There have been three attempts, so far, to engage the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in peace talks. The third attempt at talks with the LTTE, compared to the previous two attempts (April 1989 – June 1990 and September 1994 – April 1995) was a more formalised peace process, and lasted the longest, from December 2001 till the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was abrogated by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) in January 2008.

Sumanasiri Liyanage’s book covers the period 2001 – 2005. It encompasses several political periods. The period 2001 -2005 falls within the second Kumaratunga administration. December 2001- April 2004 is the period of the Ranil Wickremesinghe UNF (cohabitation) government. The UNF lost in the general elections of April 2, 2004. And Presidential elections on November 15, 2005 saw the election of President Rajapaksa. For a political process as complicated as a peace process, this was a very bumpy political terrain.

The highlight of the peace process was the CFA entered into between the GOSL and the LTTE, which came into effect on February 23, 2002, and the six rounds of negotiations between the two parties from September 2002 – March 2003.

The main feature of the author’s book is that he deals with the subject in a manner that enables the reader to assess the latest peace process with ones that have gone before, and others that may come in the future. He treats the peace process as an exercise with its own format (not necessarily rigid), and stages, and based on which one can assess both its positive qualities, and drawbacks. And he does this by situating the examination of the peace process in the context of the literature on the subject.

Now, the literature on the subject is a formidable field to digest. Some are digestible; and some just are not, especially what is written by those who never got close to a negotiating table. At the same time, those at the negotiating table are often too narrowly focussed on the politics of the ongoing negotiations (‘to cut a deal’). The author is eminently suited to write about a peace process combining these two poles. He is an academic well versed in the literature; at the same time, he has been following the Sri Lanka conflict closely, and writing about it, and commenting about the negotiations between the GOSL and LTTE, while they were ongoing.

The author locates his analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict in the concept of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC) as developed by Edward Azar. Very briefly Azar argues that denial of basic human needs of non-dominant communities lead to PSC. Azar identified four basic needs, namely, (a) security,(b) distinctive identity, (c) social recognition of identity, and (d) fair access to political institutions and effective participation in the processes that determine the conditions of security and identity and other such developmental requirements.

The denial of basic human needs happens in three ways – the result of the strategies and actions of identity groups, the result of state actions and strategies, and the result of built-in properties of conflict. Through this process, the author says, "Many observers agree that the Sri Lankan state has gradually become an ethnically dominant state and view this development as a major cause of the ethnic conflict today."

The author calls Azar’s model "the most satisfactory diagnosis of identity-based conflicts in post-colonial situations."

In giving "An Overview of the Sri Lankan Ethnopolitical Conflict," (Chapter Two), the author wisely does not try to re-hash narratives we are all too familiar with, especially that dangerous minefield as to who came to this country first, where facts do battle with myths.

Of much greater current relevance is the angle the author focuses on: "What was the critical moment within which old ‘ethnic categories’ developed gradually into nationalities?" There is the Sinhala and Tamil nationalism that began in the British colonial period, and Muslim political consciousness that began then, and more recently is taking shape as Muslim ethno-nationalism.

The author, using the Azar model of the four basic needs of ethnic groups, outlines briefly what has now come to be termed "Tamil grievances." He traces the evolution of Tamil politics from efforts at power-sharing at the centre in the mid-1950s, to confrontational politics with the enactment of the Official Language Act of 1956, to non-violent campaigns by Tamil political leaders between 1956 and the mid-1970s ,and the government suppression of them, to the emergence of several armed resistance groups emerged in the 1970s.

Coming to the peace process of 2002-2005, the author asks the question "What led to the Cessation of Hostilities?" (Chapter Three) The question is important, because it has a definite impact on the outcome of negotiations, among other factors..

The author offers a game-theoretic explanation of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), with a simplified explanation and diagram. Game theory can be heavy going, but it is an useful tool of analysis. One can’t navigate oneself through the thinking of conflicting parties just by a seat-of-the pants-approach, when other tools of analysis are available..

The author also very briefly gives the reader what he calls the Architecture of the Peace Process, the structure of the CFA.

The chapter titled Peace Talks 2002-2003 (Chapter Four), is the core of the peace process. It deals with the following areas: Pre-Negotiation Phase: February 2002 – August 2002, the issue of de-proscription of the LTTE which took place on 6 September 2002, the six rounds of Talks from September 2002 – April 2003; the work of the three sub-committees – Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIRHN), Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN) and Sub-Committee on Political Matters, and the Breakdown of Talks and After (April 21, 2003).

Mostly, this chapter gives the factual details of what happened. The author has woven in the activities of the three Sub-Committees and the six rounds of direct GOSL-LTTE talks, so the reader gets a clear picture of the totality of the talks. This chapter provides a reliable basis on which to base ones critique of the peace process.

After the talks broke down with the LTTE announcing on 21 April 2003 their withdrawal from the talks, it was a question of when war would break out again. The author calls the waiting period as an "Interregnum: From the Breakdown of Talks to Fourth Eelam War (Chapter Five).

The significant development of this period was the ‘Changes in Power Configuration,’ that occurred with the breakaway from the LTTE by its Eastern Wing military commander, Col. Karuna., in March 2004.

With the talks unilaterally suspended by the LTTE, the active phase of the peace process comes to an end. The author devotes the last two chapters to looking at some of the overall issues of the peace process. This is, in a way an assessment of the peace process, with the future in mind. Things to look out for, mistakes to avoid and how to do things better, the next time.

One subject the author highlights is the role of the Facilitator, Norway. What were the positive contributions and shortcomings of the Facilitator? There were criticisms of Norway right from the start. But this mostly came from what one could term the hardliners, who saw only a military solution to the conflict, and so saw no use of a Facilitator. But, governments have to look at conflict resolution from a different perspective, and the role a facilitator can play.

Another subject the author highlights, under the heading ‘Strategy and Agenda Setting,’ is what were the strategic and tactical justifications of the GOSL and LTTE when they decided to enter into a CFA. It is not a totally speculative exercise. The author goes through some of the thinking on this subject from the GOSL and LTTE sides, based on the views of the political personalities involved in the process, and the thoughts of commentators who have been following the conflict and the peace process closely. It will show what ‘were the common features in the thinking of the two sides (if any), or the differences.

A third subject the author mentions is the recurrent problems plaguing the implementation of peace agreements. Referring to the literature, he draws attention to six ‘recurrent problems’ (a) vague and expedient peace agreements, (b) lack of coordination between mediators and implementers of agreements, (c) lack of coordination among implementing agencies, (d) incomplete fulfilment of mandated tasks, (e) short-time horizon and limited commitment of implementers, and (f) presence of spoilers. It is an interesting exercise to see how many of these six ‘recurrent problems’ had any relevance in the case of the short-lived peace process of ours.

Domestic conflicts, especially identity-related ones, are awfully complicated. And so is their resolution. There is no one prescribed method. Throughout the book the author is non-dogmatic in his analysis, allowing for other paths and routes. This is seen in the use the author makes of several metaphors and theories to elucidate the points he makes.

To mention a few – when we speak of root causes of a conflict, there is the image of the conflict or the problem as a tree letting its roots deeper and deeper. The author, in addition, speaks of the ‘rhizome’ character of the conflict. A rhizome is a horizontal stem of a plant that is usually found underground, often sending out roots and shoots from its nodes. They send out roots from the bottom of the nodes and also new upward-growing shoots from the top of the nodes. Visualizing the conflict as a rhizome will take us away from mono-cause explanations that are sometimes trotted out, and give us a view of how the conflict has been getting more ramified and complicated over time.

He speaks of ‘capital theory’ when explaining how conflicts widen and deepen.

And on another occasion he uses what he calls a ‘drama theoretic approach.’ This was to examine whether the GOSL should implement the undertakings agreed to at the Geneva 1 round (22-23 February 2006), to disarm para-military groups (Karuna group).

Talking of the need for innovative ideas to keep a peace process from going stale, he uses (borrowed from John Paul Lederach) the metaphors of moving sidewalks (as found in airports) and trampolines (as found in gymnasiums), to explore different paths to conflict resolution.