The war is expected to end soon. If victory as defined by Clausewitz is to be achieved the military gains need to be transformed into political capital. Perhaps, influenced by this belief, President Rajapakse assured the visiting Indian Minister of External Affairs that his intention was to implement the 13th Amendment following the military operations. The President is reported to have added that he would explore the possibility of going further and improve upon those devolution proposals (The Island, 29th January, 2009).

The 13th Amendment was the constitutional outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord following India’s intervention in 1987. The Accord acknowledges the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society of Sri Lanka. It also recognizes the Northern and Eastern Provinces as an area inhabited by Tamil-speaking people. India used these facts to pressure Sri Lanka to merge the two provinces into a single political unit and to recognize the remaining seven provinces as separate provincial units. Political power was devolved to these units under the 13th Amendment.

From the inception, sections of the Tamil community considered the extent of powers devolved to their regions to be inadequate while others took to arms to create a separate state as the only means to realize their goals. After a lapse of two and half decades, and consequent to a Supreme Court decision, the single political unit of a merged Northern and Eastern Province has ceased to exist. Thus, Sri Lanka today consists of nine provincial units, eight of which are multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and plural while one, the Northern Province, is mono-ethnic and mono-lingual and therefore not plural. Thus one province stands apart at present and does not reflect the character of the rest of Sri Lanka.

Devolution to this unit would result in politically empowering a mono-ethnic and mono-lingual region; a political entity with tendencies for separation by virtue of its exclusive character and geographic isolation. Furthermore, such an environment with a completely different character to the rest of the island would be an ideal sanctuary for a militarily weakened LTTE to transform itself into guerrilla outfit and resort to hit and run tactics. Under such circumstances a mono-ethnic mono-lingual Northern Province strengthened with devolved political power would turn out to be an ideal breeding ground to nurture the revival of LTTE with the backing of the Tamil diaspora.

However, insecurity created by a guerrilla outfit would not by itself translate into a political objective. What would promote a political objective would be the mono-ethnic and mono-lingual character of the Northern Province. Instability in such a region could be the linchpin to claim justification for a separate state on grounds of its exclusive character visa-a-vi the rest of Sri Lanka. Should that happen it would have the potential to even destabilize and annex the Eastern Province at some point in the future.

In view of such very real possibilities the question of devolution as a power sharing political arrangement cannot be considered in isolation of the territorial size of the unit to which political power is devolved. If the significance of this relationship is not appreciated and devolution is viewed purely from the perspective of a power sharing arrangement without considering the security implications, the newly won military gains would be squandered.

Devolution has come to be accepted as a power sharing arrangement to resolve Sri Lanka’s national issue. The fact that devolution has failed to serve the people since its introduction in 1987 to seven provinces does not seem to have diminished enthusiasm for the concept, at least among persons notably involved with constitutional reforms. The explanation offered for its poor performance is the insufficiency of the extent of political powers devolved. Security considerations have never figured in their deliberations. Had they done so, those sold on devolution as a power sharing arrangement would have recognized the security implications involved arising from the particularities of the respective regions to which power is devolved.

The character of the region to which power is devolved has a significant bearing on security and territorial integrity. For instance, devolution to a region that is economically viable and located in the periphery of a state would seek politically exclusive powers on the threat of separation or even separation as has happened with East Timor, Quebec, and Kosovo to name a few. This is the objection to devolving power to a merged Northern and Eastern Provincial unit. This would also be the case with devolving power to the Northern Province even though presently it is not economically viable in the traditional sense but could become so with time. Therefore, location, size, character and demography of a region within a state all have a direct bearing on the territorial integrity of the rump state if political power is devolved.

It is widely predicted that elements of the LTTE would survive as a guerrilla outfit and create instability not only in the Northern and Eastern Provinces but also with occasional forays in other parts of the country as well. However, even though such actions by themselves would not precipitate political outcomes the potential to threaten the territorial integrity of the state would remain for as long as the unit of devolution remains the province. Therefore, one way to prevent such developments would be to make the District the peripheral unit.

The peripheral units should serve two primary functions. The first is that it should not be a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. The second is that it should be the most effective and efficient arrangement to serve the needs of the people. Since its introduction Provincial Councils have failed to serve the needs of the people. The District on the other hand has been accepted as being better suited to serve the needs of the people. Furthermore, the District can be a better guarantor of territorial integrity than the province by constitutionally prohibiting the merger of any two or more districts. Since the District is better suited to collectively fulfill the intended purposes of a peripheral unit, the Government should use its resources to campaign for the District as the ideal peripheral unit, and this effort should start with India.

India’s Central Government should be receptive to the idea of making the district the peripheral unit on grounds of security. In fact, India also subdivided larger regions into today’s 28 linguistic states primarily to diffuse separatist tendencies. In the current context of serious internal and external threats, India should welcome attempts to stabilize Sri Lanka thereby discouraging Tamil Nadu’s tendency to involve itself in Sri Lankan politics; a tendency that has often driven Delhi to compromise on its policies towards Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s Central Government cannot administer the entirety of Sri Lanka without assigning certain powers and functions to peripheral units. If the ideal territorial unit from a security perspective as well as from the perspective of service to the people is the District the issue boils down to what powers and functions should be assigned to the districts and whether they should be constitutionally assured or granted by Acts of Parliament or even decentralized. Such considerations are for the future. For the present however, if the military gains are to be consolidated serious development has to be undertaken. The political framework under which such development activities have to be undertaken is the 13th Amendment. However, since the security situation is expected to be tenuous for sometime to come it is not prudent to assign the full scope of powers under the 13th Amendment at this time. Instead, powers assigned should be limited in scope to ensure a secure environment in which development efforts could bear positive results. This is for the immediate term.

For the long term, the deliberations thus far have focused only on the powers and functions to the peripheral units without any consideration being given to the structure at the center. This is a serious omission. What is urgently needed is to reconsider the approaches pursued thus far and realize that powers and functions to the peripheral units by themselves have no meaning unless it relates to the structure and form of the government at the center as well. Therefore, deliberations should cover the totality of power sharing both at the center and the periphery.

The demerger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces has spawned a situation where 8 of the 9 provinces are multi-ethnic and multi-lingual and one, the Northern Province is mono-ethnic and mono-lingual. The remnants of a militarily weakened LTTE would be operating in the Northern Province. The inevitable instability that such LTTE remnant groups would generate coupled with the unique character of the province would be used to justify claims for separation. To prevent such developments it is imperative that the Government takes action to make the District the peripheral unit instead of the province with restrictions for districts to merge in order to ensure territorial integrity of the state. The District has the better capability than the Province to fulfill the two primary functions expected of a peripheral unit, namely a guarantor of territorial integrity and the ability to serve the needs of the people.

The replacement of the province by the district should be undertaken with the concurrence of India because it was India that imposed via the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, the province the peripheral unit. India should be receptive to such a modification considering that India too subdivided larger territorial units to contain separatist tendencies in the mid fifties and ensure territorial integrity. Considering the level of instability surrounding India a stable Sri Lanka should be welcomed by India at this time.

Two serious omissions can be cited in the process adopted thus far to evolve a political arrangement. One, the process has failed to recognize that devolution as a concept cannot be considered in isolation of the size, economic potential and demographics of the region to which power is devolved. Two, the powers and functions to the peripheral units are viewed purely from a political power sharing perspective. The security implications involved have been completely ignored despite recent history. Consequently the province has remained the peripheral unit throughout the APRC deliberations. After two decades of war aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of the state, political power to the peripheral units should be subordinate to security considerations of the island as a whole, because never again should the security forces be called upon to confront threats to the integrity of the state.