The restoration of democracy in the east, has been a success. When the Eastern Provincial Council was first formed some months ago, there was a spat between M.L.A.M.Hisbulla and Pillaiyan over the chief minister’s post and it looked as if the normalcy that had been achieved would not last in the atmosphere of Tamil-Muslim ethnic tensions in the province. But since then things have worked out well and Hisbulla and Pillaiyan have been working together in a manner no one anticipated. Last week, in an interview with the Island, Hisbulla was effusive in his praise of Pillaiyan. When Pillaiyan’s secretary was shot dead in Athurugiriya, by unknown assailants last Thursday, Pillaiyan and Hisbulla arrived together at the scene of the attack in a show of solidarity. This Tamil- Muslim rapprochement is one of the most positive developments in Sri Lankan politics in recent times and it augurs well for the people of the east. It is not from this front that problems will emerge in the province, but from within the Tamil community itself.

We often hear of TMVP cadres being shot dead, with others going missing. There was an instance like that some days ago in Batticaloa. The latest killing involving the TMVP is that of Pillaiyan’s secretary in Athurugiriya. Even though many people think that this bloodletting is part of the tussle between Karuna and Pillaiyan for control over the TMVP, what is actually happening is very different. There are at present around 1,200 cadres in the east belonging to the TMVP. They live under the supervision of the Army intelligence wing. Until a few months ago, the main problem confronting the government was the reestablishment of government control over the east and the normalization of civilian life. This has been achieved to a large extent and with elections being held, quite a few ex-LTTE cadres have made the transition from terrorist to politician. But one blind spot in the government’s otherwise excellent plan to bring normalcy to the east is the rehabilitation of the ex-LTTE cadres who are now in the TMVP. This lapse is now jeopardizing the hard won peace in the east.

The unpalatable peace

After years of fighting, many of them know no other life than that with the gun. Only those with a certain bent of mind will take to the life of a terrorist. That kind of life has certain attractions. Even though all we hear in government propaganda is of LTTE cadres being cruelly treated by the LTTE – the latest such propaganda ploy being the captured government teacher of English, the fact is that membership of this feared terrorist organization gives many an opportunity to lord it over the local population. When the JVP took up in arms in the late eighties, we saw the same phenomenon in the south.

Young men and women from the numerically small, underprivileged castes and other oppressed sections of the population saw wielding a gun as the means of reversing roles. Similarly, the TMVP cadres were for a long time, used to lording it over the people in the east, not just the Tamils but the Muslims and the Sinhalese as well. So long as the LTTE was around and there was an enemy to fight, these cadres were kept on their toes. But after peace was restored and the tasks that need to be done with the gun minimized, they are at a loose end. Asking them to re-integrate into civilian life is easier said than done because many of them have never known any civilian life. Moreover, in civilian life many of them will have to bow their heads to those who would have earlier cringed at the mere sight of them and that cannot be a palatable prospect for many of these ex-LTTErs. The problem that the government is facing now in the east will one day confront them in the north as well and it is best to formulate some solutions now.

At present what is happening in the east is that these 1,200 or so TMVP cadres are being maintained with a monthly allocation of around Rs. 10 million which is inadequate. This works out to less than Rs. 9,000 per cadre. They need something like Rs. 25 million a month to maintain their cadre in the east. This money was obtained until recently by the usual means adopted by the LTTE to raise money for their cadres’ upkeep – an arrack ‘tax’ in the area of their control. A ‘tax’ of Rs 30 was charged on every bottle of arrack sold in the east and especially the Batticaloa district. This went to maintain the TMVP cadres. This has now been stopped for some time and is causing serious problems within the TMVP ranks. While it is true that the government had to put a stop to the illegal taxation and extortion to give the people the feeling that normalcy had returned, this has been having a negative impact on those who had got used to relying on these sources of income for their livelihood.

The LTTE too may have their lean periods, but generally speaking, an LTTE cadre was looked after by the organization which had the resources to do so. As of now the ex-LTTE cadres in the TMVP miss not only the power they exercised when they were in the LTTE but also the financial benefits they got from it. The LTTE had no compunction about squeezing whatever they wanted, be it money or personnel, from the civilian population that they controlled. The TMVP cadres now have to get used to restraints that they never had to face when they were in the LTTE. Only a few TMVP cadres will get into mainstream politics and become politicians like their leaders. The rest will have to look for new occupations. There are plans afoot to absorb about 300 cadres into the state security apparatus and some of the cadres are in favor of this. But it still leaves out many who do not fancy the option of joining the state forces.

Frustrated fighters

Thus far the government has not put in place any rehabilitation project for the ex-TMVP cadres as was done after the JVP insurrection. There was one project where JVP cadres were sent to Japan for vocational training. What the TMVP cadres who are averse to serving in the state security apparatus needs is something on those lines. It may be a valuable exercise for the government to look at international experiences in rehabilitating former terrorists and aiding their entry into normal life. The mechanism set in place by the Indians vis-a-vis the former Sri Lankan terrorist groups would be a pointer in this direction. More than twenty years after the Accord, many Sri Lankan Tamil ex-terrorists are still on the payroll of the Indian government in accordance with terms offered for the surrender of weapons.

What is happening in the east is rubbing the ex-terrorists of the TMVP on the wrong side. On the one hand their sources of income such as the arrack tax has been done away with in the name of restoring normalcy. Furthermore, with the return of normalcy, the forces of law and order have returned, with the police checking the licenses and identity cards of the very people who exercised the sole right to do that earlier. In former times, anyone checking their IDs was unthinkable. These minor irritants have generated a great deal of frustration among the remaining TMVP cadres and they have become easy prey for LTTE recruiters. Already, nearly seventy TMVP cadres are said to have gone back to the LTTE. The modus operandi has been for the LTTE to order those who want to return to prove their loyalty by killing as many TMVP cadres as they can before rejoining the LTTE. Once this happens, the TMVP cadre is committed for good to the LTTE and has no way of going back to the TMVP even if he has second thoughts.

This is also a way for the LTTE to ensure that no double crossers enter their ranks. Because of the numerous incidents involving TMVP cadres shooting at their own, many people in Colombo think the LTTE has infiltrated the TMVP. These are not infiltrators but frustrated TMVP cadres trying to go back to their old life. As a matter of fact the government should give as much thought to rehabilitating the rank and file gun-carrying member of the TMVP as it does to building bridges and roads in the east.

In an interview last week, Minister M.L.A.M.Hisbulla told the Island that if these TMVP cadres don’t allow the people of the east to cultivate, the Muslim and Sinhalese farmers would not be able to go about their work in peace. Thus the capacity of these cadres to upset the applecart in the east is enormous. While it is true that the LTTE is in a bad way and is hardly able to inspire new recruits to join them voluntarily, some among the TMVP cadres may prefer to rejoin the Tigers and go down with them if necessary rather than living as nonentities and ‘has beens’ in the east.

The attraction that a terrorist group may have for rural youth will be the same as the attraction the criminal underworld has for urban youth. You live for the day and live well while life lasts. While nothing about life will be certain, they will at least be feared if not respected by society. Above all, they will not be the underdogs in society so long as they are alive. What we have in the TMVP in the east is several hundred men of the same mentality who’d rather live well for the day rather than being underdogs for a lifetime.

We will of course have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that there will be a certain proportion of incorrigibles who will never be rehabilitated whatever the government does. Leaving that element out, the government has a duty to do something more than throwing open the armed forces to the TMVP. The rule of applying normal criteria to these TMVP cadres is wrong. If one applies the normal rules for recruitment to the armed forces, even the area commanders of the TMVP may make it only to the lowest ranks. Likewise, if in going for foreign employment, these cadres are asked to follow the usual procedure, none of them will ever make it. These are people who have never presented themselves for interviews or been sent from pillar to post by government bureaucrats. There has to be some sort of special arrangement for these people to be able to make it back to the mainstream. Overseas training, as in the case of ex-JVP cadres, and foreign employment in developed countries would be a good option that the government should negotiate for these ex-LTTE cadres.

Enjoined to silence

When the UNP working committee met last week, one of the matters taken up was the constitutional amendment to have a deputy leader and an assistant leader appointed. Tissa Attanayake read out the criteria decided on by the committee of party seniors. Among this was the criterion that whoever is appointed deputy leader should not have any personal agendas and should take on the government both inside and outside parliament. At this point S.B.Dissanayake stood up and suggested an amendment to the criteria to the effect that once the UNP formed a government, this deputy leader should also attack the opposition both inside and outside parliament!

Speaking at the working committee meeting, party leader Wickremesinghe said that some people were making defeatist statements to the effect that the UNP could not win and that this had to stop. The party had to unite and defeat the government. At this point, Dr Ranjith Atapattu had stood up and said that the party can win under Wickremesinghe’s leadership. The leader need not speak on everything; he should get others to do the talking while he handled things behind the scenes. Attapattu advised the leader to talk less.

When the UNP(D) parliamentary group met last week, the main topic of discussion had been the invitation extended to them by the SLFP and to discuss on what side they would be contesting the next election. They did a review of what had been achieved from the point that they decided to support the government. The main platform on which the group had decided to support the government was to end the war against terrorism and most of those present were of the opinion that this objective was being met. Those present expressed their satisfaction at the fact that their support had enabled the restoration of civil administration in the east and to clear large areas of the north including the entire Mannar district. However it was emphasized that there were certain policies and practices of the government with which they could not agree.

There had been a frank exchange of ideas with the SLFP in this regard and the UNP(D) group’s suggestions to the SLFP would be handed over to them before the end of this month. As we reported in past weeks, the initiative to rejoin the UNP had come more from within the UNP(D) group than from within the mainline UNP. This was mainly due to considerations of getting re-elected to parliament if a snap parliamentary election is held. Some members of the UNP(D) group feel that they will have no chance of getting elected on the UPFA ticket and if they make their way back to the UNP they may stand a chance.

It must be said that from the UNP side, there has been scant interest in getting the UNP(D) group back even though certain individuals like Rukman Senanyake have been trying to do some work in this direction. If there is any lack of enthusiasm on Wickremesinghe’s part, that is understandable, because the negotiations to get the 17 defectors back will once again raise the question of amending the party constitution and pruning the leader’s powers – a situation that Wickremesinghe obviously wants to avoid. Bringing up this topic of reforms once again may in fact spark a fresh rebellion within the party. The UNP(D) cannot hold discussions with the UNP unless the latter shows some flexibility with regard to the factors that led to the split. The UNP has to demonstrate that something has changed if the UNP(D) group is to be able to justify a return. So there’ll be a cost to the UNP and its leader if these defectors were to return. But what will be the net benefit to the UNP and its leader?

Between two stools

This is where the hitch is. Even if all 17 defectors return to the UNP (a highly unlikely scenario) the UNP will still not be able to topple the government. Moreover, if any of the 17 defectors leave the government and create vacancies, there’ll be plenty of takers from those within the UNP at present who are looking for an escape route. This is probably why the UNP has made no plans whatsoever to try and topple the government at the budget readings. If there is no net benefit for the UNP in taking the 17 defectors back, and it will only inflame rebellious tendencies within the UNP, then the probability is that the UNP will not want them back. Even though some members of the UNP(D) group were hopeful that the UNP would call off the disciplinary inquiries against them as a peace overture, nothing of the sort has happened. The clear message seems to be that even if some members of the UNP(D) group may want to go back, the UNP is no longer interested in having them back unless they return not as a group but individually and unconditionally.

When this columnist asked the general secretary of the UNP(D) group what would happen if there is no change within the mainline UNP, he said that in such an event, the status quo will remain as it is. Despite the noises made by some members of the UNP(D) group indicating their willingness to return to the UNP, there has been no reaction from the SLFP which in normal circumstances, would have been loud in their denunciations of treachery. This is because the president had given strict instructions to the SLFPers to refrain from making any comments on the matter and to allow him to handle the UNP(D) group. In any event, this inability to make a quick decision as to whether they were fish or fowl or running with the hare or hunting with the hounds has done irreparable damage to the entire UNP(D) group. They are not wanted by the UNP and are now mistrusted by the SLFP as well.

Last week, the JVP and the JNP marked the 19th death anniversary of the JVP founder Rohana Wijeweera who was killed on the 13th of November 1989 as the insurrection launched by his party wound to a close. Wijeweera, a terrorist by the standards of ordinary people, was by the reckoning of those of a Marxist background the only truly revolutionary Marxist leader that this country has produced. Power was always Wijeweera’s motive and like all other revolutionary Marxist leaders, a few dead bodies here and there were not seen by Wijeweera as a moral obstacle to pursue the goal of political power. Overall, Wijeweera was a failure. He brought nothing but destruction to those who followed him and the dream he pursued evaporated with the sudden collapse of socialism globally while his second insurrection was in progress.

The JNP which broke away from the mainline JVP marked the occasion in a unique way. Instead of holding a public commemoration, the politburo, central committee and the leading activists of the party crammed into the Library Services Board auditorium in a closed door gathering to participate in a programme titled ‘Wijeweera soya yema’ (Searching for Wijeweera). No members of the public or the press were invited and it was a gathering meant only for the faithful. The highlight of this programme was the participation of two or three senior JVP activists who had worked with Wijeweera. Among them was Senaratne de Silva and the former secretary of the JVP’s trade union wing D.R.Liyanaarachchi who had left the JVP around 1985. One of the things that Liyanaarachchi had told the gathering about Wijeweera was that he ‘stood out among the politburo of that time’. Almost all members of the JNP had probably never seen Wijeweera in the flesh much less talked to him even though they would have been within the clandestine organization he led in the mid to late 1980s.