It is now quite apparent that a major shift is taking place in the centre of power of Tamil national politics; it could have beneficial as well as negative consequences. The LTTE has been very nearly conclusively defeated as a conventional military force and how effective the next stage of armed resistance – guerrilla combat – will be, cannot be answered with any certainty for many more months, if not a year or two. I was perhaps the first person to have explained the importance of the emergence of the LTTE as a technologically sophisticated and multisided conventional military force (Sunday Island: 1 April, 2007, ‘Technology and the LTTE’, and 23 November 2008, ‘Reflections on the Transformation of the LTTE’s Military Organisation’). Therefore its demise as a conventional armed force signals an important alteration in this phase of war.

I call it a change of phase and not an end of the LTTE for two reasons; firstly, human capital - a knowledge base - of the scope I explained in the two articles, once acquired, persists and resides indefinitely in the minds and abilities of various actors. It can be resuscitated quickly, even after a defeat, if conditions are right – vide the resurrection of Germany and Japan after pulverisation in World War II. The second factor is the uncertainty of how prolonged or effective the guerrilla stage may be; and what if one of the important ‘right conditions’, territorial operating space, is absent? Too many uncertainties. But what if the nerve centre of Tamil nationalism is deflected away from Lanka? These technical factors then become less important and we need to undertake some lateral thinking about whether the influence of the external Tamil diaspora on the internal national question has risen by a great leap.

The fish and the sea

Mao’s famous idiom was that the revolutionary is a fish and the people the sea. The sea fed, protected and nurtured the fish, which lived on to fight against great odds. This, to a degree, describes the circumstances of militant Tamil youth from the middle of the 1970s until the first years of the 21st Century. I say to a degree because none of these groups, not a single one of them, possessed any theoretical sophistication. This led to a blind alley where the military aspect dominated the political. Hence they failed where the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries and the Nepalese Maoists had succeeded. But this aside the Tamil people extended support and succour to the "boys", the principal beneficiary the LTTE.

Now, in the new situation (post-LTTE is not a correct term) the question we need to ask is, has this changed? Is the fish and the sea analogy no longer valid? I am not so naive as to ask: Is the Rajapakse government going to solve the national question if it wins military and electoral victories? I was not born yesterday; I know that the Sinhalese pressures on this government are such that this is impossible. I had something else in mind; have Tamils in the north and east become war weary, have so many migrated to the south and given up on national rights and devolution, are the people fed up with the LTTE that over lording by the Sinhala State engenders a ‘so what’s the difference’ feeling? The question that many ask is: ‘Has the LTTE lost its base in the Tamil community within Lanka?’ It has palpably not in the diaspora.

The answer is not contained in bowed heads and fearful visages of Tamils, middle class and poor, slinking around Colombo and in the Wanni holding camps; they are merely biding their time. Sans electoral democracy in the north and east we are each left to our own guesswork about support bases, and my guess is that Tamil nationalism today, though in retreat, is both angry and determined. However, my guess also is that its next incarnation will no longer manifest the LTTE legacy of prioritising the armed struggle over politics. For a period though, in the face of repression unleashed by the state, not only against nationalist dissent but democratic and media freedoms, it will, within the confines of the Island, remain muted.

The regime’s Tamils

What are the chances that the torch of genuine leadership will pass to the likes of Douglas, Sangaree, Pillayan and Karuna? A great majority of Tamils regard these worthies as those who sleep with the enemy. But leave that prejudice aside and ask: If appointed and anointed (as Pillayan has been) can pro-Rajapakse Tamil politicians deliver? The anointed ones face a conundrum that will eventually discredit them. A central government enforcing a military occupation cannot allow even its own quislings much leeway. They in turn, cannot win acceptance except through the exercise real power (land, police, budget, Tamilness). But there is no such meeting point between a Sinhala State and a Tamil regional administration in respect of national aspirations or day-to-day needs of the people. Either the epigones will become estranged from the master, or alternatively, alienated from the people. A people responsive minority regional administration can find a meeting point only with a genuine national democratic state; neither is on the cards.

To summarise, the LTTE has been weakened and no longer able to exercise physical and ideological hegemony, Tamil politicians dwelling in the government’s pocket cannot win leadership of the community, and finally, there is no credible, independent Tamil ‘third force’ – non-LTTE, non-quisling – in the country. There is no third force to assume the mantle of leadership. So here is the question: ‘In the absence of an option at home, will the Tamil leadership baton pass to the diaspora for a period?’ I think the answer is "yes".

Politics of the overseas Tamil community

There was a time when the diaspora flushed the LTTE with dollars, Euros and sterling, but kept its trap shut. It spoke when spoken to, but in a different sense – it said in public what it had been instructed to say. But now the LTTE has been so weakened, militarily and by proscriptions, that the mammoth demonstrations in London, the large rallies in Australia and Canada and the various goings on in the United States are no longer a robotic responses wound up by arm twisting. No, the diaspora is now functioning as an independent force. We are seeing a spontaneous upsurge, as natural as the Sinhala chauvinist surge behind Mahinda Rajapakse at home and abroad in the wake of military success.

The Lankan Tamil diaspora is different from the Zionist movement of yesteryear or today’s jihadist fighters. It is made up of comfortably ensconced communities. None will send sons and daughters to join the armed struggle for Eelam. Its forte is funding, pressure on Western governments, propaganda and diplomacy. This too this is an effective arsenal. Just two examples will make the point.

The government is in dire financial straits and desperate for a $1.9 billion lifeline from the IMF without which the local economy will crumble – yes, things are that bad. The diaspora in the meantime is orchestrating a campaign to deny it this lifeline remonstrating that GoSL is guilty of war crimes and genocide. Whichever way this pans out, the operation shows that the diaspora can put a knife to the regime’s jugular. It has influence and it will make life miserable for GoSL for so long as there is no acceptable political settlement.

The second example is the 8th April meeting at the US State Department reported in the latter’s press release as follows. "Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert Blake met with several U.S.-based organizations representing members of the Tamil Diaspora to discuss the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka". The penultimate paragraph said "Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake emphasized the urgent need for the Government of Sri Lanka to engage Tamils, including Diaspora communities around the world, to find a political end of the conflict. Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake concluded by saying that they would like to continue the dialogue with the Diaspora community and urged participants to continue to share feedback".

To my mind this is a significant and symptomatic event. Others see this as a signal that the West is toughening against GoSL. In the context of this article my point is different; I am drawing attention to the growing importance of the Tamil diaspora in the eyes of the ‘international community’, that is foreign governments, human rights bodies and the public.

A SWOT analysis

Let us mull over the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as the diaspora assumes a major role in Tamil nationalism. The great opportunity is to move away from adolescent emphasis on the gun and the RPG and once again to put politics in command. This is by no means assured, but the re-examination of today’s failures provides an opportunity for rethinking tomorrow’s strategies. Such rethinking is impossible in the Wanni for more reasons than one; in another place it may be possible. However the downside is that people removed from the centre of reality, the diaspora, will be making decisions affecting not their own lives but of Tamils living in the north, east and the southern provinces of Lanka. Daft decisions may sometimes be made though one can hope that the catastrophes of recent years have taught a stern lesson or two.

One question to which analysts and LTTE watchers have never produced a sensible answer is succession. Who after Prabaharan? Pottu Amman is controversial and not fancied by other commanders, son Charles Anthony is young and still lacks credibility, Balakumar is an outsider, does Nadesan have stature, and Soosai – how old his he? There is no credible candidate in the Wanni.