A jubilant Army Chief Lt. General Sarath Fonseka yesterday met President Mahinda Rajapaksa at Temple Trees to brief him of the recapture of Pooneryn, a key objective of the largest ever combined security forces campaign directed against the LTTE.

Fonseka walked in for yesterday’s meeting with the President as the Task Force I (TF I) commanded by Brigadier Shavindra Silva battled its way towards the Jaffna lagoon, a major accomplishment in the overall battle plan.

The victory came amid weeks of media speculation that New Delhi was forcing Colombo to call off the offensive and resume fresh negotiations with the LTTE.

Army headquarters Friday evening said that the TF I had positioned about 500 metres south of Nallur, a village along the Pooneryn-Paranthan road. But the 12 GW (Gemunu Watch) and 10 GR (Gajaba Regiment), after successfully negotiating marshlands south of Pooneryn had cut across the Paranthan-Pooneryn road (B 69) road close to Nallur. Once they secured Nallur, badly depleted enemy units at Pooneryn had retreated as troops backed by armoured fighting vehicles approached the town, situated about 10 kilometres away.

Battlefield reports indicated that LTTE units had withdrawn towards Kalmunai point. After meeting the Army Chief, the President in a short statement aired over the national television reiterated his call to LTTE leader Velupillai Prtabhakaran to surrender.

Yesterday’s action effectively cut off one of the two major LTTE sea supply routes. The bottom line is that Sea Tigers had lost all their bases along the north-western coast for the first time in the entire Eelam war. This would be one of the three major battlefield defeats suffered by the LTTE in the entire war with others being the loss of Jaffna in 1995 and the entire eastern province later.

The navy and SLAF played critical roles in the overall campaign with intelligence services of all services including that of the elite Special Task Force contributing to success on different fronts.

War veteran Sarath Fonseka told The Sunday Island that taking Pooneryn had been a key objective. He said that his troops were now well positioned to go ahead with planned operations to liberate remaining areas held by the LTTE.

Army headquarters raised the TF I especially to regain the Mannar-Pooneryn land route to pave the way for restoration of the Sangupiddy causeway, a task which about a year ago seemed impossible and Pooneryn impregnable.

The TF I overcame stiff resistance to register its first major victory in May this year. The fall of Adampan (May 9, 2008) was the beginning of the enemy’s end as the TF I maintained pressure along a wide front.

During their march, the TF I wrested control over the Adampan, Andankulama, Parappakadattan, Vidattaltivu, Iluppaikkaddavai, Vellankulama, Molonkavil, Nachchikudha, Vannerikulama, Manniyankulama , Pallawarayankaddu , Chunnavil, Nochchimoddai and Chempankundu areas .

Once the army captured Nachchikada, the fate of LTTE’s Pooneryn base was sealed. The LTTE used Pooneryn as a launching pad for attacks on the Jaffna peninsula on many occasions with the offensive launched in August 2006 being one of the major coordinated actions undertaken by them. Pooneryn had been a major artillery and mortar launching point for over a decade since the army vacated the base during the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s first tenure as the President.

    The TF I in its final push towards Pooneryn covered about nine kilometres in about 48 hours to reach the strategic township in the early hours of Saturday.

The capture of Pooneryn would speed up the collapse of LTTE resistance west of the A9 road. The TF I’s progress would also facilitate the offensive action carried out by the 57 Division deployed in its right flank. The 57 Division is heading towards Kilinochchi.

The eventual collapse of LTTE power in the western part of the Vanni region would give the army chief an opportunity to push eastwards across the A9 road at a point north of Kilinochchi and south of Elephant Pass. The LTTE, struggling to resist four fighting formations (57 Division and three Task Forces), on the western part of the Vanni region, would soon experience a similar situation developing in the area east of the A9.

If the LTTE hadn’t already shifted at least a section of its forces deployed on the Jaffna front to reinforce units battling altogether five fighting formations, it would be soon compelled to withdraw both men and material. The Jaffna frontline stretches for about 12 kilometres on the neck of the Jaffna peninsula.

A major army push eastwards across the A9 north of Paranthan would make LTTE fortifications on the neck of the peninsula useless.

The army lost the A9 route to the Jaffna peninsula at the beginning of Eelam War II in June 1990. The security forces and police deployed in the Jaffna peninsula had to depend on the costly sea and air supply routes. Although the Norwegian brokered CFA envisaged the movement of unarmed security forces and police personnel along the A9, it never materialised. The LTTE made two major attempts in early 2000 and August 2006 to cut off the supply lines and isolate the peninsula.

Against this backdrop, it would be pertinent to discuss an attempt to cut off the Jaffna peninsula at a time the LTTE controlled the Jaffna peninsula except Palaly, Kankesanthurai and Elephant Pass and several islands. Had the military strategy spearheaded by war veteran Major General Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne succeeded, the war against the LTTE would have received a turbo boost. They almost succeeded in cutting off the Jaffna peninsula before the LTTE reversed the trap by destroying an isolated navy base at Nagathevanthurai, tasked with disrupting LTTE movements across the Jaffna lagoon. The SLN directed operations against LTTE movements between Punchi Paranthan on the Vanni mainland and Kilali on the Jaffna peninsula.

During the north-east monsoon, supplies required by the troops based at the isolated Elephant Pass base had to be brought to Comar, situated between Pooneryn junction and K point and then moved overland to Nagathevanthurai before moving them in Inshore Patrol Craft (IPCs) to Elephant Pass. When weather permitted, supplies were brought in at Vettilaikerni on the Mullaitivu coast and moved overland to Elephant Pass. Some supplies were also moved in helicopters.

As the army controlled Elephant Pass as well as Ooriyan and Kombadi points, the LTTE had no option but to move supplies across the Jaffna lagoon, the scene of bloody clashes between the Sea Tigers and the navy.

Rear Admiral Clancy Fernando who succeeded Vice Admiral Ananda Silva on August 1, 1991, when the latter went on leave prior to retirement on November 1, 1991, spearheaded the naval action. The soft talking Navy Chief, a veteran in the service almost missed the opportunity to command the service due to him being called a staunch SLFPer but the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa elevated him to the rank of Vice Admiral.

The naval action directed from Nagathevanthurai earned the navy chief the wrath of the LTTE leaders who ordered his assassination in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Charles believed to be the second-in-command of Sea Tigers. An assassin on a motor cycle rammed the Vice Admiral’s car on November 16th near the Taj Samudra as he was on his way to navy headquarters.

During his short stint as the navy chief, Fernando sought to enhance relations with his Indian counterparts. One of the highlights of his visit to India in late January 1992 was his meeting with the then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha Jayaram. The LTTE blew him up a few months after a landmine blast claimed the lives of Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne, the architects of the siege on the Jaffna peninsula. The August blast crushed any hope of a sustained military campaign against the LTTE. Although, the navy launched operations from Nagathevanthurai, the army didn’t engage in any major offensive action for over a year after the loss of Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne.

Finally the then Army Chief Lt. General Cecil Waidyaratne ordered "Operation Yal Devi’ in late September/early October 1993 to destroy the Kilali boat points. The army lost about 125 officers and men in the five-day offensive but failed to achieve any strategic objective. The loss of two precious T 55 main battle tanks made the situation worse.

But nothing could have been as irrational as returning to Elephant Pass after reaching Kilali. In the second week of November, the LTTE launched a multi-pronged assault on Nagathevanthurai navy base and the army at Pooneryn. Despite taking heavy losses, the attackers forced the navy to abandon its base while the army had to give up a large part of the area under its control.

The attack came amid talks between the UNP government and the LTTE facilitated by the UNHCR to restore the Sangupiddy causeway.

A court of inquiry revealed negligence on the part of the army top brass to take counter measures despite clear evidence of an LTTE build-up against Nagathevanthurai-Pooneryn complex.