The terrorists who attacked Mumbai had come from the sea. This serves as a reminder to us that the LTTE has in years past tried to penetrate our harbours and Colombo has always been a target. The recently concluded Fisheries Agreement allows Tamil Nadu’s fishermen to fish in our waters, as the Indians are concerned that Sri Lanka’s fish would otherwise ‘die of old age’! This situation holds huge dangers for this country. It is not just that Sri Lankan fishermen who have suffered for decades as they were not allowed to fish in our waters but it is an opening which would be exploited by the LTTE to bring in weapons and also to penetrate our naval defences taking cover behind fishermen. Let us recall some earlier incidents to prove that this is more than a mere possibility.

Before venturing further let us look at the Joint Statement concerned.

"Keeping in mind the humanitarian and livelihood dimensions of the fisheries issue, India and Sri Lanka have agreed to put in place practical arrangements to deal with bona-fide India and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). This was agreed to during the visit to New Delhi on 26th October 2008 of Honourable Basil Rajapaksa, Member of Parliament and Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka

As part of these practical arrangements, following the designation by the Government of Sri Lanka of sensitive areas along the Sri Lankan coastline and their intimation to the Government of India, Indian fishing vessels will not venture into these identified sensitive areas. Further, there will be no firing on Indian fishing vessels.

It was agreed that Indian fishing vessels would carry valid registration/permit and the fishermen would have on person valid identity cards issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu.

India and Sri Lanka have agreed to continue with their discussions, initiated in 2005, on the proposed Memorandum of Understanding on development and cooperation in the field of fisheries.

New Delhi

26th October, 200

It is important to highlight that with a very narrow body of waters, it will be difficult to accurately demarcate the maritime borders by fishermen. Firing, killing and maiming the fishermen is not the solution to this vexed problem. Similarly, allowing the Indian fishermen a free run and thereby threaten the survival of our own fishermen or the security of the county and safety of SLN is also not an answer.

If the Indians can police the maritime border, provide the fishermen with GPS units to accurately plot their location, most of the unfortunate incidents can be avoided without harming fishermen or jeopardising Sri Lanka’s security. Of course, the LTTE being a resourceful organisation, can very well go deep into Indian side of the maritime zone and carry out attacks and blame the SLN, with a view to keeping the pot boiling over.

Both Indian and Sri Lankan authorities were confident that following the agreement reached, consequent to Basil Rajapaksa’s visit to India, which covered the conflict and fisheries issues, allegations of shooting by SLN would be put to rest. This is a mistaken belief.

Whenever there was military action against the LTTE by the Sri Lankan forces, LTTE had two cards to play. First relates to violation of human rights by the armed forces, which resonates well with the West. That also helps LTTE immensely as foreign governments tend to make their bilateral assistance to Sri Lanka conditional to good governance by GSOL. The second was the allegation that there was a genocide against the Tamils. This is well orchestrated by goading the Tamil Nadu politicians, with some of whom LTTE has a close rapport. Karunanidhi’s daughter is one such person and Vaiko is another. The biggest supporter of the LTTE is the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu himself.

Very interestingly there are also allegations of harassment of Indian Fishermen by the SLN.

While the India fishermen demonstrate against such atrocities, Tamil Nadu politicians get into the act by claiming that innocent fishermen are harassed by SLN in the Indian waters! It is clear that such incidents are orchestrated by the LTTE to achieve certain political objectives. Every day virtually hundreds of Indian fishing boats illegally enter the territorial sea of Sri Lanka and carry on fishing virtually within short distance from our shores. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan (Tamil) fishermen of the north face severe difficulties due to restrictions imposed on them by the SLN for security reasons.

It is noteworthy that the Jaffna civilians have two main vocations viz. agriculture and fishing. While they have severe restrictions over fishing, they also have to face untold difficulties due to taking over of fertile land in close proximity to military establishments for enforcing HSZ. Consequently, they are unable to support their families. Against this backdrop the Indian fishermen having virtually fished their side of the ocean dry, have been pushing themselves to the Sri Lankan waters, where fish is bountiful, thanks to the restrictions on our own fishermen due to the conflict.

India’s position is that Sri Lanka should allow the Indian fishermen to fish in Sri Lankan waters. Having made their point that on the Sri Lankan side ‘fish die of old age’ (2003 New Delhi Discussions with Lionel Fernando) India has persistently demanded that Sri Lanka should issue license to the Indian fishermen, to eliminate the allegations of poaching in Sri Lankan waters.

Is this demand not akin to legalising and illegal activity as a means to prevent illegal activity being carried out over a period of years? Note that for Indian fishermen, it is more lucrative to smuggle contraband for the LTTE. If this is in fact the case, how can licensing would prevent gun running etc., by Tamil Nadu fishermen, or others posing as fishermen. Note that Indian fishermen are fully aware that there is a armed conflict going on in the northern part of Sri Lanka including in the sea. Why would they risk their lives and fish in Sri Lankan waters in such a situation?

If India says that licensing a specific number of fishermen would help eradicate poaching by Indian fishermen, one should ask how that would restrict the number of Indian boats venturing into Sri Lankan waters. How would one distinguish a licensed boat from an unlicensed boat? How would SLN differentiate between the legitimate fishermen from poachers sans licence? Would not the SLN have to face security threats in such circumstances, with LTTE using the opportunity to send in their suicide craft?

This is where the Indian Navy has its work cut out; they should understand the circumstances under which we were compelled to make the concession in question to them to let them off the Tamil Nadu hook. It is incumbent upon the Indian government to ensure that the Sri Lanka Navy does not have to be at the mercy of LTTE’ s suicide boats

The Indian authorities will have to prevent LTTE firing and harassing the Indian fishermen and placing the blame on the SLN as was the case of "Maria" in April 2007.

It will be noted that the Tamil Nadu politicians blamed SLN for the killing of the crew of "Maria" whereas the dastardly deed had been committed by the LTTE , which hijacked the boat with its captain for gun running. Eventually, the boat was detained by the Maldivian authorities and later the Tamil Nadu police admitted that the culprits were the LTTE.

Whenever, fighting escalates, LTTE harasses the Indian fishermen with a view to stirring up the Tamil Nadu. Recall the detaining of more than dozen of Indian fishermen by the LTTE soon after the CFA was signed. The Peace Secretariat had to intervene to have them released.

It is also noteworthy that Tamil Nadu politicians also raise the issue of the Kachcchative island whenever fisheries related issues are raised. It is not a case of India handing over the Kachchctive to Sri Lanka. It was an admission that the ownership was proven to be Sri Lankan and Indian agreed to settle the issue in 1964 and 1966. (Check for the contents of the two agreements). It is noteworthy that Sri Lanka gave away two fishing areas (Wadge Bank and Pedro Bank to India) with the signing of the maritime boundary.

It is against this backdrop one must look into the agreement reached between Mr. Basil Rajapaksa and India. What does the following sentence mean: "As part of these practical arrangements, following the designation by the Government of Sri Lanka of sensitive areas along the Sri Lankan coastline and their intimation to the Government of India, Indian fishing vessels will not venture into these identified sensitive areas. Further, there will be no firing on Indian fishing vessels."

It was agreed that Indian fishing vessels would carry valid registration/permit and the fishermen would have on person valid identity cards issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu.

Does this mean that Sri Lanka is obliged to demarcate areas sensitive to us and Indian fishermen are free to enter and fish without let or hindrance in all other areas of Sri Lankan waters? Above all, how will this mechanism prevent the problem of gun running, threat against SLN by vessels masquerading as fishing boats etc? What is the difference between a vessel carrying license and one without such license?

In the end, India appears to have got what it wanted namely to fish in Sri Lankan waters. With this understanding, Indian fishermen will overwhelm Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen, intimidate and over-fish our waters as they have already done to their side of the maritime boundary. The risk the SLN has to run in challenging the LTTE which has increasingly used fishing boats to undertake gun running will continue and threat to SLN vessels, checking on the fishing boats, will be high. Let us hope that what has been conceded under the present circumstances will be re-negotiated after the war is over because the present concessions will adversely affect the livelihood of the Jaffna fishermen who have suffered for decades as a result owing to the conflict.

With our agreeing to receive the food consigned for the displaced by the war and our agreeing to Indian fisherman fishing in our waters Basil Rajapaksa has not only saved the Congress government from falling but has also satisfied the Indian authorities and given them the leverage they need to counter mounting campaign in the ‘LAND OF THE TAMILS’, which is what Tamil Nadu stands for. Meanwhile, Karunanidhi has a huge internal (family) problem to settle because of the conflict between his nephews and his son and daughter, which is essentially a battle to succeed the 86-year-old leader. The Sri Lanka problem is really an irritant to Karunanidhi. With the elections approaching Vaiko, Ramdoss (well funded by the LTTE no doubt) and the smaller parties have acquired an importance quite out of proportion with their actual level of influence in Tamil Nadu.

With a certain defeat facing them the LTTE will no doubt seek by whatever means possible to save them, but it is unlikely that Indian government and the Indian people will allow the murderer of Rajiv Gandhi to be saved once again.

Sri Lankan government should for its part mount a massive publicity campaign on the heels of the Bombay bombings and also lobby every possible constituency to pressure Prabhakaran to surrender and save the Tamil people from further hardships. The government should utilise Messrs V. Anandasangaree, Douglas Devananda, Karuna and Chandrakanthan to get the message across in Delhi. It has been reported that the Indian External Affairs Minister may visit Colombo despite their current problems to persuade us to stop the war.