Nobody doubts Victor Ivan’s courage in public interest matters nor does he lack credentials as a fighter against racism. Therefore when in a departure from his usual positions he puts forward an entirely new thesis it is deserving of careful scrutiny.

Victor Ivan’s new thesis

Victor’s seminal contribution appeared on August 17 in Ravaya in Sinhala; hence a brief English summary is needed. Unfortunately the English, Tamil and Sinhala media live in non-intersecting compartments - when is somebody going to have the courage and the money to establish a free flowing cross fertilisation? The thesis is easy to summarise in four cardinal points as it is clearly expressed.

This is a summary of the core arguments which I understand Victor finds truthful. I respond point by point.

I don’t know when Victor reached this conclusion but it has been pretty standard fare for the Marxist left for about two decades. My own writings, since the time of the LTTE’s war against the IPKF and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, have made this point repeatedly. Victor gives pride of place to the impossibility of any Sinhala state granting Eelam. To my mind the main reason is international; in conditions like Kosovo, South Ossetia or Abkhazia, Eelam would be a certainty. The LTTE by antagonising India, murdering Rajiv, getting itself banned all over the world, getting its international supply lines and funding cut, has strangled its own child, Eelam.

However, Marxists for reasons of principle would also record their support of the right of the Tamil people, not the LTTE, to self-determination notwithstanding that the practical possibilities of exercising this right are minimal at the present time.

Victor is plain wrong and he distorts the historical record on this matter. I showed Victor’s article to a lifelong Tamil leftist who is politically engaged and follows events carefully. This was his response:-

Point (b) is the most erroneous and the most dangerous of Victor’s four points. Erroneous because it belies, or at least distorts the historical record, but let me explain why it is also dangerous. The Iron Logic of Victor Ivan (ILVI) proceeds as follows; Thamil Eelam, for whatever reason, is impossible and the military defeat of the Sinhala State by the LTTE is also impossible; the LTTE will never give up the separatist demand; so either Lanka is condemned to eternal war or the only way to peace is militarily defeating the LTTE. Now even if one has reservations about persuading the LTTE to settle for substantial autonomy short of separation, still it is premature to peremptorily write of the possibility since it condemns Lanka to eternal war if the LTTE proves resilient.

ILVI becomes more dangerous when Victor distorts the historical record; let me elaborate. Consider the 1948 disenfranchisement of plantation Tamils, Sinhala Only, 1958 riots, language discrimination, university entrance standardisation, the Sinhala-Buddhist Colvin-Sirima 1972 Unitary Constitution, a constitutional amendment making secessionist views illegal, JR’s worse constitution, 1983 riots, military occupation and rape of Jaffna. Yes this is the old story again, but was it not this that led to the Vadukkodai resolution and the emergence of the LTTE? To argue that separatism is not rooted in this history is not well founded, and to insist that the LTTE, even if given a ‘devolutionary moon’, will never give up separatism hardens probability into absolute certainty. Neither Victor nor I, nor for that matter the LTTE itself, know today where the chips may fall tomorrow.

Victor only tells half the story and omits the other half of the relationship between the Tamils and the LTTE; his incomplete account creates problems in (d) below. He emphasises the undeniable downside which I can summarise better; authoritarian control, oppression of Tamils by the arrogation of monopoly of power, fear psychosis, lack of democracy, extraction of money, child recruitment.

This however is not the totality but only part of the relationship between the Tamil and the Tiger. The fact is that there is also a substantial reservoir of support for the Tigers among Tamils because nearly all know that the military prowess and achievements of the LTTE has made it possible for them to "hold up their heads again and no longer cringe in fear and humiliation", to use a common phrase in the community. Even anti-LTTE Tamils, who oppose the dictatorial conditions, see benefits in the LTTE’s military achievements. Many fear that if the LTTE is vanquished they will return to an age of humiliation and the more traditional minded will encounter emotions of defeat, despair and disillusionment.

Emotionalism aside there is a more important side to the Tamil-Tiger equation. The Sinhala State would not have so much as stopped to give the time of day to the Tamils, let alone discuss federalism, devolution, power sharing, 13th Amendment, APRC etc, unless it had been forced to do so by the situation on the battlefield. Even moderate Tamils like Tiruchelvam got a hearing only because the alternative was the guns of the LTTE.

I am not interested in glorifying the LTTE - far from it. My point is to spell out the multisided, complex and contradictory relationship between the Tamil and the Tiger and to correct Victor’s one-dimensional outlook. Indeed the Tamil people have many accounts to settle with the LTTE, but first they have to settle their accounts with the Sinhala State. If the state of a perceived oppressor attempts to settle it on their behalf, it will fail. It is quite another matter for democratic, leftwing and anti-chauvinist Sinhala and Muslim citizens who have earned their credentials on the national question by standing firmly against chauvinist excesses, to address the Tamil people on issues such as terrorism, democracy in Tamil areas, secession, and constitutional options.

Let us turn to what is likely to be the scenario if the LTTE is completely vanquished. I am not a military expert and access information only in the newspapers; hence I am in no position to say whether such an outcome is likely. Therefore, for the purposes of this article, I am prepared to go along with Victor’s forecast of an impending big LTTE defeat. By big defeat most people mean the fall of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, scattering of cadres and flight or elimination of leaders. OK, so this is the presumed scenario; what after that?

I am in disagreement with Victor’s assertion that the Tamil people will be better off after the defeat. My most forceful assertion is on constitutional matters - to be fair, Victor does not claim that federalism or substantial devolution will follow. If the LTTE is wiped out, let us forget about federalism, deep devolution, autonomy and such pie in the sky. All of this came on the agenda only because of the military balance; remove the military threat and it will disappear from the radar screen. The victorious Sinhala mood, the hard-line character of the regime, the enhanced power of extremists in society and government, and Mr Rajapakse’s own non-pluralist penchant, will ensure this outcome. Agreed, state controlled or quisling politicians will be appointed or ‘elected’ to Tamil districts and they will be able to bargain for concessions on economic and social issues. This is a sub game not to be confused with the main game of devolution and constitution making. Furthermore, I fear that a military triumph scenario will embolden the state towards broader and greater repression and abuse of power, that is, in Southern society as well.

India likes the 13th Amendment, America and the EU may fuss about human rights, Japan will, as usual, whistle in the dark, but with the urgent internal threat removed, Colombo will ignore external pressures and the International Community will have better things to do than fart around a non-existent problem. But the national question will remain unsolved and we know what happens to third world countries (or even second world if you remember Yugoslavia) that fail at national unification and bourgeois democratic tasks.

The Tamils are also likely to be worse off in day to day matters - language of official correspondence, police matters, land allocation, appointments and education. The reason is not deliberate anti-Tamil conspiracies, but with the big pressure gone, ministers, politicians and bureaucrats will lapse into the time honoured tradition of neglecting the public. The Tamil public, powerless in the absence of devolution, will be the most neglected.

The Eastern Province (EP) is showcased as an exemplar of potential economic development in the north if peace and normality return. It is self evident that if there is peace and quiet, life will regenerate, business bustle, trade flourish, and foreign aid and investment permitting infrastructure grow. That’s about as obvious as saying that if someone wins a war and bombs stop dropping, children won’t die! This will happen irrespective of whether peace returns under government occupation or an LTTE regime.