The LTTE has lost game and set; whether it has lost the match as well, or can reincarnate as a successful guerrilla movement a second time, remains to be seen. However, the thought I wish to pursue today is not that the LTTE in its current avatar as formal army has been routed, rather, the corollary consequence that, at least for now, the quest of the Tamils for a new constitutional dispensation has come to nought. Only servile opportunists and fond dreamers, for different reasons, delude themselves, or con others, that devolution, ethnic democratisation of the Sinhala State, self-governing arrangements in Tamil regions, or a non-unitary constitution, will see the light of day. Nothing of the sort will happen; when one side loses an ethnic civil war, then, the consequences are etched in stone. There will, of course, be economic inputs into the North more so than the East, facilitated by foreign aid and coordinated by India, but it is moot if the Tamils in the Vanni and the North are so broken in sprit and exhausted by war that this peace dividend will be an adequate substitute for devolution.

A subtle distinction

The reasons why an ethnic civil war is lost and the consequences of losing an ethnic civil war are different. At first sight they may seem only subtly different but I crave your indulgence to labour the point. The LTTE made strategic blunders and committed crimes over the last quarter century – so did the Sinhala State over a longer period. Nevertheless, the LTTE lost the conventional war, the State won, and that’s decisive for now. Let’s put it another way, even if the LTTE had not committed blunders and fought nice and clean but eventually lost, then the Tamils would still be exactly where they are now. Conversely, even if it fought dirty but won, the national question would have been transformed. This is no amoral case for fighting dirty, perish the thought, it is sober realpolitik.

The Tigers assassinated democratic Tamil political leaders, resorted to terrorism, drove the Muslims out of the North and killed them in mosques in the East scuttling any possibility of an alliance, and worst of all, alienated India by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. Had the LTTE been of a different genre and refrained from such folly could it have won the war? Well, it would not have so estranged India and the whole world hence it would have fared better politically and militarily. Then, assuming a different military outcome, some form of self-rule for the Tamil regions could have materialised. Secession would not have been possible except at Indian instigation and with international support, but this caveat is not to be confused with the right to self determination, which is a matter of principle not feasibility. At this point I must add that sharing criticism of the LTTE with anyone who does not accept that the Tamils are an oppressed nation is pointless; pointless because such discourse cannot include an agenda to end denied alienation.

Nevertheless, the LTTE’s transgressions are tangential to my thesis; transgressions blunted military fortunes, hence they are relevant, but only tangentially. Tangential because if the Tigers had won (that is fought the State to a standstill and no more), irrespective of the blunders, the political outcome would have been Tamil autonomy of some sort. If defeated, as is the case now, irrespective of the niceties of war, the plight of the Tamils would have been dismal - forgive the repetition. The proof of the pudding is that the State too fought, and is fighting, no more clean and no less dirty than the LTTE, but triumphed. Hence its insignia adorns the skies. The idealism of the feeble intellect, you will observe, is not my forte.

The crisis of Tamil Nationalism

The Tamil nationalist movement since independence falls into two broad periods of about equal duration, 30 years each. The first was a period of democratic procedures, of petitions and agreements (B-C and D-C), of non-violence. This parliamentary, bourgeois democratic phase, ended in disappointment and humiliation in the late 1970s. The 1972 Constitution and the 1976 Vattukottai Resolution mark the fork in the road, 1983 the decisive denouement. Tamil nationalism at the time was hostile to the left, socialism, worker’s struggles and the like; it was wrapped up in the righteousness of its own cause.

The second phase, the armed struggle, reached its apogee when the LTTE eliminated all other armed groups and assumed a monopoly of military and in truth political power as well. What is fundamental about this phase is an exclusive preoccupation with military methods. The single minded pursuit of a military strategy marginalised political activities and engagement with economic, social or democratic issues. The LTTE abjured the Southern polity with its creed: "We don’t care what goes in the Sinhala nation, that’s not our business". (The 2005 presidential election is one of a few isolated aberrations). Nor did the Tigers make any meaningful efforts to build diplomatic bridges with foreign states and India, for which they now suffer unrelenting global isolation.

The political demand for secession and a focus on the armed struggle frequently go together in the modern world. The former is virtually impossible without the latter (ex-Yugoslavia, Kashmir, Sudan, the two Georgian enclaves, Turkish Kurds and scores of others). The converse though does not always hold; armed movements can prosper without a relationship to secessionist issues – Mao, Castro, Nepal. In the case of the LTTE the secessionist demand and an exclusive focus on military practices were symbiotic. Could the LTTE nevertheless have been persuaded to settle for less than a separate state? There were moments in the negotiating process in the mid-1990s and at the ISGA time when, in my assessment, it may have been possible, but mistakes were made on both sides.

Tamil nationalism, indeed the Tamil community as a whole, subcontracted the national question to the LTTE during this period. Confidence in ‘the boys’ and the acclaimed military prowess of ‘thambi’ (later thalaivar) persuaded the community at home and more so in the diaspora to sit back and subcontract out the national liberation struggle. Exclusive reliance on military methods was the consequence; it was not just an error of LTTE, it was also a failure of Tamil nationalism. I do not say this without sympathy. One must bear in mind the bitter humiliation piled on by the Sinhala State, wide public involvement in the 1958, 1977 and 1983 pogroms, and the difficulty of containing a powerful force like the LTTE. The community in its majority supported the LTTE but had no control over it; the power relationship was a one way street.

Both phases of the liberation struggle have ended in defeat. I use the term ‘liberation struggle’ advisedly. National question, the core question of the democratic revolution and national unification, remains in shambles in Lanka and the Tamils remain an oppressed minority; hence their pursuit is for liberation. But the defeat of two different approaches since independence to this undertaking must give us pause.

Chandrasekaran on Nepal

Dr. S. Chandrasekharan, a retired senior officer of Indian intelligence posted a paper a few days ago entitled "Alternative Conflict Resolution – The Case of Nepal" on the website South Asia Analysis Group. While armed insurrection in Nepal won, the LTTE did not; the differences between the two cases will not be lost on anyone. Extracts, much edited for abbreviation follow.

"How does one explain the remarkable success of the Maoists in capturing power within a space of ten years? First and foremost the leadership had political skill. It understood that the military campaign had its limits and cannot go it alone without political initiatives at every stage. They were in touch with political leaders of all hues including those who were opposed to their campaigns and methods. Leaders at every level - village, district and centre - were in touch with political leaders, bureaucrats and ministers; they even had a channel of communication with the Palace. The civilian leadership was in command. The PLA chief was fourth or fifth in the hierarchy and was accountable to the party politburo; the party commanded the gun".

"There was consensus in decision making. They differed but at the end of the day, the party resolution was adhered to. The most important aspect was collective leadership; Prachanda was the supreme leader, but never pushed down his decisions".

"When the Maoists hit a wall they did a "debono" of going round it. Though militarily strong and capable of prolonged war, they realised the futility of a military solution and instead supported the democratic movement. They encouraged civic bodies to take the lead. Thus they were able to make the people’s movement a success in getting rid of the monarchy".

"Finally they understood the importance of India. They never targeted India outwardly and left the Indian business community relatively free. Indian trucks were freely allowed in and out of the valley. They never abused the Indian leadership openly though in internal documents they referred to India as an expansionist power".

What next?

Surely there is no need to spell out ‘what next’ word by word. The national liberation struggle of the Tamil people must continue until the fundamental nature of the state in Lanka is transformed, but it must be prosecuted by methods starkly different from those of both the Chelvanayagam and the Prabaharan eras. I will not be so presumptuous as to pontificate a full-fledged alternative methodology at this point, but the essential immediate step is clear. The Tamil nationalist movement must put politics in command and engage with broad struggles on social and economic issues. It must join the current campaign to preserve democratic rights (right to life, right to dissent) and link the demands of national liberation into these tasks. Emphatically, this is not the same as ‘joining the democratic mainstream’, the phoney approach that the regimes new found hangers-on, jaded left-opportunists and recently articulate petty-bourgeois quacks postulate. It is as different as Rosa Luxemburg is from Anadasangaree; though no offence meant to this respected gentleman.