The inability to evolve political solutions that equitably address the priorities of groups in societies distinguished by social and cultural identities has been the cause for most of the global conflicts, particularly in former colonies. Past as well as ongoing conflicts in the African continent and in Asia could be attributed to the weaknesses of political arrangements that failed to share political power and economic resources in a reasoned and proportionate manner, and in the inability of former privileged groups to accept the need for change. This has been the cause for real and perceived grievances arising from such arrangements and for solutions to be sought through violence and armed conflict. The conflict in Sri Lanka is no different.

In a span of 60 years, Sri Lanka has had 3 Constitutions and is now exploring a 4th under the aegis of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). India, on the other hand, has retained its original Constitution, but has over 100 Amendments. Being organic, Constitutions will evolve and change to suit altered circumstances and emerging priorities. However, these modifications would be accommodated by amendments if the Constitutions embody fundamentals that underscore stability. If they do not, modifications would be significant enough to warrant altering Constitutions totally, as has occurred in the case of Sri Lanka.

The Union of India is governed by its Constitution. Its structure is federal with some unitary features. No other structural arrangement could have accommodated India’s large territorial size and its several multiple groupings. The Constitutions of Sri Lanka by contrast have been unitary, with the sovereignty of the People currently being exercised by Parliament and an Executive Presidency. Sri Lanka has experimented within the unitary boundary largely influenced by its territorial size and apprehensions on stability, brought about by the number of its cultural groupings being limited basically to two (Sinhala and Tamil) but over time to three (Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim).

The call by the Sri Lankan Tamil community, the more dominant of the 2 minority cultural groupings, has been to make the structure of the state federal with the Northern and Eastern Province as the federal unit. The deliberations within the APRC seem to indicate a tendency to approximate a federal arrangement with the province as the unit without calling it ‘federal’ by name in the hope of resolving the conflict. However, devolution with federal arrangements for countries with two or three cultural groupings has not been stable. The tendency in such instances has been to secede from the contiguous states to establish "a state of one’s own" (Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol XV, Issue 1, Fall/Winter 2008). Examples of countries with ongoing conflicts or where stability is tenuous, and with two cultural groupings are Sudan (Arab/Muslim & African/Christian), Rwanda (Hutu & Tutsi), Canada (English & French), Belgium (Flemish & Walloon), Kashmir (Hindu/Muslim), to name a few.

Instability has been particularly experienced in former colonies that adopted federal arrangements where units were based on established colonial boundaries. On the other hand, countries with several cultural groupings such as India and Nigeria for instance, had to revise former colonial boundaries and increase the number of nits for the sake of stability. When however, the cultural groupings are few and federated units are large enough to economically stand alone, the tendency has been for separation to take place. The lesson from this is that federal arrangements may work in countries with a multiplicity of groupings but is unstable for countries with few cultural groupings and the unit is large, as in Sri Lanka. Therefore, adopting the Indian model in Sri Lanka is fraught with potential for territorial instability.

In countries such as Sri Lanka where the cultural groupings are two, for all intents and purposes, territorial stability depends on the size of the unit if political power is to be devolved. Since devolved powers are dynamic and not static, there is every possibility that with time devolved powers could end up being leveraged for political patronage, in which event the size of the unit would make the difference between threats to territorial integrity through separation and staying as a contiguous state. These possibilities make the province a potentially unstable unit if power is to be devolved. On the other hand, a structure based on a smaller unit such as the district would be stable. Therefore, devolution as a concept should not be considered in isolation, but rather in conjunction with the size of the unit.

The province as the unit was a carry over from the Indo-Lanka Accord followed by the 13th Amendment. The district on the other hand was the unit in the present Constitution until it was revised to suit the demands of the Tamil community whose goal has always been to claim the Northern and Eastern Provinces as their political unit. This latter unit under a federal arrangement is sure to secede. Constitutional safeguards to prevent separation would mean little once the die is cast. This has been the experience in Canada and Belgium. Therefore, if the integrity of the territory is to be assured, the district should be the unit.

The APRC has failed to appreciate that considerations of stability should be the foundation of any political arrangement. Its approach instead, has been to deliberate on the extent of powers that could be devolved to the province as the unit. Relying on the fact that the Northern and Eastern Provinces are now separate is no guarantee that it would stay separate. Circumstances may arise for a merged territorial unit comprising the two provinces. Such a unit has the potential and the inclination to separate. The only guarantee against such developments would be make the district the unit.

The approach of the APRC and previous attempts at conflict resolution have been how best to accommodate the aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamil community without jeopardizing the interests of the Sinhala community. A more meaningful approach would be to prioritize the interests of both communities. For instance, territorial integrity of the island nation in all likelihood would be Priority One for the Sinhala community because of the umbilical link between security of state and self. For the Sri Lankan Tamil community as well as the other communities, priority number one presumably would be inclusion as an integral part of the Sri Lanka nation. If the respective priorities are, in fact, as stated, the structure of the state should be based on the district and discussions should focus on how and what political powers could be shared between the district and the center for the non-Sinhala communities to realize that which they aspire. This approach would be in keeping with natural justice.

The current approach at evolving a political solution is basically to build on existing Constitutional provisions that were specifically designed to resolve the conflict and not designed to foster security, development and human rights. The aspiration to improve and develop materially is the goal of most human beings. Such development is not possible in an environment where the territorial integrity is tenuous. Therefore, the precondition for development is security and stability. It is in such an environment that human rights can prosper. In a report titled "IN LARGER FREEDOM", Kofi Annan states: "The world must advance the causes of security, development and human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights".

Since the beneficiaries of security, development and human rights are the People, they should not be presented with a fait accompli of devolution to the province as unit, which is a carry over from the past. Justice requires that they be presented with an alternative of power being devolved to the district. The devolved powers under each option would naturally be different. However, since the APRC has already spent considerable time on the option of power being devolved to the province, natural justice requires that at least the concept of devolving power to the district as an option should be presented by the APRC as an alternative. This would give the People and their representatives a choice to evolve a political arrangement that is autochthonous, and has better possibility for development, and human rights to prosper in an environment of security, than what is currently being pursued.

The cause of Sri Lanka’s conflict as it is with most other countries, lies in the inability to evolve equitable political arrangements to meet the hopes and aspirations of two or three influential cultural groups. When the structure of the state in such countries is federal and the federal units are sizeable, the tendency is for separation. Such conditions exist in Sri Lanka if power is devolved to provinces. If, on the other hand, power is devolved to the districts the tendency would be greatly mitigated and territorial integrity would be better assured.

Even if what is proposed by the APRC legally conforms to the characteristics of a unitary state, with time the scope of these provisions are bound to expand as they have done in India to a point where the unitary character of the Constitution would be compromised. In such an eventuality the province, because of its size, has the potential to tempt separation. The one safeguard against such possibilities is to make the district the unit.

Considering the enormous sacrifices made by Sri Lanka’s valiant soldiers to protect the territorial integrity of their motherland, it is incumbent upon those engaged in deciding the island’s political future NOT make the province central to political arrangements, because threats to territorial integrity could rise up again. The least the APRC could do is to offer the alternative of the district as unit in the formation of the State’s structure, and leave the final decision to the People.