Neville Ladduwahetty has raised an important point in his article in ‘The Island’ of February 3, 2009, when he says that the character of the region to which power is devolved has a significant bearing on security and territorial integrity. This is not confined to mono-ethnic considerations of the territory selected as a unit of devolution. It could also include other considerations such as economic viability. He quotes the examples of East Timor, Quebec, Kosovo and others as examples of the latter.

This, as he says, is one of the reasons for objection to devolving powers to a merged Northern and Eastern province unit. Though presently it is not economically viable in the traditional sense, it could become so with time (with two thirds of the islandsea coast alone and vast under-utilised agricultural land at its disposal). He argues therefore, that location, size, character and demography of a region within a state (meaning unit of devolution), all have a direct bearing on the territorial integrity of the state if political power is devolved.

Thinking of the prospects of the LTTE (with its financial base in the Diaspora and other interested states/entities behind it), the potential threat to the territorial integrity of the state would remain for as long as the unit of devolution remains the province. He opts for the district as the peripheral unit. I shall not go into the details of his other reasonings, as this should be clear to the readers. However, a point I wished to place before the readers for the last few weeks is one which was raised by an Indian correspondent, in a local newspaper recently, where he suggested that India and Sri Lanka should cast aside the historical baggage (reference was to the encouragement given by India to cross-border terrorism in Sri Lanka), but work out a strategy to meet terrorism in the region. His point of departure was the attack on Mumbai.

Examining his thoughts closely, I found that he was trying to find a link between the Pakistan-based terrorist group, Lakshar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Eastern province. He was not even loath to suggesting the hand of a foreign power in that configuration. The idea might appear as a bit of kite flying from across the Palk straits, but the message it conveys should not be lost. It is not the prospect of such a situation developing, but the message is what Sri Lanka would be confronted with externally, should such a situation of Sri Lankan territory come to be used for cross-border terrorism – reversal of the earlier process – that should engage the attention of the GoSL.

The scenario one could envisage is not one of the North and East of Sri Lanka which has seen the brunt of terrorism for over quarter of a century continuing to be susceptible to such further dangers of instability, even after the conventional war is concluded as Neville L. thinks, but also the prospects of that region where lethal arms of various types have found their way, becoming an area of instability for the whole region. Even the IPKF, with the support of the Indian Navy, could not stop arms smuggling as the transportation was carried in small boats supplied from ships in mid-sea. Ironically, the GOC of the IPKF Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Harikat Singh found the Indian government itself unloading arms for militants without the knowledge of the IPKF! (Harikat Singh: Intervention in Sri Lanka: IPKF Experience, (Vijitha Yapa, 2006).

With the prospects of the North and the East which lie in close proximity to India with an on-going brisk smuggling of war related goods and others from India to this region in the guise of fishing being used as a base for cross-border terrorism against India, notably, in Tamil Nadu, where fissiparous tendencies are but dormant only, as the Indian correspondent seems to infer, what seems to be significant is how Sri Lanka could contain a situation arising from part of her territory being used by elements for activities which India perceives as hostile to her territorial integrity and other domestic interests; or even to her regional supremacy. For example, India was much concerned over the proposal of the Monitors of CFA to permit sea access to the LTTE – a virtual sea corridor (to bring in arms?) and the LTTE acquiring an air wing. Should the situation develop into one like India faced in Mumbai, where would Sri Lanka stand in the face of Indian pressure or even evoking the principle of hot pursuit?

In the Mumbai case, India had to be circumspect in dealing with Pakistan because the latter is also a nuclear power and there was the U.S. and the U.K. to contend with before any drastic military action was contemplated. But does Sri Lanka have such clout?

This is where Sri Lanka has to take a close look at the devolution package to ensure that the Centre retains enough safeguards to prevent a situation leading to causing concerns to neighbours and even vital interests of industrialised nations whose oil supplies pass through sea lanes close by, resulting in foreign intervention from arising. I touched on this in my last article in these columns, under the caption "Mumbai and India’s neighbourhood role" (‘The Island’, January, 15/16).

The problems India herself has faced over Police powers of constituent states should be a pointer to the difficulties that arise. How the Bombay (now Mumbai) Police, in that strongly pro-Hindu state was dragging its feet over the investigations over the killing of Mahatma Gandhi and later the central Police had to take over the investigations is something that cannot evade our thinking. The problems the Central Police is finding itself in dealing with situations in Tamil Nadu like arms and other contraband smuggling to Sri Lanka should provide further constant reminders to us. The issue of highly placed fugitives from law – Chettiyars and others who were wanted for illicit felling of timber in state lands - running across to Jaffna and disappearing was a problem even during the British colonial administration is recorded in the Administrative Reports of Government Agents /AGAs of Trincomalee.

As Neville L. points out, the deliberations on devolution have thus far focused only on the powers and functions to the peripheral units, without any consideration being given to the structure of the centre which is a serious omission. His emphasis on the structural needs of the centre is an important one to be taken into account in respect of meeting not only the issues he has discussed, but also the state’s international/regional responsibilities entered into for meeting the global scourge of terrorism. These international/regional responsibilities should give expression in the devolution package. There will no occasion to close the stable doors after the horses have fled! No country could fault the GoSL for making such precautionary provision to meet international obligations.