave Wickremesinghe a massive majority.

That being the situation, the UNP as a party, has a head start over the PA in the east. Furthermore the UNP managed to form an alliance with the SLMC which also has a very significant following in the east. Even though the Pillaiyan group swept the board at the recently concluded Batticaloa district local government elections, that was in a situation where the UNP and the TNA accorded them a walkover. The voting strength of the Pillaiyan group has not yet been tested in a real fight. All these factors have kindled the hope in the UNP that they would be able to win the eastern provincial council. The stakes are high. The SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem has resigned his parliamentary seat to contest the provincial elections on the UNP ticket. If he loses the election, his entire political career will be in jeopardy. And for the UNP, a defeat in the east could well set a trend which will result in them losing other elections as well, a process which is going to have serious implications for Wickremesinghe’s political future.

In hoping that they will be able to win the eastern elections, the UNP apparently thinks that there will be repetition of the voting pattern at the presidential elections. In 2005, the UNP won the Batticaloa district with a majority of 92,600 votes, the Digamadulla district with a majority of 36,800 and Trincomalee district with a majority of 36,500. The UNP/SLMC combine probably thinks that the UNP will be able to carry the east even with reduced majorities. If these hopes are realized, then the government is done for. But there are certain factors which may tilt the balance the other way. In the first place, the presidential election was a national election where there was no Tamil or Muslim candidate, and the Tamil and Muslim people of the east voted en bloc for the contender who appeared to be the most pro-minority candidate. That was Wickremesinghe.

But at the forthcoming election, there will be a Tamil party - the TMVP - contesting, and for just the second time in the political history of this country, the eastern province Tamils will get the opportunity to vote not just for a Tamil political party, but a Tamil political party based in the east. Up to February 2008, the eastern province Tamils have never been able to vote for a political party that was formed in the east and led by eastern province Tamils. Until the TMVP appeared on the scene, all Tamil political parties and terrorist groups have been led by northern Tamils. Historically, the eastern Tamils have felt discriminated against and looked down upon by the northern Tamils, and the fact that so many of the senior eastern LTTE cadres opted to decamp with Karuna Amman when he raised the issue of the manner in which eastern Tamils were treated within the LTTE itself, shows that this cry struck a responsive chord. After the formation of the TMVP, the Karuna-Pillaiyan faction has been playing the regional card for all they are worth.

This Tamil regional issue could be one reason why the TMVP just swept the polls in the Batticaloa district at the recently concluded local government elections. The TNA did not contest saying they did not have any security. But at the forthcoming election, the UNP and SLMC will be contesting and foreign delegates will be coming to monitor the elections, so the security issues of the TNA parliamentarians and leaders will not be that acute. Besides, even though the TNA did not contest the Batticaloa local government election this year, they did contest the 2006 local government elections in the Trincomalee and Digamadulla districts and they swept the board in the Tamil dominated areas in these districts. For example, they won the Trinco Urban Council getting 75% of the votes. Then in the Digamadulla district, they won all the seats in the Tirukkovil PS. In this manner, the TNA was able to win the Alaiyadivembu and the Naveethanveli Pradeeshiya Sabhas and the Trinco Town and Gravets PS. But that was in the context where the Karuna group was not yet a party. The reason why, the TNA backed out of the provincial council election may well be because they may not be able to garner the Tamil vote quite in that manner with the TMVP playing the regional card against them. Like all other political parties, the TNA is dominated by northern Tamils.

Muslim-Tamil rivalry

There is the hope in the UNP that the anti-Pillaiyan Tamil vote will gravitate towards the UNP. But what exactly is this anti-Pillaiyan vote? The idea is that the Pillaiyan group has been extorting money and recruiting children and therefore the Tamil people want them out. But the fact is that the Pillaiyan group has not done anything to the Tamils that the LTTE has not done on a larger scale. If it comes to a case of being harassed, the Tamil people of the east have less to fear from the Pillaiyan group than they have from the LTTE. If the Tamil people are harassed by the Pillaiyan group, they can at least complain to the international community and they will find a sympathetic ear, whereas when they were under the LTTE, they had no one to turn to. Even the international community would look the other way if some Tamil went to them complaining of harassment by the LTTE. The international community would be afraid to antagonize the LTTE by taking up such issues with them.

Implicit in the hope that there will be an anti-Pillaiyan Tamil vote in the east, is the hope that the Tamil people of the east are still harbouring the dream of a separate state. Therefore they still have regard for the LTTE and not the Pillaiyan group because the latter has given up separatism and is working with the government. So the eastern election works out to be a contest between separatism vs regionalism. If at this election, the Tamils of the east vote en mass against the Pillaiyan group, then it might be assumed that Eastern Tamil regionalism has been defeated and the separatist agenda remains triumphant.

But even if one assumes that there is an anti-Pillaiyan Tamil vote in the eastern province, what hope is there of this vote going to the UNP/SLMC coalition? This group has already announced that their intention is to appoint a Muslim chief minister for the province arguing (quite reasonably) that this is the only province in the country that has even a slight chance of having a Muslim chief minister. But in the context of the intense rivalry between the Tamils and the Muslims in the east, it is highly unlikely that the Tamils will vote for a Muslim chief minister. When the LTTE was around, the Tamils ruled the roost even in areas where they were a minority. Tamils had been ‘using’ Muslim owned land without any transfer of ownership all over the east. Now, with the LTTE gone, the only succor the Tamils have is the Pillaiyan group. And the Pillaiyan group has also been very conscious of their role as the protectors of the eastern Tamils against the incursions of both the northern Tamils and the Muslims. The relationship between the Pillaiyan group and the Muslims has never been good. Hence to say that the Tamils of the province would vote for the Muslim chief minister of the UNP/SLMC combine and thereby jeopardize the Tamil position in the east, is highly unlikely.

If areas like Tirukkovil and Alaiyadivembu in the Digamadulla district and the Trincomalee town area, votes with the TVMP at this election for fear of being swamped by the Muslims, then the UNP may well lose in one fell swoop, the majorities of 36,000 that they got from each of these two districts at the presidential elections. And if the Tamils in the Batticaloa district vote the same way that they did earlier this year, then the UNP’s huge majority of 92,000 that they got at the presidential elections will suddenly disappear. Today, the UNP will be going to the Batticaloa district as the ally of the SLMC with the avowed objective of appointing a Muslim chief minister with the votes of the Batticaloa Tamils. Even if the Tamils of Batticaloa prefer the LTTE to the Pillaiyan group, will that make them vote for a Muslim chief minister?

The Sinhalese factor

The population of the eastern province according to the last census in 1981, was something like 400,000 Tamils, 315,000 Muslims and 250,000 Sinhalese. Because of the conflict in the two and a half decades since, the proportion of the Sinhalese would have gone down, and with Tamils going overseas and migrating to Colombo, the Tamil population would be down and more or less equal to the Muslim population. At the first provincial council elections in 1988, the Muslims and Tamils got 14 seats each and the Sinhalese got seven seats. That distribution of seats may be deemed to reflect the relative proportion of the three communities in the east. If the Tamils and Muslims are more or less equal in an ethnic identity based election, they would at most finish neck to neck - in which case the Sinhalese vote will tip the balance. At the local government elections held in 2006, the PA won the Sinhala dominated areas of Gomarankadawela, Morawewa, Padavi-Siripura, Tambalagamuwa and Seruwila in the Trincomalee district and Damana, Maha Oya, Padiyatalawa, Lahugala, Dehiattakandiya, Ampara town and Namal Oya in the Digamadulla district.

These areas were the mainstay of the PA even at the presidential election. And the agenda chosen by the people of this area was clearly the agenda of Mahinda Rajapakse. That was at a time when Rajapakse had yet to show what he could do. Today, the east has been cleared and these Sinhala villages which were once called ‘border villages’ are no longer that. Today they have no need of sirens to warn of LTTE attacks and they have more or less entered mainstream society. The UNP expects the cost of living problem to be an issue in the Sinhala areas, but the CoL is less of an issue in the rural areas, than it is in the urban areas. Moreover the gratitude at being free of the LTTE terror would be a major determining factor when these people go to the polling booth. Besides, the UNP/SLMC coalition is perceived by the public to be for the ceasefire agreement, under which the LTTE had a free run of many parts of the east. The Sinhalese may fear that if the UNP/SLMC wins, the LTTE would be back, and that fear may motivate them to vote for the government.

This same fear of having the LTTE back if the UNP/SLMC coalition wins is also going to affect the Muslim vote. Just as much as the Muslims of the east will find the idea of a Muslim chief minister attractive, their fear of having the LTTE back will also be a major factor at this election. Ashraff formed the SLMC in 1987 saying that J.R.Jayewardene sold the Muslims to the Tamils. Well, the UNP did it again in 2001, when they signed the CFA without a single line about the Muslims. Rauff Hakeem and the SLMC acquiesced in that situation. In fact it is this fear of having the LTTE back, that motivated M.H.Hizbulla to defect to the government. His base is in the Tamil majority Batticaloa district where, if the LTTE comes back, life would become impossible for the Muslim minority living in that district.

Hakeem is not an Ashraff

Even in the Digamadulla and Trincomalee districts where the Tamils are a minority as against the Sinhalese and the Muslims, combined, still the idea of living with the LTTE again is going to put many Muslims off. Then again, Hakeem is not an Ashraff who united the Muslims in the late eighties on the cry that the Muslims were being harassed by the LTTE on the one hand and ignored and taken for granted by the government on the other. Both issues were close to the day to day realities faced by the Muslims of the east. Hence the meteoric rise of the SLMC. But Hakeem is trying to lead the Muslims according to a national UNP agenda, which may not be of immediate relevance to the eastern Muslims. This could be one reason why the many different groups that have broken away from the SLMC in the recent past are sticking to their guns and siding with the party that has promised the chief ministership to the Tamils.

For the Muslims of the east, it may be better to have a chief minister from the Pillaiyan group than to have the LTTE back. Whatever the LTTE does to the Muslims, they have nowhere to turn to. But if Pillaiyan does something, they can complain to their own Muslim MPs who are with the government or they can complain to the international community and receive a sympathetic hearing. The LTTE, unlike the Pillaiyan group, can do anything and get away with it. Quite apart from this, Hakeem is not a charismatic figure like Ashraff. The SLMC has lost chunks of their eastern base. At the local government elections held in 2006, in the predominantly Muslim Akkaraipattu, the SLMC came third after the National Congress led by Minister Athaulla, and NUA led by Ferial Ashraff.