The killing fields of Muhamalai claimed hundreds more combatants on Wednesday, as government troops and LTTE cadres fought each other to a standstill in one of the biggest battles in almost a year.

The Muhamalai-Nakar Kovil–Vettilaikerni areas has traditionally been a mass graveyard for both sides, and more than 5,000 on both sides have perished over this small piece of land, in battles starting as far back as 1991.

By the end of the day, troops had gained little ground in the massive operation, which was then suspended indefinitely. Seventy-six soldiers were killed or are missing-presumed dead, according to the official government figure. The LTTE admitted losing only 16 cadres killed, but the Army claimed to have killed more than 100 rebels.

Both figures are likely to be incorrect, and the real number of Tigers killed can be expected to be somewhere in-between these two figures. The LTTE officially claimed to have killed 100 soldiers, while pro-LTTE websites have an even higher figure of 150.

One hundred and twenty soldiers sustained injuries, according to the Army’s figures, and the number Tiger cadres who were wounded is yet to be ascertained.

The LTTE claimed a major victory over the armed forces. The Government in turn denied that it was a defeat and claimed to have inflicted devastating losses on the Tigers.

The correct story is that both sides lost huge numbers of fighters, which will have an adverse effect on the ability of both to launch fresh operations. However, the Army is more able to take such losses than the LTTE, due to its numerical superiority.

Strategically, the battle was a stalemate. Neither side gained or lost any significant ground. In the end, the forward defence lines continue to be in almost the same locations as before, although the Army has advanced a few hundred yards in some small areas. However, since it was the Army that moved forward, the LTTE can rightly claim to have halted the offensive.

The battle began shortly after midnight, when troops of the 53rd Division and 55th Division advanced in the darkness into LTTE defence lines. They met little resistance at first, but moved slowly as they had to clear their way through obstacles such as mines and barbed wire.

However, although the soldiers gained ground initially during the darkness, their progress was too slow, and once dawn broke, heavy LTTE resistance began. By then, troops had taken over the Tigers’ first line of defence, and were moving into the second line. But a rain of mortar and artillery fire from many concealed guns far beyond the battlefield, caused havoc among the advancing troops. This firing was extraordinarily accurate, proving that the Tigers had prepared exact co-ordinates to fire upon their own defence lines once the Army captured them. The maelstrom of fire forced the soldiers to retreat.

Unfortunately, the hasty retreat meant that some soldiers were cut off in the vanguard of the offensive, and perished. The LTTE recovered 28 bodies and handed them over to the Army later through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The inability of Air Force jet bombers and helicopter gunships to silence the enemy artillery was a key factor in the battle. The Tigers had camouflaged the guns very carefully, and the Air Force did not know their locations beforehand. When dawn broke, the guns started their deadly barrage, and SLAF air strikes were too few in number to take out the many guns. By the time the air strikes became accurate enough, the Army had been forced back, and the Tigers are believed to have quickly moved the guns back and under cover.

The entire operation was in fact a miscalculation of the LTTE’s strength in the Muhamalai area. The Army had believed that the months of fighting in the Mannar-Madhu areas had weakened the Tigers to the point where they would have withdrawn cadres from the Jaffna front to reinforce the southern Wanni fronts. Certainly, the LTTE has fought tooth and nail in the Madhu area, as it will be a considerable loss of prestige to lose control of the Madhu shrine, sacred to Catholics. And they may have withdrawn some cadres from the Jaffna front. However, the Tigers are clearly stronger in numbers than the Army believed, and also possess far more long range weaponry – artillery and mortars – than was expected. In the small area of operations, the numerical superiority of the Army was of little effect, despite having two divisions of troops advancing.

In the end, it was not the number of Tiger cadres that dictated the course of the battle, but the number of artillery guns and mortars, and the level of accuracy of the fire. The Muhamalai area is a narrow spit of land with the Jaffna Lagoon on two sides, which can be easily and accurately targeted by long range fire.

Meanwhile, there was better news on the Madhu front, as soldiers continued to encircle the area, battling inch by inch closer to the church. Many expected the church compound to be taken this week by the Army, which will be a major propaganda victory, despite the fact that the sacred statue has been removed by church authorities to a safer location in the nearest church.

This week’s battle in Muhamalai was only the latest in a long history of battles in the area, in which casualties on both sides have been counted in the hundreds and even thousands.

The first major battle was in 1991, when the LTTE laid siege to the Elephant Pass Army Camp. It was defeated after more than a month when Lt. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa led a rescue mission that landed by sea. More than 1,000 Tiger cadres were killed in the battle, as were 150 soldiers.

The next major battle here was in the year 2000, when the LTTE overran the Elephant Pass-Vettilaikerni Army Complex, killing more than 1,000 soldiers. The Tigers marched to the very doorstep of Jaffna town before being halted.

The Army then pushed back the Tigers to Muhamalai, and the defence lines have been in the same location since then.

In August 2006, the LTTE suffered a major defeat at Muhamalai, when their attempt to advance up the A9 road was beaten back. This was a turning point in Eelam War IV, as the Tigers suffered heavy casualties that had a negative influence on their entire campaign. More than 400 Tigers were killed.

However in October 2006, the Army tried to advance in the opposite direction and suffered heavy casualties, again to artillery fire. Nearly 200 soldiers were killed.

Muhamalai is not in itself of any strategic value. It is simply the point where the FDLs have been stuck there for some seven years now, from before the beginning of the last ceasefire. If the Army succeeds in capturing the area, it will simply be pushing the Tigers back, further from Jaffna town. It will also inch closer towards throwing the Tigers entirely out of the entire Jaffna Peninsula.

The Army’s hope has been that a breakthrough at Muhamalai would push the LTTE back a considerable distance, all the way back to Elephant Pass and beyond. This would open up another avenue for the Army to attack the Wanni, this time from the north.

However, the lesson that frontal assaults will not work has clearly not yet been learned. The fact is that the tigers are prepared to fall back a little during the night, and have prepared their artillery barrages carefully for maximum effect in daylight. Troops cannot move quickly enough through all the obstacles of mines, booby traps and barbed wire, to reach the enemy’s rear areas and destroy the heavy guns before they begin spouting death.

The Army’s resources would be better used to attack the Tigers’ heartland in the Wanni from other fronts such as Mannar, Madhu, Weli Oya, and Vavuniya. These are far broader fronts, where the numerical superiority of the Army is a heavy advantage to the soldiers, and the Tigers will spread themselves thinly while defending against multiple assaults from many points.

What this week’s battle unfortunately did was to hand the LTTE a propaganda victory at a time when it is hard-pressed after losing territory for nearly two years now. During this time, the LTTE lost the entire Eastern Province, losing key battles at Mutur, Sampur, Vakarai, and Thoppigala. They have since then been on the defensive in the Mannar and Madhu areas for many months.