It was not so long ago that New Delhi decided to continue with the proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. India has also time and again declared that it cannot accept any erosion of Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. The meaning is quite clear that it does not approve LTTE’s declared objective of achieving Eelam.

When Eelam War IV commenced the LTTE had gained the upper hand by turning the military balance more in its favour by establishing new camps at strategic points to the south of the Trincomalee harbour which provided the life line to troops in the Jaffna peninsula. These were the heavily fortified camps at Sampur within striking distance of the Trincomalee harbour.

In fact, it had already begun to interfere with naval activities of the harbour. Making use of the CFA signed with the GoSL in 2002, the LTTE had also established camps at Manirasakulam close to the Trincomalee road, from which access to Trincomalee could have been controlled. The closure of Mavil Aru was intended to further consolidate that position by chasing away the Muslims in nearby Muttur area and the Sinhalese in the Seruwila area so that the whole area south of the bay of Kottiyar would be exclusively in the LTTE hands.

It was the closure of Mavil Aru sluice gates that really led to the undeclared Eelam War IV with the GoSL which was determined not only to stop the LTTE intrusion into Muttur and regain the strategically important Sampur area but also to extend the operations to the whole of the Eastern province. The LTTE’s hold on these two districts was weakened with the breakaway of the military commander, ‘Colonel’ Karuna.

The war has since spread to the Vanni and GoSL armed forces have ousted the LTTE from territory west of A 9 Kandy-Jaffna route and is poised to take on the LTTE administrative centre of Killinochchi. They have also made advances on the Weli Oya front closing in on Mullaitivu. .

The above scenario points to the LTTE having lost the initiative it held when it announced a ceasefire in December 2001 after the victory of the UNF at the General Elections. It took place in a situation, where though both sides were weary of battle, the GoSL’s ‘Agni-keela’ offensive having failed, the LTTE had gained military victory as well as much territory in the Vanni and the East as well as the highly strategic camps of the SL Army in Pooneryn, Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass among others and was in a position to interfere even with air traffic between Colombo and Palaly while its sea borne wing had become a serious threat in the Mullaitivu seas.

The LTTE, however, needed to recruit and train new cadres and replenish its armament though it had captured much from the GoSL armed forces, in readiness for future armed confrontations to achieve its goal of Eelam. The LTTEdeclared a unilateral ceasefire. The CFA that followed which led to six rounds of ‘talks’ held abroad (rather than negotiations) provided the opportunity for the LTTE to engage in a recruitment drive which saw mass scale recruitment of child soldiers. As Karuna later disclosed, he was asked to provide 1000 cadres in addition to the 600 Eastern cadres he had already provided which was part of the dispute that led to the breakaway of Karuna. (See also Austin Fernando on the massive recruitment drive).

Much of the advantages that the LTTE enjoyed at the time of signing the CFA in February 2002 and at the time of its breaking up talks in April 2003, and through rearming itself under cover of the CFA, have been lost since the out-break of hostilities following the Mavil Aru closure. The defection of Karuna has caused a heavy drain on the manpower resources. How bad the situation had become was seen from the LTTE re-recruiting child cadres which Karuna had released to their parents after his breakaway.

The issue has had its historical ups and downs. Whether Premier Indira Gandhi directly encouraged the training of Tamil militants in their camps located on Indian soil or looked the other way, it was clear at that time that such action might lead to a threat to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity as all Tamil militant groups then were singularly agreed that they were seeking to establish a separate state of ‘Eelam’. Better counsel prevailed later when India found that the monster it helped to create could not be controlled. This was seen from their response at talks starting with Thimpu that India sponsored to bring about a settlement.

After the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed in July 1987 the situation began to drift in a different direction. When President J. R. Jayewardene had doubts about the LTTE falling in line, High Commissioner J. N. Dixit held his index finger to his temple to demonstrate what India would do. But things did not happen that way. The IPKF got involved in a bloody war with the LTTE in which over 1,400 Jawans and officers sacrificed their lives while more were injured by the LTTE. Since the de-induction of the IPKF in 1990 India has avoided playing a direct role in Sri Lanka’s internal problem though there has been much pressure from Tamil Nadu and LTTE’s supporters for intervention in Sri Lanka in favour of the Tamils (read LTTE). Matters were complicated after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi at the behest of Prabhakaran and the LTTE intelligence chief, Pottu Amman and the proscription of the LTTE in India.

The scenario has shifted since to verbal expressions that India stands for Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity while saying there is no military solution to the Tamil issue.

There is absolute ambiguity over the link between Tamil issue and the LTTE involvement. So, the million dollar question is whether or not, India treats the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, its proscription in India notwithstanding. The answer is not clear at all. So, when India advocates a non-military solution understandably, in dealing with the LTTE, it forgets the role that the IPKF played in trying to bring the LTTE to its heels and the GoSL has no other alternative but militarily weaken the outfit.

There are several scenarios in which two belligerent parties may agree to stop hostilities even temporarily. One is an asymmetrical situation in the military balance where an insurgent group may see an advantage in offering or agreeing to a ceasefire. The other is the opposite situation of reaching a military balance. Both these scenarios were present when the LTTE offered to stop hostilities temporarily against GoSL forces. Today, the military balance has shifted to the government side and the LTTE is suing for a halt in the war which could be nothing but a strategy as it was on earlier occasions.

India’s position regarding GoSL waging all out war against the LTTE as a terrorist group also remains ambiguous. It is implied in the Indian position that there is no military solution to the Tamil issue. For all intents and purposes it would seem that New Delhi does not want to see the LTTE wiped out of the military map even if that were possible though it might want to see it weakened.

India also may have been guided by its own perception of what GoSL’s capabilities are in executing the war. The earlier idea of invincibility of the LTTE in the context of the GoSL (IPKF may not have believed that), has eroded since in the face of a determined and well executed military plan. That itself introduces a new dimension.

The present status of confusion seen on the part of India’s approach to the LTTE has nothing to do with India’s perception on terrorism but it is the result of India’s internal political compulsions where the Congress government at the centre is beholden to Tamil Nadu support to hold on to power. How hollow the claim to safeguard the territorial integrity of the island was was demonstrated when the LTTE was threatening to occupy the whole of the Jaffna peninsula after the capture of Elephant Pass. On that occasion, all that India offered to do was a humanitarian move of sending ships to evacuate the armed forces out of the peninsula! GoSL had to seek the assistance of Pakistan and Czech Republic for urgent military supplies to overcome the situation and successfully beat back the LTTE’s advance.

This situation contrasts with India’s pressure on GoSL to arrive at a ceasefire with the LTTE at the present juncture when the latter is cornered in the Mullaitivu jungles as demanded by Karunanidhi. How could this difference in attitudes be explained? Were the GoSL armed forces less important then than the LTTE fighting cadres today? Such a question may be leading the issue in different direction from what India may want to present it, though in 1987 it was made quite clear to the GoSL by High Commissioner Dixit on behalf the GoI that after the success of overrunning Vadamarachchi that India would not allow the Jaffna town to be captured. The issue then centred round a question of honour and humiliation of the Tamils rather than a question of defeat in battle for the LTTE. The defeat of the LTTE would not be acceptable to Tamil Nadu which really wants the LTTE to maintain its parity of status with the GoSL in the military field even more than its concern for Tamil nationalism (read racism) overflowing to Sri Lanka.