In the absence of a Sri Lankan identity is it possible to sustain the unity of Sri Lanka, particularly in an international environment conducive to separatism?

The Georgian crisis may lead to a new cold war. However it is a powerful fillip to separatism, already strengthened by the example of Kosovo. As Russian President Dimitry Medvedev stated, "We argued consistently that it would be impossible…to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them" (Financial Times – 27.8.2008). Given the economic unfeasibility of sanctions, the West may respond to South Ossetia and Abkhazia the same way Russia responded to Kosovo, by aiding and abetting separatist elements in Chechnya and elsewhere in the heterogeneous Russian Republic. Russia in her turn may assist separatist movements in her pro-Western neighbours. Even if the domino effect which may result from such a tit for tat policy is more regional than global, it will politically strengthen separatist movements the world over, including in Sri Lanka.

Eelam War IV moves into its most critical phase in this new and destabilising international conjuncture. PM Ratnasiri Wickramanayake claimed that Killinochchi may fall by election day; it did not. He declared that the Tigers are on their last legs; less than 48 hours later Air Tigers bombed the Trincomalee Naval Base and escaped unscathed. The LTTE is weak but Vellupillai Pirapaharan still has a couple of aces up his sleeve, such as Air Tigers, Black Tigers and a combination thereof, Black Air Tigers (yet to be experienced). None of these can enable the LTTE to win the war; but by acting as force multipliers they can help the Tigers to avert a defeat.

The other factor which can push the war back into a state of stalemate is India. Delhi’s Sri Lanka policy is shifting, against Sri Lanka. The recent bonhomie towards the TNA and the failure of Indian leaders to unveil the specially built IPKF memorial during their SAARC visit are symbolic of this new direction. India has waited, for almost three years, for the Rajapakse administration to produce a political solution. Without it Delhi cannot remain ‘neutral’ once the war moves into the Tiger heartland, endangering the lives of civilian Tamils holed up there. A reasonable political solution will enable Delhi to pacify Tamilnadu; without such a solution the pressure from Tamilnadu can become irresistable, especially in an election year.

The Possible-Impossible Solution

Is a political solution to the ethnic problem possible without external pressure? Can an externally compelled solution be implemented without destabilising the South?

All Lankan attempts to address Tamil grievences, notably the B-C Pact and the D-C Pact, were stillborn, due to Southern opposition. The provincial council system happened as a result of the Indo Lanka Accord, imposed on the Jayewardene administration by India, which in turn imposed it on the South. Devolution was thus not a home-grown product; nor was it something that the government and the people of Sri Lanka accepted willingly. If the will of a majority of the majority prevailed in 1987 there would have been no 13th Amendment, no provincial councils, no language parity and no recognition of the pluralist nature of Sri Lanka.

The PC system was implemented amidst unprecedented chaos and bloodshed. It need not have been so, because the unprising was not spontaneous but engineered by the JVP with the backing of the SLFP. In their ignorance of devolution (an ignorance fostered by Sinhala extremists) a majority Sinhalese may have distrusted the PC system. But if the SLFP and the JVP acted with responsibility and restraint, the South would not have erupted. SLFPers and JVPers opposed the 13th Amendment for the same reason UNPers supported it – because the respective party leaders willed them to do so.

Most Sinhalese are either UNPer or SLFPers, loyal party men and women who will swallow whatever policy imposed on them by their leaders. When the SLFP leadership opposed devolution and the PC system, ordinary members did likewise. When SLFP adopted a pro-devolution stance under the leadership of Chandrika Bandaranaike, the rank and file fell in line. It was a gigantic shift for the party of Sinhala Only, a party which had been opposed to even mild decentralisation since the abrogation of the B-C Pact. But there was no internal rebellion, no defections at grass-roots level. The transition of the SLFP from a party vicereally opposed to decentralisation to a party backing federalism happened smoothly, because the leader of the time willed it

11 years later the SLFP changed tracks yet again, with equal placidity. During the Presidential election campaign of 2005, the SLFP abandoned its pro-federal stance and reverted to a unitary state policy; this shift away from devolution accelerated under the new Rajapakse leadership. Still the SLFP rank and file fell in line with nary a murmer. The situation is no different in the UNP. There too party loyalty has taken and will take precedence over ideological issues. Rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, what matters in Sri Lanka is party loyalty and not ideology or principles.

Therein can be charted the way out of the Lankan quagmire. If the two main parties come to an agreement, a political solution to the ethnic problem is possible. This is especially so, given the weakening of the JVP; if the performance of the JVP in the recent PC polls is reflective of the national mood, Sri Lanka is back to being a two party democracy. This makes a moderate bi-partisan consensus between the SLFP and the UNP even more feasible. Not a national government but a single issue convergence, with both parties backing a political solution which goes beyond the 13th Amendment and is closer to the Indian model. If the two parties can agree to support such a solution in parliament, and at a referendum and to refrain from using it to attack each other at any future election, the Gordian knot can be untied without destabilising the South. Since the JVP is not banned, it is unlikely to take up arms against such a deal. The JVP will protest and the monks will fast, but if the two main parties hold firm to their moderate line, the storm could be withstood.

That is a possible scenario which, nevertheless, cannot happen. Neither of the two parties will put the interests of the country first. Even if the Rajapakse administration shifts to a moderate stand (an unlikely eventuality), the possible solution will be sabotaged by Mr. Wickremesinghe’s UNP. The Tigers are opposed to devolution because devolution undermines separatism; they will compel Mr. Wickremesinghe to wreck any political solution generous enough to be acceptable to the Tamils, India and the West. Thus the possible solution will remain impossible so long as the SLFP is led by the Rajapakses (who are in thrall to Sinhala extremism) and the UNP is led by Ranil Wickremesinghe (who kowtows to the LTTE).

Undermining Diversity

When Ceylon became independent, she was blessed with good inter-ethnic relations (despite the Sinhala-Muslim riots of 1915). But in the next 50 years, she made error after error, until she became enmeshed in a bloody – and as yet endless - war. Ceylon/Sri Lanka has been moving backwards on the racial and religious fronts for at least fifty years, becoming less inclusive, less tolerant and more bigoted. The USA came into being as a country in which slavery was legal; a bill to prevent lynching was defeated less than 100 years ago; and racial segregation was a fact of life in the American South right into the 1960’s. Despite these inauspicious beginnings and bigoted history, the US has taken giant steps forward in dealing with the issue of race in the last five decades. Barrack Obama may or may not win the Presidency; even if he becomes the President, the economic, social and psychological gaps between whites and blacks will not disappear. Still, because he became the nominee of the Democratic Party, an absolute majority of Black Americans will feel a greater sense of belonging to the country of their birth, making America stronger, more united and more capable of facing the challenges ahead.

In the US, students are taught Black History; the UK is following suit: "All pupils aged between 11 and 14 will be taught about the slave trade and the British empire when term begins next month ….. one of the aims of the switch is to ‘put immigration, the Commonwealth and the legacy of the Empire into a clear historical context...This can help pupils prepare for life in a diverse and multi-ethnic society’" (The Daily Telegraph – 29.8.2008). Sri Lanka, though no less a pluralist country, does nothing to prepare the next generation to deal with the difficulties and challgenges of living in a pluralist society. Most government schools are ethno-religiously segregated, albeit unofficially. An attempt by the PA to end this outrageous and counterproductive practice was abandoned due to protests by Sinhala Buddhist extremists. If the American establishment was similarly subservient to ‘majority opinion’ in the 1960’s, if it gave in to white extremists, segregation would still be alive today and Barrack Obama would be an unknown name.

History, when it is taught in Sri Lankan schools, is mostly Sinhala history, where Tamils figure mainly as enemy aliens. Little wonder that this country perpetrated the Sinhala Only and Black July. While non-Tamil children are not taught Lankan Tamil history, a Sinhala Only version of Lankan history is shoved down the throats of Tamil children. No effort is made to teach positive historical examples of Sinhala-Tamil cooperation, even when such stories are available. One of the abiding myths of Sinhala extremists is that Tamils did not resist colonial occupation. Recently DBS Jeyaraj wrote about a Tamil chieftain who fought the British; Simon Casie-chitty provides a detailed account in the Ceylon Gazetteer of 1834: "Formerly this part of the country (Wanni) was divided into several independent principalities, over each of which a Malabar prince or princess, under the title of Wanniya or Waninchi presided….. Pandara Wanniya (one of the original Wanniyas) raised a formidable insurrection against the British government; and being assisted by the Kandyans, they at once overran all the Northern districts, and had the temerity to penetrate even into the province of Jaffna, as far as the Elephant’s Pass. His object was to recover the independence of Wanny, and to render himself as head of all its principalities…." Here is an example of Tamil resistance to the British and of Sinhala-Tamil cooperation in resisting foreign invaders. Such stories of inter-racial cooperation against a common enemy should be taught in our schools (to balance the ubiquitous and divisive Dutugemunu-Elara stories) because they can become important building blocks of a future Sri Lankan identity. (Incidentally - according to the Tamilweek article - the Tigers commemorate Pandara Wanniya as one of their heroes. Obviously when we succumb to Sinhala chauvinism and develop a Sinhla rather than a Sri Lankan outlook, it encourages Tamil extremism and fosters separatism)