1) I must confess at the outset, when I read in the Island (27/05/08) the news story of our Navy Commander addressing the 7th Annual Future Naval Plans and Requirements 2008 in London, I was nervous. Full speech was not published at the time. World’s leading Navies such as those of UK Royal Navy, US, France, Spanish, Indian, Greece, Denmark, Australia, Netherlands and New Zealand had been represented, together with four leading experts.

2. I therefore obtained immediately a copy of the speech from the Navy website and was greatly relieved.

3. First reasons for my nervousness has to be explained. Ever since AM Panikkar the Architect of India’s Naval doctrine argued in his works more than fifty years ago, that the "Indian Ocean must remain truly Indian". India has been consistently pursuing policies to achieve that goal. Though Governments changed in New Delhi, Panikkar’s vision became a bi-partisan policy and corner stone of India’s defence and foreign affairs strategy. While the goal remained constant, the strategy adopted to achieve it changed even radically to suit the changing global political, economic and security environment.

4. In the beginning and soon after India’s independence, India felt secure as long as UK / Sri Lanka defence agreement was in operation, since it was paramount to India’s defence that a friendly power controlled the defence of Sri Lanka and that the British Navy was occupying Trincomalee. Britain was viewed by India as a friendly power at the time. When Britain had to withdraw both from Trincomalee and Katunayake, US navy sailed in to protect western interests in the Indian Ocean.

Cold war, India’s alignment with the Soviet Union, the development of the Indian Navy and India’s staking a claim as a pivotal regional power in South Asia prompted the policy makers in India to work in the 1960’s towards a UN declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (IOPZ). For this purpose Sri Lanka initiated a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 1971. The resolution was adopted by 61 votes with USA, UK , France, USSR and even Singapore abstaining. Later the General Assembly adopted a resolution to convene a meeting in Colombo in1981 to consider ways and means to implement the peace zone resolution. However with the change in the Government and the foreign policy in Sri Lanka in 1977, that meeting was never held.

5. Noor A Hussain the Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad remarked that "IOPZ policy was an attempt by India to seek maritime hegemony under the pretext of declaring it a zone of peace". It was obvious, once the major powers left the Indian Ocean only had India a navy capable of controlling the Indian Ocean. That was the first attempt by India to realize Manikkar’s vision to dominate and control the sea traffic in the Indian Ocean.

6. Dr. Kissinger observed in a memo to the next President, a similarity between the US Monroe Doctrine which warned Europeans not to interfere in South America and Indira Ghandhi’s Doctrine. Dr. Kissinger wrote "whatever the day to day irritations between New Delhi and Washington, India’s Geopolitical interest will impel it over the next decade to assume some of the security functions now exercised by USA". Hence, the attempt by the Congress government to enter in to a nuclear deal with USA is most understandable. What is sad is that our diplomats who worked tirelessly to declare Indian Ocean a Peace Zone did not realize what Kissinger observed.

7. Besides the Central Government, numerous defence analysts, writers, Navy Chiefs, politicians and even the previous President of India Kalaam emphasized the imperatives of Indian strategy namely to control the Indian Ocean. President Kalaam outlined the future role of the Indian Navy after his traditional review of the Navy. He emphasized the need for Indian to have a powerful blue water navy and to control and protect the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. He described the Indian Ocean as a "National Treasure" (The Hindus 13.02.2006). It is significant that although IOPZ is dead and buried, Prof. V. Suryanarayan speaking at the December 2006 seminar, sought to resurrect it.

8. When India’s strategy to gain control of the Indian Ocean security via the IOPZ failed the strategy to achieve Panikkar’s vision was changed. Under Indira Ghandhi and her son Rajiv, decided to follow a more aggressive policy in the pursuit of Panikkar’s vision. The result was the unfortunate Indo-Lanka agreement of 1987 and worse the exchange of letters between J.R. and Rajiv Ghandi. Part 2 of the letters exchanged and dated 29/07/87 states "Trinco or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests". Fortunately for Sri Lanka even JR’s own constitution does not provide the executive president with powers to surrender Sri Lanka’s rights or territory in this manner. The letters exchanged and even the North East merger has been declared invalid by the Supreme Court.

Once again India’s second attempt in the pursuit of Panikkar’s vision failed. A new strategy more ambitious, but less conspicuous and superficially attractive to Sri Lanka than previous attempts, is currently in operations as seen from the following:

9. An NGO named National Maritime Foundation was established in New Delhi on 15/02/2005. Two of the objectives of the NMF are 1) Study and evaluate factors affecting Indian maritime security, focus on vulnerable areas, and suggest suitable counter measures in the formulation of national security strategy. 2) Carry out studies on international relations and geo-political factors of strategic significance with a view to suggest maritime CBMs and enhance maritime cooperation among sea faring nations as also to achieve a stable security environment in South Asia and Asia Pacific.

10. This NGO is funded fully by the Indian Government. Some believe the funding amounts to USD 200 million annually. As John Perkins has illustrated in his book ‘Confessions of an Economic Hitman’, even C.I.A. today operates through front organizations which appear to be very benevolent to the potential victims.

Soon after NMF was established a seminar was held in New Delhi on 11/12/06. Subject was India Sri Lanka maritime cooperation – opportunities and challenges. Sri Lanka was represented by several experts drawn from defence and foreign ministries and other institutions. Strangely perhaps neither the Indian nor the Sri Lankan maritime sector was represented though the subject was maritime cooperation. The focus was mainly if not exclusively on maritime security or more precisely how India and Sri Lanka could cooperate to protect the Indian Ocean from Persian Gulf to Malacca straits. For whose benefit and against whom is the 60 million dollar question. Once again Panikkar’s vision is visible particularly judging by the contributions made by the Indian authorities including the former minister of defence KC Pant. Pant argued the game plan, namely for India and Sri Lanka to organize a "Co-operative security regime or mechanism to control the Indian Ocean between Persian Gulf and Malacca Straits"

11. Admiral PS Das (retired) stressed the importance of "east west shipping routes which transit southfh of Sri Lanka’ for India’s security. The justification according to Pant is that "India and Sri Lanka straddle one of the most important sea lanes in the world and hence we must be prepared to shoulder our share of responsibility" Sounds sweet unlike Rajiv Gandhi plan of 1987.

12. Our former Ambassador and expert on security strategy John Gunaratne in his address said very diplomatically’ the importance of Indian Ocean is not confined to the littoral or hinterland states of the Indian Ocean alone. Extra regional big powers have for obvious reasons economic and military interest in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean like the other larger oceans of similar size is also seen as a "global common". No doubt JG while reminding Indian strategists the importance of Indian Ocean for China and Japan also punctured a hole in Indias’ plan to establish a cooperative security regime or mechanism to patrol the Indian Ocean from Persian Gulf to Malacca straits.

13. A representative of Sri Lanka Navy in his address concluded "a bi lateral agreement on cooperative maritime security supported by strict laws and progressive diplomacy must be immediately perceived.". I do not know whether this reflects correctly the policy of the Sri Lankan navy or Defence Ministry.

14. Six months after the Delhi seminar, our foreign minister made a dangerous statement at the very high level regional security summit of defence ministers held in Singapore on 03/06/2007. Addressing the seminar our Foreign Minister quoted a 1997 observation by a London based Maritime Intelligence and Counter Piracy operations centre that "Sri Lankan waters continue to remain an extremely dangerous area for maritime traffic". He added, vessels flying Philippines, Greece, Indonesian, Panamanian, Belize, Chinese Jordanian, Cambodian and Indian flag vessels have been attacked by LTTE. It would have been in Sri Lanka’s vital shipping interest, if the FM emphasized that non of these ships were engaged in the international trade or using the East West sea lanes. All these vessels were engaged by the Government authorities to carry cargo to the north. Addressing the same group of Defence Ministers at the international institute for strategic studies in Singapore on 31/05/08, our FM has stressed "we need greater assistance and cooperation of the countries in the Asia Pacific region in particular", to deter terrorist activities in the sea. The shift from bi-lateral to multi-lateral cooperation is significant and timely. Incidentally this important summit on security is attended by defence ministers and defence chiefs of countries such as USA, Australia, Japan, China and India and not by foreign ministers. Ideally our PM in his capacity as Deputy Defence Minister together with Defence Secretary and Navy Chief should have represented Sri Lanka.

15. This in a nut shell is the back ground against which I viewed with apprehension the news on the Navy Commanders’ speech in London. I recalled Panikkar’s naval doctrine and his advocacy that Indian Ocean must remain truly Indian. He even emphasized widening of the political hemisphere of the Indian state to include Ceylon and Burma for defence purposes. Cautioning against the Chinese thrust, he wrote that the "movement towards the South may and in all probability will be reflected in the Naval Policy of resurgent China".

16. Panikkar’s doctrine was strongly supported by another Indian author KD Vaidya who wrote in his book The Naval Defence of India "even if you do not rule the waves of all the five oceans in the world, we must at least rule the waves of the Indian Ocean." He even argued the creation of full fledged fleets to be stationed in Trincomalee, Mauritius and Andaman’s to guard the Western and Eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean. Another writer Gaurang Bhatt wrote in an article published by the think tank South Asia Analysis group on 31/06/05 "unlikely though the scenario may be in the event of a war with China there must be sufficient naval power and assets to blockade the straits of Malacca, the bottle neck of oil transit to China".

17. India’s marine doctrine released in 2005 declared that the seas from the Persian Gulf to Malacca straits are now India’s legitimate area of interest . Former Indian Navy Chief, Admiral Prakash added this when he said "India aspires to a certain position in the world and so we must have a navy commensurate to this need" (AFP New Delhi 2/12/05)

As if all this was not enough to make one nervous of India’s policies, Dr. Subramaniam Swami, the Leader of Janatha Party wrote in his book, Sri Lanka in Crisis, India’s Option " India and Sri Lanka should integrate either by confederating like Europe or like outright merger as was the case with Sikkim". This to resolve the so called Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem.

With such bad recollections in my mind, I read the speech delivered by our Navy Chief in London. My fear was that India would have succeeded in getting his support to argue the case for India’s plan to control the Indian Ocean through an innocuous looking objective of maritime security for international trade. India no doubt could achieve two objectives by implementing such a plan. First it would inevitably sour our most valuable relations with China and Pakistan and secondly it could have a negative impact on Sri Lanka’s transshipment business and development of commercial ports. Studies by National Maritime Foundation include Chinese ship building and maritime aspects related to China.

I was therefore greatly relieved when I read our Navy Commanders speech in London on 20/05/08. No doubt Vice Admiral W. Karannagoda must be fully aware of India’s Naval doctrine and maneuvers. He had therefore to navigate to safeguard Sri Lanka’s interest without offending the big brother, while safeguarding our relations with China, Pakistan and other regional and extra regional countries. This has been achieved by Vice Admiral Karannagoda magnificently. The diplomacy reflected in his speech should be a lesson to our not so diplomatic diplomats.

Fully conscious of India’s plans no doubt to protect Indian Ocean from the Persian to Malacca Straits, Karannagoda has drawn very diplomatically the attention of the audience of Navy Chiefs of all the major powers including India, to a possible terrorist target which is more attractive to terrorist than Malacca Straits. Referring to this threat to Malacca Straits he said, a) "Of the shipping lanes, the Malacca Straits may be the most attractive target, considering the fact that one-third of all world trade passes through it. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is primarily the trade to Asia including 80% of China’s oil imports, that depends on its security. B) On the other hand, one has to consider the aim of the terrorist and their objective. If the objective is to affect the flow of trade primarily to the West, however, would a strike in the Malacca Strait have the desired effect, or will it be the straits of Bab el Mendeb, Hormus, the Suez canal or Gibralter, that are targeted?

Diverting India’s focus and claim of LTTE threat to International shipping Karannagoda has reminded the Navy top bras of major powers, that like the LTTE which had sixteen ships before they were destroyed by the navy, Al Queda learning a lesson from the LTTE has acquired a fleet of ships. To high light the threat to Western countries he has referred to the Al Queda attacks on US war ship Cole at Aden, French tanker Limburg at Yemen and another us war ship at Jordan. He has very cleverly illustrated the existence of links between LTTE and Al-Queda.

He has then very cleverly impressed the audience, that by fighting the LTTE sea igers our Navy has acquired the expertise and the experience to fight terrorists at sea and to protect Sri Lanka’s naval and port interest.

Having argued his case, Karannagoda’s final shot would have disappointed those seeking bi-lateral solutions to maritime security with ulterior motives. Karannagoda has concluded c) " To ensure maritime security and stability, it is very clear to me, that maritime security should be a cohesive effort and requires an international solution for it has altered the dynamics of security paradigms world wide".

Vice Admiral K’s speech in my view is a master piece of diplomacy and naval strategy. Although one could write a thesis on his maneuvers through a mine field, I shall leave it to New Delhi National Maritime Foundation to study, evaluate and digest his speech. I would only say congratulations Vice Admiral Karannagoda, well done!