Russia’s recognition of the independence of Georgia’s rebellious regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has thrown Russia’s relations with the West into turmoil but it needs to be ruled out that the world would now slide back into a ‘Cold War’ type polarity, because there is no ideological confrontation in this new ‘East-West’ conflict but a fierce thrust to secure and hold what are seen as spheres of influence.

But the poser arises: was not the East-West polarity in the Cold War decades, all about the super powers securing, holding on to and expanding their spheres of influence? This was certainly the case but the super power rivalry in those years centred mainly on the antagonistic dispensations – capitalism and socialism – and their different models of national development. These contrasting world views, the US and USSR sought to implant on the world through the establishment of spheres of influence and their military arms, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were instrumental in achieving these aims.

How the Cold War and the USSR, as a super power, came to crumble, leaving the US the sole super power, is now history but the predominant force the West would need to contend with in regard to Russia, is nationalism. There is no ‘Socialist Empire’ worth defending and expanding but it is certainly hurting Russian national pride to see its sphere of influence in particularly Eastern Europe, coming under the sway of NATO, its one –time Cold War military rival. It is the perceived shrinking of what it considers is its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe which propelled Russia’s military thrust into Georgia and compelled it to recognise the independence of the rebellious regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, wherein reside substantial, separatist-prone Russian populations. Russian nationalism, therefore, is alive and thriving and this is likely to stand in the way of a steady improvement in the West’s relations with Russia.

But insofar as Russia has embraced capitalist-led ‘development’ its current stand-off with the West over Georgia, is unlikely to have any divisive ideological overtones and to that extent the current confrontation would not portend a Cold War type, explosive antagonism. However, the West may eventually consider the imposition of economic and other non-military sanctions on Russia. Foreshadowing some of these repercussions, US President George Bush warned Moscow to ‘reconsider this irresponsible decision’. He went on to say that, ‘Russia’s action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations’. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner summed up the mood in the West: ‘We fear a war and we don’t want one, if it’s hot, we don’t want it’.

The recognition of the independence of Georgia’s rebellious regions by Russia is an ironic follow-up to the West’s endorsement of Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence ( UDI ), some months back. Then it was Russia which cried ‘foul’ on seeing the dismemberment of Serbia, a state coming under the Russian sphere of influence. Now, it is the West’s turn to exasperate helplessly.

What is important to perceive in both instances is that the respective reactions of the powers are not inspired by any lofty International Law-based principles or ideals, although they may be couched in language that smacks of the latter. The stark reality is that the world’s predominant powers are relentlessly nibbling at each other’s spheres of influence with the aim of eroding each other’s power bases. In other words, the conduct of the West as well as that of Russia in these crises is explainable mainly in Realpolitik rather than any other terms.

It is as if the ‘great international disorder’, voiced by some observers, is relentlessly coming to pass. Indeed, the ‘disorder’ was accelerated when the UN system proved a pliable tool in the hands of the West and when it more or less stood idly by when the US-led military forces undertook their armed incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan. The ‘disorder’, in fact, reached a high point of sorts earlier when NATO violated Serbia’s airspace in 1999, in aid of the rebelling Kosovo province. Unilateral military action by the major powers, to further their geo-strategic interests, had received a major boost.

There is an unsettling message in these developments for the world’s smaller states; particularly those which are fighting tooth and nail to defuse separatist uprisings in their territories. First, they cannot expect their big power mentors and patrons, if they have any, to adopt a principled position on these separatist conflicts. These big powers would ‘sell’ the interests of these minor client states, in the context of these conflicts, if it would serve their vital interests. Second, they would be more or less alone in these struggles to uphold their territorial integrity. Assistance from the ‘international community’ would be slow in coming or it would be half-hearted.