When the Philippine Court of Appeals handed down its decision acquitting US marine Daniel Smith, no one was surprised. The departure of ‘Nicole’. his accuser, from our shores had already conditioned the country into believing an ‘arrangement’ was in the works. In that sense, whatever the actual merits of the court’s decision, the case may be relegated as yet another one decided on clout rather than in fulfilment of justice.

The United States can claim it fulfilled the letter - though not the spirit - of the Visiting Forces Agreement by keeping Smith in Manila throughout the judicial process, but not a second longer. Smith is now out of sight and, probably, out of mind - seemingly the objective of both the Philippine and American governments.

Smith’s co-defendants went on to dishonourable or less-than-honourable discharge from the military. And no one expects Smith to be glorified or rewarded by his military or country. But that is a pretty small consolation for the manner in which Smith’s case proved that the VFA is a lopsided agreement; and worse, that the instinct of our own officials is not to assert Philippine rights and processes but to kowtow and grant every possible consideration to American wishes.

Public opinion forced the prosecution of Smith and company. Public opinion kept the justice system creaking along; and while the beginning of the case found American authorities complying with their obligations under the VFA, Philippine authorities began finding ways to subvert the spirit of the agreement. Most dramatic of all was the handing over of Smith to American custody in the dead of night in December 2006. All throughout the judicial process itself, it was hard to tell whether the Department of Justice, for one, was lawyering for the government, the alleged rape victim, or the American soldiers.

Now the government says that the Supreme Court’s exhortation to renegotiate the custody of Smith - something on which the government dragged its feet because it knew, as the Americans did, that it would be virtually impossible to renegotiate what had already been a surrender of the Filipino advantage in the case ("possession is nine-tenths of the law") - is moot and academic. By such means are potential enhancements to the country’s legal and diplomatic position blocked by its own people.

Considering its proven track record of buckling whenever American pressure is applied, it is unlikely for the present administration to ask for a renegotiation of the VFA itself, an imperfect agreement that has been turned into a mockery of what it supposedly represents.

That being said, let us return to the first principles and consider what’s at stake here. Our political class and a significant portion of public opinion have been conditioned to consider the ‘special relationship’ with America the alpha and omega of our foreign and military policy. This is neither in keeping with American or Philippine strategic considerations or interests. The real problem the VFA tried to solve was the sense of neglect and unimportance Filipino officials felt in the wake of the non-renewal of the RP-US Bases Treaty. The VFA, was meant to skirt the constitutional obstacles to the reinstatement of US bases in the Philippines - without calling them bases.

And this is what the VFA has done: the Americans’ temporary stay and, more significantly, the logistical support for their "visiting" troops have become pretty much a permanent, though diminished, presence on our shores for five years now. As was true of the past, there are Filipinos who welcome this, not because of their deep devotion to the alliance or strategic considerations, but simply because this promises American dollars.