Some Tamil websites have splashed the news that Indian Premier Manmohan Singh and Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse have agreed on a strategy for the next phase to fit Congress Party electoral needs and suit the Lankan regime’s next stage plans. Versions of the story doing the round of the Tamil diaspora seem plausible. Be that as it may, let us, even on a speculative basis, consider the options available to Congress and Rajapakse during, say the next six months. Prabaharan’s Heroes Day message will be broadcast after I dispatch this to my Editor, but will be available at the time of reading, hence my musings can be adjusted as necessary.

The strategy in outline

I have called the story plausible since it comes across as a compilation of the minimum common factors to suit the needs of both governments; neither entirely, but a fair compromise. South India is on the boil and general elections are due in six months. Congress was facing lousy prospects across the Hindi cow-belt even before the global economic crash; and now it is becoming clear that the Indian economy is not as "decoupled" as many, yours faithfully included, had hoped. Moreover, the Indian government has not announced state directed economic stimulus programmes to turn the economy forcefully towards the internal market. Even the recently announced Chinese $570 billion programme is disappointing, not bold enough in redirecting the economy, but India has not proposed anything at all; perhaps because, in any case, domestic demand drives the economy more than exports. Jeremy Warner writing from Delhi in World Slowdown Threatening India, on 21 November, on the web says:

"House prices are plummeting, credit markets have become frozen, business and consumer confidence collapsing, the auto industry is at a standstill, and the stock market is off more than 50 per cent. To the apparent bewilderment of policymakers and business leaders here, the banking crisis has arrived with a vengeance, with credit markets in disarray and demand across a broad swath of industries in free fall. The decoupling theory lies in tatters, and though there is no talk yet of outright recession, for growth to slow even by a couple of percentage points in a country where 10 million are entering the workforce every year is grim enough".

This is somewhat exaggerated, but the moral of the story is that Congress is plunging into an election with the economy in a spin and its political standing in the UP-Bihar-Orissa-MP-Rajasthan north central regions shattered. It is facing electoral defeat; if the Tamil Nadu (TN) turns against it (strictly speaking its DMK coalition ally) the Sonia-Singh led UPA coalition will be routed. It is a matter of supreme importance for the UPA government to cool things down in TN at least some months before May 2009. The Indian establishment is not as daft as to think (sometimes, though, one is not sure) that it can pull of a political solution to the national question in Lanka, not even an emasculated 13th Amendment version, quickly. But a ceasefire and perhaps talks about talks may be enough to cool all but the most febrile hotheads in TN.

Unsurprisingly, the corner stone of the purported strategy is said to be that Colombo has been given a deadline. ‘Crush the Tigers to whatever extent is possible, even take Kilinochchi if you can, and then declare a ceasefire’. That the SL military is throwing everything it has into the offensive and sustaining heavy losses without flinching adds credibility to this view; maybe the deadline is drawing nigh. The second pincer in this movement is to ensure that the LTTE accepts the ceasefire. The Tigers have said they will agree to a ceasefire; obviously, they have their backs to the wall. And if a little international prodding is needed, that too can also be arranged.

Until recently Delhi gave Rajapakse carte blanche, providing even surreptitious military and logistical support, hence the reason for the shift in policy, assuming that the speculation thus far is correct, is the mounting pressure from TN and the possibility that it could snowball into a mass street phenomenon. There is no likelihood of TN mobilisation petering out; if anything the BJP is milking the situation and will carry the nettle into the north. BJP TN State President L. Ganesan promised that if elected to power, the party would "solve the problem within six months" and that Rajapakse’s "refusal to stop the war is an insult to India". The sting was reserved for Manmohan Singh: "The UPA Government is not respected by other countries and the prestige and influence of India have declined after Manmohan Singh took over as Premier". Or in the language of my dear departed buddy C.B.P.M. Wijedoru: "Singh has no balls".

Flies in the ointment

Assuming that there is some such done deal between the governments of India and Lanka, there is nevertheless no guarantee that the Lankan side can or will deliver. First there is the possibility of malafides; this regime is famed for deception and Singh is said to be a compliant and ineffectual leader easily taken for a ride. But even if deceit is not Colombo’s intentional agenda, if the war goes well, then to stop short of a comprehensive victory will be anathema to Rajapakse’s chauvinist allies and the military, and indeed will run counter to his own instincts. Singh may find the rug pulled from under his feet and his vitals too impotent to say boo.

If this fly doesn’t spoil the game there is alternative possibility that quite the opposite fly may dip its feet in the ointment. If against all expectations the LTTE does well on the military front for another, say two months – that is to say it forces a stalemate of sorts – then it becomes more difficult for Rajapakse to declare a ceasefire, and perhaps it will also make the Tigers cocky and less interested in one. My view is that it would be feasible for Rajapakse to face the Sinhalese people after a victory and appear to be magnanimous to the Tamils; but this view is contested by others who believe that Rajapakse will agree to a ceasefire only if the military is checkmated. Choose your side. Which of these flies will get a chance to contaminate the ointment will be clear within a few weeks; either the military will take Kilinochchi now, or if it fails, will in effect have handed the LTTE a significant psychological gain.

Ancillary plays

Currently, there are two ancillary plays on the Lankan side. When to call a general election has been a hot topic for months. The government held back after the Eastern Province and the NCP-Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council electoral victories. Now, with Pooneryn and Mankulam in the bag, it is still hesitating; perhaps Kilinochchi will be the big one. Since the Tigers are not going to lie down and play dead whatever the outcome in Kilinochchi, to delay may be electorally fatal. The procrastination is difficult to understand because the regime is unlikely to get a better opportunity to camouflage its failures, rights violations, and racism. Nor is it sensible to allow the passage of time to risk the eviction of its patron, Manmohan Singh. If I was the betting type, I would offer a wager that there will be a parliamentary general election in Lanka before India, say early next year.

Secondly, it is considered likely that the regime will use the implements of state power to obliterate formal (legal) Tamil nationalism in the North. Harassment using charges of violation of the abominable 6th Amendment, intimidation, and abuse of armed power, may be deployed to electorally eliminate the TNA from the North and install pliant quislings in parliament and a putative Provincial Council. Lanka is as yet far from fascist, but the regimes unyielding determination to obliterate democracy, widespread political misconduct and sleaze, a gutless UNP in shambles - with disloyal types in its bosom hardly makes things easier – and a racially supercharged Sinhala public dancing in the streets, all this does not auger well. The eviction of this regime from office would be welcome, but the forces for this task have still to consolidate.