The middle ground exists, even when it is unoccupied, ignored or denied. There is a moderate space between the two extremes of a permanent ceasefire and an immediate (ground cum air) assault on the ‘safe zone’. The Rajapakse administration positioned itself on that sane locus, momentarily, when it declared a two day unilateral ceasefire in time for the traditional Sinhala and Tamil New Year. That one gesture did more to counter Tiger propaganda and improve the tattered image of the country than innumerable verbal and written barrages.

The two day respite from incessant gunfire, from omnipresent death and injury, would have been very welcome to the beleaguered civilians. It was obviously and manifestly unwelcome to the Tigers. The LTTE always throve in polarised situations, which could be twisted in accordance with their politico-propaganda needs. A Colombo willing to compromise or even appease, was ever an anathema to the Tiger. The last things the Tigers want at this juncture are humanitarian gestures, acts of generosity by the regime. They would welcome a permanent ceasefire because that would give them another lease of life; in the absence of such an elixir, they would prefer an all out assault on the ‘safe zone’ by the Lankan Forces, killing and injuring tens of thousands of civilian Tamils. Such a carnage would enable Vellupillai Pirapaharan to cover his failure on the battlefield with the blood of innocent Tamils. Such carnage would win for him a place of honour in the Tamil Pantheon of Gods and Heroes by transforming the military defeat of the LTTE into a heroic saga capable of inspiring future generations of Tamils.

As Sri Lanka comes to the verge of geographical reunification she is more divided than ever before - psychologically. The regime’s timely action prevented the traditional New Year’s Day, one of the few points of reference common to Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus, from becoming a day of blood and death for the Tamils (particularly those caught in the ‘safe zone’). Still there was a chasm of difference in the way the Sinhalese and the Tamils would have greeted their New Year. Despite debilitating economic conditions, most Sinhalese are hopeful about the future. But for the majority of Tamils the future would seem bleak (if not dangerous) since the Sinhala Supremacist nature of the regime and its war effort is turning the impending defeat of the LTTE into a humiliation and a setback for the Tamils in general.

The 48 hour humanitarian pause would have been more meaningful had it been preceded by an international effort to persuade the LTTE to permit the evacuation of civilians. The LTTE is unlikely to be persuaded to let go of its final and most potent weapon, but the effort needed (and still needs) to be made by the government, in conjunction with selected members of the international community and the UN. For the humanitarian crisis in the ‘safe zone’ is no Tiger illusion and the government’s refusal to admit to its existence is ridiculously untenable. Truth is indeed the best propaganda; it would make far more sense for the government to acknowledge the plight of the civilians while focusing on the LTTE’s primary culpability for this tragedy though its inhumane refusal to permit these unarmed men, women and children to flee for their lives.

The Penchant for Extremes

In Sri Lanka the moderate centre is unoccupied territory while the two antipodes are teeming with actual and would be owners. The Tigers and their supporters want the war to end either in a permanent ceasefire or in a bloodbath of epic proportions; they are undeterred by the knowledge that the victims of the latter outcome will be fellow Tamils, unarmed men, women and children, who want to escape and live, even in open prisons masquerading as welfare villages. The Rajapakse administration and its Sinhala extremist allies are similarly undeterred by the possibility of massive human losses and the Tamil hatred such carnage will give rise to (if anything is giving them the pause, it is the prospect of international outrage). They are also uninterested in a parallel political track, and openly declare their disbelief in the very existence of an ethnic problem. Each side lives up to the worst expectations (and the most damaging propaganda) of the other; neither hesitates to prove the other correct.

By refusing to make a clear break with the LTTE and by failing to concentrate solely on the suffering of the civilians, most Diaspora Tamils are becoming a party to the diabolical plan by the LTTE to cover the shame of its defeat with the blood of innocent civilians. Ironically the Diaspora Tamils would have met with more international sympathy and support, if their protests were not premised on the oneness of Tigers and Tamils. That equation has brought the Tamils little gain. On the contrary it enabled the LTTE to subjugate Lankan Tamils in the name of liberation, denying to them even the most basic of rights. The Tigers can no longer further Tamil interests and Tamils need to emerge from under the Shade of the Tiger if they want a future for themselves. The longer they remain prisoners of the LTTE politically and psychologically, the more damage they would do to themselves, as a nation, as a people.

If the UNP had a leadership that was hard on the Tigers but soft on Tamils, backed the war while advocating a political solution to the ethnic problem, Sri Lanka’s problems would not have reached the level of an existential crisis. Unfortunately such a leadership is impossible so long as Ranil Wickremesinghe clings to the zenith of the party. The JVP is caught in a time warp and blinded by ideological blinkers. It is trying to be more ‘patriotic’ than the regime, an impossible effort which is doomed to political and electoral failure. With a pro-Tiger UNP and a Sinhala chauvinist Left, moderation and sanity are as rare in the ranks of the opposition as it is within the government.

This critical absence of a moderate centre has created a debilitating vacuum in the Lankan polity. A Sinhala Supremacist war cannot create a Sri Lanka peace, unless there are powerful countervailing forces which can propel Sinhalese and Tamils into more moderate (and centripetal) courses. The Sinhalese need to stop talking and acting in old ways; they have to combine their opposition to the LTTE with support for substantial devolution. The past is not a good place to return to, because it is full of errors which alienated the Tamils and pushed them into (initially non-violent and subsequently violent) separatism. If the end of the conventional phase of the war entails a return to that past, the victory, however intoxicating it is now, will be a toxic one which will further poison the country’s social fabric, rendering it unsustainable.

The Tamils need to embark on a less destructive-self-destructive path. They need to consciously move away not only from the LTTE but also from the thinking that created and sustained the LTTE, enabling it to beat the competition and dominate Tamil polity and society. The end of the war will not end the conflict. The Tamil struggle will resurface, possibly with the Diaspora playing the role of the ‘Motive Force’. But if it is to succeed, it needs to be not just non-LTTE but also anti-LTTE; it must embrace a different ethos and a different path from the Tiger Way, consciously and manifestly. It needs to be tolerant and democratic, and embody the best rather than the worst in Tamil culture and civilisation. If the Tamils (especially the Diaspora Tamils) fail in this task, if they permit Tigers or proto-Tigers to enslave them once again, in the name of liberation, the living would have suffered and the dead would have died in vain.

Eternal Recurrence?

In a post-war analysis of the German debacle, Thomas Mann made the crucial distinction between liberating and anti-liberating liberty, of liberations which liberate and liberations that subjugate a nation. "The German concept of liberty was always directed outward… this German concept of liberty behaved internally with an astonishing degree of lack of freedom, of immaturity, of dull servility. It was a militant slave mentality…" (Germany and the Germans).

The LTTE was the most successful, the most efficient of the armed Tamil groups in the 1980’s. The Tigers were the Tamil Prussians, and their successes engendered the belief that only Vellupillai Pirapahran and his men can liberate the Tamils from the oppressive Sinhala state and take them to the Promised Land. It was their many victories against the Lankan Forces which enabled the Tigers to impose and sustain an anti-liberationist regimen at home. In the process of winning for the Tamils the right to self-determination as a nation, the LTTE took away from each Tamil his/her right to self-determination as an individual. As the Tamil liberation struggle gained momentum under the Tigers, the Tamils became less liberated than ever before. The most fundamental human rights were denied to them, in the name of furthering the cause of liberation.

A similar psychological process is underway in the South currently. The Rajapakse regime has been more successful than any of its predecessors in dealing with the LTTE; in return it is demanding certain rights and privileges which are extra-constitutional. In a bargain as destructive as the one offered to and imposed on the Tamils by the Tigers, the Sinhalese are being expected not just to tolerate but to embrace the denial of certain basic rights in return for ‘national liberation and reunification’. They are being asked to back the regime unconditionally because of its success in beating the Tigers. Unfortunately many Sinhalese seems to regard this ‘quid pro quo’ with either approbation or indifference. As the Tamils did once, they too tend to look upon the anti-democratic conduct of the regime as something necessary to the successful completion of the task at hand, the task of defeating the LTTE and taking the country back to the ‘idyllic’ days predating the outbreak of the war. The regime is thus getting away with the objectionable, the abominable and the punishable, from messing up the economy to sabotaging the 17th Amendment to killing dissidents. For the Sinhalese it is important to take a stand and do it now because it is all too easy to go the way the Tamils went with the Tigers. The descent to the abyss can often be too gradual to be noticeable.

Post Scriptum:

Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange crisis is symbolic not only of the regime’s inane economics but also of the limits of Sinhala Supremacist ‘patriotism’. Early this year the Central Bank, under the stewardship of its unique Governor, Ajith Nivard Cabraal, launched a ‘Patriotic Bond’ targeting the Sinhala Diaspora. The aim was to raise US$600 million to stave off the impending foreign exchange crisis. That effort was a monumental failure, compelling the regime to turn to the once despised IMF. Argentina in 2001 may provide us with some inkling of what awaits us if the IMF loan fails to materialise. Faced with a foreign exchange crisis - caused by IMF advice, according to many economists, including Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz - Argentinean government announced its incapacity to payback foreign loans; it also cut down government expenditure drastically, triggering off a societal crisis.