Pervez Musharraf’s formal role in Pakistani politics came to an inevitable end this week when he resigned the presidency under threat of impeachment.

While defiant of the proceedings brought against him, Musharraf was correct when he said, "Whether I win or lose the impeachment, the nation will lose".

Under his leadership one of Asia’s few democracies has been at a loss. Arguments of stability for the "greater good" cannot excuse the confinement of democratic processes which occurred under Musharraf’s rule.

Blame and guilt for the political rancor must be shared all around: the civilian administration unable to govern adequately, the generals who took part in the 1999 military coup d’etat and Musharraf himself for autocratic behaviour which only aggravated an already fragile system.

No less to blame is the Bush administration which propped up an unelected regime under the pretext of the so-called war on terror.

How ironic the United States — one of the world’s greatest democracies and a global propagator of the democratic system — could so easily go back on its own principles for the sake of narrow national interests.

Musharraf’s ascendance was a convenient quick fix for Washington’s fetish with roaming terrorists in south and central Asia.

The coalition government led by Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif must be breathing a collective sigh of relief since Musharraf chose the most practical option rather than dragging the nation through yet more political anxiety.

However, getting rid of Musharraf was perhaps the easiest of tasks. The former Pakistani president’s resignation stems as much from political pressure as it does from Washington’s loss of confidence in him.

Instability and political paralysis remains a very likely prospect. Musharraf’s departure is no quick fix for Pakistan’s problems.

Zardari and Sharif have to somehow subjugate the military apparatus and the intelligence community to civilian rule at a time when security and order are needed most.

As the latest bombing has shown, violence, terrorism and fanaticism pose drastic threats.

At least 23 people were killed Tuesday (Aug 19) when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a hospital in northwest Pakistan.

What will happen or, more precisely, what they will do to Musharraf is another critical question impacting Pakistan’s body politic.

Zardari and Sharif may both bear personal grudges against the retired general.

Zardari, husband of the late Benazir Bhutto, is a former political prisoner. Bhutto had already accused Musharraf of trying to assassinate her three months before she was killed during an attack after a campaign rally.

Sharif, on the other hand, was the elected prime minister whom Musharraf deposed in 1999.

Musharraf in many ways proved a catalyst for cooperation and unity between Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party and Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League.

With Musharraf removed as a protagonist, there are questions as to how long the coalition can sustain itself before the temptation of power becomes too beguiling.

What Pakistan should have learned by now is that there is no quick fix for their troubles.

Musharraf was no quick fix for the ills of a weak civilian administration.

The United States eventually understood propping up a military regime was not a viable means of eradicating terrorism.

And now the ruling administration is recognizing the complexities of politics do not end with Musharraf.

The lasting lesson learned is democracy can eventually trump dictatorships. There is no substitute for the democratic process — despite its often lethargic and painful nature — if a nation seeks a permanent, rather than a quick, solution.