High intensity ground battles on the Vanni front will soon come to an end with the infantry backed by armoured fighting vehicles, artillery, mortars, jets and helicopter gunships gradually eating into the area held by the LTTE.

By end of February, the army wouldn’t call in 152 mm artillery or MBRL (multi barrel rocket launcher) fire or jets to neutralize an LTTE target. The SLAF wouldn’t be requested to launch jets from Katunayake to bomb LTTE facilities or provide close-air-support to ground troops.

The overall change in the northern and eastern theatre where the army deployed several Divisions simultaneously as in the case of the ongoing offensive will certainly be astonishing to all military watchers. The bottom line is that the Eelam war is rapidly turning into a low-level insurgency from high intensity conventional battles involving armour and artillery.

Large scale operations undertaken by the SLN and SLAF in support of the ground operations will also come to an end shortly. The SLAF, The Sunday Island learns is already wary about launching jet attacks due to the heavy presence of civilians in the war zone. The deployment of Hingurakgoda-based No 9 attack helicopter squadron, too, is likely to be heavily restricted shortly.

"We have to switch strategies to make sure the enemy doesn’t adopt new tactics," Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa said adding that the end of major ground battles, air strikes or confrontations out at sea didn’t mean end of the war. He stressed the importance of maintaining heavy pressure on the enemy to thwart cohesive hit and run campaign.

"Yes. We are talking about a counter-insurgency campaign," he said, adding that, "intelligence services will play a pivotal role in it."

Although the army has estimated the total area outside its control at about 280 square kilometres, the ICRC which maintains an office in the final battleground at Puththukudirippu, says the LTTE-held area is as small as 250 square kilometres.

The LTTE which had effective control over approximately 15,000 square km. territory in the northern and eastern provinces at the time Eelam War IV erupted in August 2006, is facing a humiliating defeat.

Army Chief Lt. General Sarath Fonseka who spearheaded Sri Lanka’s largest ever offensive against the LTTE announced the seizure of Mullaitivu on the north-eastern coast a week ago. The taking of Mullaitivu which the army abandoned in July 1996 by Brigadier Nandana Udawatte’s 59 Division signified the beginning of the final onslaught.

The 59 Division which launched operations January 2008 from Welioya spent a year fighting the LTTE under extremely difficult conditions before reaching Mullaitivu.

The only factor that will delay the liberation of the remaining area under LTTE control is the government’s attempt to minimize civilian casualties. Had the government ordered an all out army assault backed by heavy aerial support, the LTTE would have collapsed before February 4 Independence Day. Although President Mahinda Rajapaksa would love to announce the final triumph over Velupillai Prabhakaran in his Independence Day speech, he wouldn’t want to antagonize the international community, particularly India.

The LTTE has been boxed into an area north and south of a section of the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road with the navy mounting a large scale operation off the north-eastern coastline to cut off access to the sea.

With 55, 58, 57 and 59 Divisions and Task Force III, TF II and TF IV successfully engaging LTTE defences on multiple fronts, the 26-year-old war is rapidly coming to an end. In fact, the rapidity of the LTTE collapse in the area east of the A 9 has even surprised the government.

The army has overrun LTTE high security zones east of the A9, north of the Mankulam-Mullaitivu (A34) road and north of the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road (A35). Although some published reports had said that the LTTE retained a force of about 12,000 to 15,000 well trained cadres to defend the high security zones, recent ground battles highlighted the deteriorating military strength of the Tigers who in April 2000 boasted of acquiring a conventional fighting capability following its stunning triumph over the army at Elephant Pass.

For those who believed that the LTTE had the strength to halt the army and mount an offensive of its own, last week’s developments convincingly showed that the major ground battles were coming to an end.

Had the LTTE the ability to halt the advance of the army, it wouldn’t have abandoned one 152 mm artillery piece east of Vishvamadu, senior officers said. The heavy weapon recovered by the 10 GR (Gajaba Regiment) commanded by Major Janaka Udaovita last Wednesday (28) highlighted the LTTE predictment.

Believed to be one of the artillery pieces acquired during the Norwegian brokered ceasefire and brought into the country under the very noses of the navy before Vice Admiral Wasantha Karanngoda turned the tables on Sea Tigers, it was the first artillery piece recovered by the army on the eastern flank and definitely wouldn’t be the last.

SLAF chief Air Marshal Roshan Gunatilleke, I believe, achieved what no previous commander had managed with the Katunayake-based jet squadrons and attack helicopter squadron (No 9) operating from Hingurakgoda. Their success was such that many people wrongly believed that Israeli Kfirs and Russian MiG 27s had been acquired by the Rajapaksa administration. The SLAF took delivery of these in 1996 and 2000 respectively.

The artillery piece along with some empty shells was found buried. Had the LTTE believed in waging a massive final battle, it wouldn’t have hidden this weapon. While 10 GR assigned to 58 Division commanded by Brigadier Shevindra Silva recovered the artillery piece, the TF III positioned between 57 Division on its left flank and the TF II on its right, made a startling recovery.

The TF III pushing towards the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road had come across an ultra secret LTTE factory at Udayarkattu engaged in the manufacture of underwater fighting craft. The recovery of four such craft, three ‘pedal-type’ suicide boats and what the army called a large stock of maritime equipment by 4 SLLI (Sri Lanka Light Infantry) commanded by Major Najeewa Edirisinghe couldn’t have come at a better time for the government.

In between the fall of Mullaitivu on January 25 and the seizure LTTE boat factory at Udayarkattu, Mullaitivu, UNP and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe acknowledged that government forces were on top of the LTTE. Wickremesinghe who had been targeted by state-run media for some on his remarks at a propaganda rally immediately after the fall of the LTTE’s Thoppigala bastion in 2007 congratulated the armed forces and those who facilitated a magnificent military campaign.

Warning the government that it had to overcome several obstacles to achieve a complete victory over the LTTE, the UNP chief said that with the liberation of Mullaitivu meant that the GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD CRUSHED THE LTTE’S CONVENTIONAL FIGHTING CAPABILITY. Addressing a hastily arranged press conference at the Opposition Leader’s office at the Cambridge Terrace, Wickremesinghe commended the President, Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers for their handling of the war effort.

Close on the heels of Wickremesinghe’s admission, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit fuelled speculation that New Delhi was making a last ditch attempt to throw a lifeline to the LTTE at the behest of its Tamil Nadu ally Muthuvel Karunanidhi, the ailing 85-year-old leader of the DMK.

Both the government and those who opposed to the Rajapaksa style of running Sri Lanka interpreted the Mukherjee’s visit to their own advantage. I believe a short statement issued by the Indian High Commission highlighted a few crucial points.

Asserting that Indo-Lanka relations are strong, India emphasized the importance of further strengthening of ties "at this time of transition and change." Mukherjee almost sounded like President Rajapaksa when he acknowledged that military victories offered "a political opportunity to restore life to normalcy in the Northern Province and throughout Sri Lanka," while offering to participate in the re-building of the Northern Sri Lanka.

But nothing could have been as revealing as Mukherjee’s satisfaction over the progress towards the establishment of a 500 mega-watt thermal power plant near Trincomalee by India. According to the Indian statement, the humanitarian situation (I prefer to call it humanitarian crisis) was ALSO reviewed.

Even as Mukherjee and Shiv Shanker Menon, a former Indian High Commissioner to Colombo who is now the Foreign Secretary in New Delhi were flying to Bandaranaike International Airport last Tuesday, the army was preparing to seize the ultra secret LTTE manufacturing plant.

The army believes that among the hideouts captured by advancing troops conducting operations on the eastern flank were some used by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his top aides. The likes of Soosai, Bhanu and Pottu Amman etc. may have frequented these hideouts, an intelligence official said. He believed that the LTTE leaders were probably trying to comprehend the size and intensity of the ground offensive at these meetings in the abandoned hideouts.

"Our battlefield achievements over the past two and half years were tremendous," Lt. General Fonseka told The Sunday Island. The army, he said, had paid a heavy price to liberate the northern and eastern provinces.

In an interview with this writer in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of the eastern province in July 2007, Fonseka said the eastern campaign was part of an overall strategy.

"We never had an overall plan (earlier). Of course we conducted operations and major security forces campaigns. But unfortunately they were isolated action. There was never an overall action plan on our part. In some instances we were only reacting to LTTE actions," he said.

A combination of negligence on the part of the top brass, absence of a cohesive battle plan and a ridiculous system that ensured promotions solely on the basis of seniority had a catastrophic impact on the armed forces, Fonseka said. He added that lack of political will to finish off the LTTE, too, contributed to the gradual transformation of the LTTE from a terrorist group to a formidable force with what he called ``a sea and air capability.’’

According to latest battlefield reports and assessment by intelligence services, the LTTE is speedily losing its wherewithal to conduct land, sea and air operations. Although, the army is yet to locate fixed wing LTTE aircraft responsible for a series of attacks over the past two years or arrest any of the key leaders including Prabhakaran and intelligence chief Pottu Amman, the group is unlikely pose a real threat.

The ground forces operating on the eastern flank were the strongest ever fighting force deployed against the LTTE. The size of the attacking force taking on the Tigers defending an area less than 300 square kilometres is evidence of the army’s determination to thwart an LTTE breakout.

The 53 Division has been positioned outside the ring of troops slowing advancing on enemy positions. This Division deployed along the Jaffna frontline for several years is one of the most experienced fighting formations once commanded Major General Janaka Perera, a legendary soldier turned UNP politician whose life was snuffed out by an LTTE suicide cadre last October.

Unfortunately, Perera wasn’t a party to a successful war as pointed out of Minister Dallas Alahapperuma, a key propaganda strategist for the Rajapaksa administration.

Under Fonseka’s leadership, the army has achieved unprecedented success over the LTTE which by ‘military’ means as well as strategic negotiating skills gradually accomplished an unassailable position. It evoked memories of JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghecall in the run up to the last presidential election in November 2005 to disband the armed forces if they couldn’t meet the LTTE’s military challenge. Addressing a political rally in support of the then Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, Amarasinghe declared that the armed forces should be disbanded if they couldn’t protect Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. He made the point that the task of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country not only rested on the armed forces and police, but also on their political masters as well.

His remarks triggered protests with a group of retired security forces chiefs calling for the arrest of the JVP leader under emergency regulations. Although they called his sentiment disparaging, nothing could have been truer. There is absolutely no point in maintaining the armed forces at a great cost to the taxpayer if they aren’t capable of meeting a military threat. To the credit of the armed forces and police as well as the SLFP in 1971 and the UNP in 1987-1990, they crushed JVP insurgencies.

The UNP leader’s congratulations to the armed forces and acknowledgment of president’s political leadership should be taken in the context of the joint responsibility of the military and political leaderships in tackling the LTTE. The Defence Secretary in a recent interview telecast live discussed the importance of political and military response to the threat posed by the LTTE. He asserted that the government’s dual strategy contributed to the overall success on the battlefield.

Once the army regains 20 kilometers of the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road on the eastern flank, the entire road network in the northern and eastern provinces would be under government control. But the restoration of the Mannar-Pooneryn (A32) and Kandy-Jaffna (A9) road would bring tremendous cost savings to the exchequer instantly. Once the two overland routes to the Jaffna peninsula are re-open, the SLN could stop a costly sea movement of defence cargo as well as officers and men to and from the peninsula. Although some cargo would be moved by sea, bulk of the supplies could be moved overland. The SLN over the years had paid a heavy price to maintain uninterrupted supplies to the peninsula and Jaffna islands. The convoys launched from Trincomalee had braved inclement weather and Sea Tigers operating in the north-eastern waters to reach Kankesanthurai and Point Pedro. The government also spent heavily on chartered vessels to move civilian cargo to Jaffna.

Over the years, politicians and corrupt officials, both in and out of the uniform, turned it to a lucrative business. UNP MP T. Maheswaran who was assassinated in January 2008 ended up operating several ships to KKS. Although the CFA brokered by the Norwegians helped the government to move civilian supplies overland through Omanthai and Muhamalai entry/exit points, the operation came to an end in August 2006.

Since then, the SLN took the responsibility of moving civilians to and from the Jaffna peninsula. The SLAF, too, contributed to the maintenance of an air bridge between Palaly and Ratmalana. But compared to the SLN role, the SLAF role was limited primarily due to the absence of much needed assets.

Once the A9 becomes fully operational, officers and men who faced tremendous trouble in catching an SLAF flight out of Palaly or finding room in Jetliner, a ship chartered at a great cost to the taxpayer, would find it easy to commute overland.

The opening of A9 and A 32 would change the lives of many Lankans and the re-building process would receive a turbo boost if the re-commissioning of the northern rail link receives top priority.

The military triumph over the LTTE and a mega re-building project would give a tremendous boost to the Rajapaksa administration. The Opposition says the ruling coalition should not exploit the military success to its political advantage. But that’s the way the papadam crumbles.