However, I am not as sanguine about KG’s enthusiasm for the Donoughmore constitution that was in operation from 1931 until it was replaced by the Soulbury constitution in 1947. KG’s principal concern is about the adversarial nature of Sri Lankan politics and this is what has turned his attention to the Donoughmore model.

It is well known that the Donouhmore constitution did not recognize political parties and that instead it operated through seven committees comprised of elected persons that shared both executive and legislative functions. Different communal groups, emboldened by the experience of the 1924 constitution, sought and got representation and the latter worked together in the committees. The Head of each committee was addressed as "minister". There was a Board of Ministers comprised of the ‘ministers’ of the committees and some British ministers to coordinate and plan functions across the seven committees. The Board was dominated by the colonial ministers who held the key subjects of finance, defence and justice.

To do justice to the Donoughmore Commission it must be stated that the commissioners admitted that what they proposed was an experiment in participatory democracy meant to be reviewed later.

There were a number of shortcomings in the Donoughmore model that were experienced and documented. Firstly, although the commissioners ran down the previous model as encouraging what they described as ‘the canker of communal politics’, the fact was that this canker continued unabated though it was not formally recognized during the 16 years of the Donoughmore Constitution. This development was tied to the suppression of the growth of political parties. Communal lobbies took the place of the political party. Examples were the Sinhala Maha Sabha, The Burgher Political Association, the Ceylon Indian and the Tamil Congress. Read Jane Russel: ‘Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution’ (1982) for more details.

KG’s opposition to adversarial politics does not seem realistic as politics is essentially adversarial in nature. This is a fact of life and it is better to recognize it and work out a model on the basis of such recognition rather than imagine one can do away with it. Furthermore, there is nothing intrinsically wrong about adversarial politics as it can encourage healthy rivalry among groups competing to offer a better deal to the electorate. Politics is a fact of life in offices, schools, sports bodies or in the country at large for the simple reason that people reach for power in all places where human beings conglomerate. In the rivalry that ensues the fittest survive.

Arising out of this consideration one can assert that the second failure of the Donoughmore model was that it hindered the growth of the political party system in Sri Lanka.

The third shortcoming was that the Board of Ministers was not an adequate instrument for national planning and coordination. The presence of the colonial elite in the Board helped to forge some unity of direction. If the model was put to work today under a committee system of government it would be an entirely different story. The unity of purpose and direction that the modern Cabinet system can provide is far superior. The modern Cabinet system derives its strength from the party system.

I think KG has glossed over the real problems of the current "Bahubootha Viyawasthawa"; principal among them being the lack of effective checks and balances against a background of the overpowering presence of the President. We are glad that our Supreme Court has in recent decisions helped to whittle down what had hitherto been perceived   as unbridled power to do anything-"except turn a man into a woman and vice versa." Scams like Waters’ Edge were the result.  However, such curbs should be spelled out in the body of the constitution itself.  Furthermore, we already have provisions in the form of the 17th amendment which if implemented would help in the  development of checks and balances. The constitution must be amended to make it inoperable without such implementation. There must also be provision for the independence of key institutions, like the Central Bank, Bank of Ceylon, EPF, and Rupavahini.

Another need for correction is in the area of electoral representation. The nomination of candidates in the form of a list by the party with little reference to the wishes of an electorate is not democratic.

One area where we can look for inspiration to the Donoughmore model is the better leverage the latter gave to minorities in the decision-making process. In the Donoughmore model of 1931, one observes some elements of the consensual decision- making process that are currently in practice in some European countries.  The trading off and bargaining between ethnic groups was evident at meetings of the committees. If we are to bring peace and trust among communities  we have to make some departure from the majoritarian system that now prevails and allow for greater powers in decision- making to minorities than their mere numerical strength  justifies. Decision- making by majority vote is only a practical rule; democracy demands the consent of the minority. True democracy in a plural electorate approximates to a consensual form of governance.

It is more democracy and not less that can cure our ills.