For the LTTE struggling to resist a relentless army assault on its remaining Vanni bases, the Mumbai terror attacks couldn’t have taken place at a worse time.

Terrorists struck India’s financial capital Mumbabi where they massacred over 160 civilians including several foreigners shortly before LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s plea for Indian intervention was made. In his Heroes Day speech, the beleaguered LTTE commander pleaded with India to come to its rescue. What Prabhakaran and his supporters around the globe wouldn’t have anticipated was a massive terrorist attack on India.

Against the backdrop of the Mumbai mayhem, no Indian politician or official would dare to pressure President Mahinda Rajapaksa to call off Sri Lanka’s longest ever combined security forces campaign to defeat the LTTE.

Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi’s high profile campaign to compel Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to come to Prabhakaran’s rescue will now die a natural death.

The Mumbai massacre should totally change India’s position on terrorism, the way 9/11 al Qaeda attack on the US forced the Bush administration to go all out against the perpetrators. The US campaign gave a turbo boost to Sri Lanka’s efforts to defeat the LTTE on the battlefield. The unprecedented assault on Mumbai embarrassed nuclear armed India. Her intelligence services were caught sleeping again.

Although the circumstances were different, unprecedented attack on Male in early November 20 years ago by a group of PLOTE cadres trained and armed by India revealed the danger of promoting terrorism. Had they succeeded, Male would have turned into another battlefield. India had to land troops to save the Maldivian government. Subsequent investigations revealed a Maldivian group based in Colombo had hired PLOTE to take over the Maldivian government.

Lanka in its latest issue made an attempt to link the LTTE with the group which carried out the Mumbai massacre. The pro-JVP organ claimed that the LTTE had supplied arms, ammunition and equipment to the attackers. Nothing could be as ridiculous as this against the backdrop of the LTTE’s attempt to strike a new relationship with India. Had the LTTE known through its international contacts of an impending assault on India, it would have alerted New Delhi.

Prabhakaran’s appeal to India revealed his rapidly deteriorating military strength. This is what he said, "Our freedom movement, as well as our people, have always wished to maintain cordiality with the international community as well as neighbouring India. With this in view, we wish to create a viable environment and enhance friendship. We wish to express our goodwill and are looking forward to the opportunity to build a constructive relationship. Cordially I invite those countries that have banned us, to understand the deep aspirations and friendly overtures of our people, to remove their ban on us and to recognise our just struggle."

"Today, there are great changes taking place in India. The dormant voices in support of our struggle are re-emerging aloud again. There are also indications of our struggle becoming accepted there. The positive change in environment gives us courage to seek renewal of our relationship with the Indian super power. The earlier approach and interventions of India were injurious to the people of Tamil Eelam, as well as to their struggle. The racist Sinhala state, with its intrigues, conspired to bring enmity between our freedom movement and the earlier Indian administration. The conflict arising out of this environment aggravated into a major war."

"It was because we were firmly committed to our conviction and freedom for our people, that friction erupted between our movement and India. However, at no stage did we ever consider India as an enemy force. Our people always consider India as our friend. They have great expectations that the Indian super power will take a positive stand on our national question."

"Notwithstanding the dividing sea, Tamil Nadu, with its perfect understanding of our plight, has taken heart to rise on behalf of our people at this hour of need. This timely intervention has gratified the people of Tamil Eelam and our freedom movement and given us a sense of relief. I wish to express my love and gratitude at this juncture to the people and leaders of Tamil Nadu and the leaders of India for the voice of support and love they have extended. I would cordially request them to raise their voice firmly in favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and to take appropriate and positive measures to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship between India and our movement."

The LTTE thwarted the government’s attempt to capture Kilinochchi ahead of Prabhakaran’s much awaited speech. Despite taking heavy casualties, LTTE units defending Kilinochchi and Paranthan managed to repulse a multi-pronged offensive launched by 57 Division and Task Force I (TF I) on November 23. Had they succeeded, Kilinochchi-Paranthan stretch of Kandy-Jaffna A9 would have come under government control. Inclement weather, too, caused immense problems to fighting formations deployed on the Vanni front. Although the LTTE thwarted the offensive, the fall of Kilinochchi and Paranthan would be inevitable as it rapidly lost men and material.

The 57 Division launched tasked with capturing Kilinochchi had engaged LTTE units deployed at Adampan situated about 7.5 kilometres west of the Kilinochchi town centre. Troops of 12 SR (Sinha Regiment) and 9 GR (Gajaba Reiment) had battled strong LTTE units for about five hours before defenders abandoned about two square kilometre patch held by them. As the battle at Adampan came to an end, 3 GR troops had launched an operation at Pudumrippuukulam, west of Kilinochchi.

Two other battalions namely 8 and 10 Light Infantry, too, had faced heavy resistance as they advanced towards Therumurukkandy junction along the Akkarayankulam road.

TF I engaged LTTE units north of Adampan in a bid to facilitate the offensive action carried out by the 57 Division. 17 GW (Gemunu Watch), 12 GR and 8 SR operating under TF I tasked with capturing Paranthan had been involved in the action north of Adampan.

Both 57 Division and TF I suffered heavy losses. The LTTE, too, suffered considerable losses as it desperately resisted the army advance on Kilinochchi, one of the two major towns along the A9 still under its control.

Inclement weather is likely to help the LTTE to prolong its control over Kilinochchi and Paranthan. Once TF I and 57 Division regained Kilinochchi and Paranthan, the collapse of LTTE fortifications north of Paranthan along the A9 towards Elephant Pass would be just a matter of weeks.

The offensive action launched over the weekend fuelled intense media speculation of imminent fall of Kilinochchi. Both electronic and print media reported the immediate collapse of Kilinochchi ahead of Heroes Day.

Meanwhile, Task Force III last Tuesday (November 25) captured Olumadu, situated five kilometres north-east of Mankulam along the 49 kilometre Mankulam-Mullaitivu road (a 34). TF III is expected to push along the road and link up with 59 Division conducting operations on the Weli Oya front. Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa told The Sunday Island that this would be a reality soon.

The army lost bases at Olumadu, Mankulam, Oddussudan and several other areas along the A9 southwards of Mankulam in the first week of November, 1999. It was one of the worst ever battlefield defeats suffered by the army. There was no doubt that it facilitated the LTTE offensive directed at Elephant Pass forcing the army to give up the gateway to Jaffna.

In a series of battles targeting troops of 54 Division headquartered at Elephant Pass, the LTTE forced the army to gradually vacate areas under its control including Vettilaikerni beachhead. The army abandoned Elephant Pass in late April 2000 and reached Jaffna city limits before recently slain Major General Janaka Perera and the then Security Forces Commander Jaffna, Brigadier Sarath Fonseka, stopped the enemy advance. The rest is history.

The impending link-up between Task Force III and 59 Division on the eastern flank and the capture of the remaining stretch along the A9 will pave the way for the final stage of the offensive. Let me emphasise that the fall of Paranthan will make LTTE deployment along the Elephant Pass-Pallai stretch untenable. The LTTE leadership will have no option but to retreat from Elephant Pass-Pallai stretch and re-positioned units east of A9 in a bid to stall the army advance towards Mullaitivu.

Once major operations on the western flank and the neck of the Jaffna peninsula come to an end, hopefully before end of this year, the army will have a large force including the Mechanised Infantry to finish off the LTTE. 59 Division now operating about 13 kilometres south of Mullaitivu town area is also gradually pushing westwards in the direction of TF III troops.

The LTTE struggling to resist the 59 Division advancing on Mullaitivu will soon face TF III advancing along the Mankulam-Oddusuddan-Mullaitivu road and TF I on the Paranthan-Puthukkudiyiruppu-Mullaitivu road.