

The event that took centre stage last week, was the visit by the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. During their brief stay, they met both the government as well as the opposition. After they departed, both the government and the opposition were left wondering why they ever came. Nothing concrete was achieved, mainly because both Miliband and Kouchner had not told either the government or the UNP delegation that met them, what exactly they wanted to see happening. The government team comprised Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse, Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona and the Attorney General Mohan Peiris among others. This team had first met Milliband and his team followed by Kouchner and his team. Subsequent to this meeting there was yet another meeting where Miliband and Kouchner were both present which was presided over by foreign minister Rohitha Bogollagama.
Both Miliband and Kouchner had been pretty vague in what they said. Not one word was said by either of them, about a ceasefire. They were also at pains to say that they were not trying to bail out Prabhakaran but that they were concerned only about the civilians. The government team had wholeheartedly agreed on this point and said that they too were concerned about the civilians and that this is why the president has issued an order prohibiting the use of heavy weapons in the operations to liberate the remaining hostages in the no-fire zone. Both of them had wanted to visit the no-war zone where Prabhakaran was holed up but permission was refused on the grounds that they might be taken hostage. It was also pointed out to Miliband that 24,000 soldiers had died with hundreds more maimed for life and that a very high price had been paid to get things to the present stage and that the operations cannot be jeopardized at this point.
Miliband had been at pains to point out that he was there not to put pressure on anyone but with a view to becoming partners with Sri Lanka in solving this problem. It was pointed out to Miliband that a partnership was a relationship where people do things for common gain and that the government was only too pleased to join in such a partnership with Britain. Both Miliband and Kouchner had been openly told that even though they wanted to be accepted as partners, the government of Sri Lanka was not sure whether they were fully with Sri Lanka. The government delegation had told them that their bona fides would be more visible if they went back to their countries and pressurized the diaspora to exert their influence to allow the LTTE to let the civilians go.
Unable to fathom what exactly Miliband wanted, the government delegates had said that they had the suspicion that this whole exercise was to establish an escape route for the LTTE. Miliband denied any such motive and said that the only interest he has, is to ensure that the civilians are not harmed in the process. The possibility of a third party surrender was also mooted by both Miliband and Kouchner with the latter pushing for it with greater vigour. The government delegation had pointed out that if the LTTE leadership wanted to surrender to a third party, they could easily surrender to the Red Cross ship that called at the no war zone daily with supplies. This Red Cross ship is not allowed to berth in the no war zone and LTTE boats have to ferry goods from this boat ashore. There were no Sri Lankan personnel in the Red Cross ship and the government’s suggestion was that if Prabhakaran were to get into that ship, no one would stop it. But the rub was that this Red Cross ship had to operate under the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan government and anybody who surrenders to the Red Cross will have to be handed over to the government. Perhaps what Miliband and Kouchner wanted was a surrender to a third party which would have enabled Prabhakaran to escape the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan government. If this was their intention, the problem is that neither of them spelled it out.
The meeting that the Miliband-Kouchner duo had had with the UNP and its allies the SLMC and the Democratic People’s Alliance of Mano Ganesan was apparently even worse. Miliband and Kouchner had done most of the talking and at the end of it, the UNP was left wondering what it was that they had wanted to achieve with this visit. UNP sources speculate that they may have just come here to see whether they could induce a change of heart in the government. But even this is speculation because this was not spelled out by either of the two visitors. The UNP had been eager to listen to the information the two foreign visitors had about what was going on in the no-war zone and this seems to have been the most useful part of the meeting as far as the UNP delegation was concerned. Ranil Wickremesinghe had said after the meeting, that it was sad that they had to get information about what was happening in the north. from foreigners.
One of the things that they had said was that the IDPs were under the control of the military, but this is known to everyone and until the IDPs are resettled, they will probably remain under military control. One of the points raised by Miliband and Kouchner was whether the UNP and its allies were prepared to help the government in finding a political solution to the problem. The UNP’s answer was that they did not know what the government had in mind and that they were waiting for the government to put forward a plan. What are we to make of this visit? Well, Miliband and Kouchner came, ran around like headless chickens for a day, confused everybody, and then departed.
Looking for a scapegoat
An issue which is causing concern within the UNP is the plan floated by Mangala Samaraweera, to field a ‘common candidate’ from the opposition at the next presidential election. In the first instance, the allies of the UNP really count for nothing, the SLFP(M) being just Samaraweera and no one else, and even the SLMC is fast losing its appeal to Muslims as evidenced at the recently concluded WPC elections. In this context, for the UNP to actually be guided by outsiders is too much for many to take. The fact that it was Samaraweera who has been pushing for a common candidate has not helped the cause at all. Of course in presenting this view, he may have been doing so according to the directions of the UNP leader who has once before suggested in the working committee that the party should field someone other than him at the next presidential elections. This resulted in Sajith Premadasa firing back that if he is the leader, he has to contest.
Wickremesinghe probably feels that if he manages to avoid another defeat, he would be able to save himself for the final battle in 2017 when someone other than Mahinda Rajapakse will be the UPFA candidate. Those within the UNP are livid. Many would be willing to accept someone from within the UNP as the presidential candidate, but not an outsider. They feel that by fielding an outsider UNPers will refrain from voting by the droves and further erode the party’s dwindling vote base. They point out that by fielding Hector Kobbekaduwa in 1982, the SLFP actually made significant gains. So they feel that a different candidate from within the UNP with a different agenda, may be able to bolster the UNP vote base whereas a complete outsider will result in the UNP being reduced to a cipher at the presidential elections with disastrous consequences at the parliamentary elections that will follow. Some irate UNPers were going to raise this issue at the next working committee meeting scheduled for May 5, but then they have put off discussing it until it is brought up by the leader himself.
What was most salient about the WPC elections concluded last week was the high turnover of provincial level politicians in both major parties. This situation was more pronounced in the UNP than in the UPFA. In the UNP, the district leaders of Colombo Lakshman Abeygunaratne and Lawrence Madiwela of Gampaha failed to get elected. They were not the only seniors to get wiped out either. In the Colombo distrct alone, around eight members of the WPC failed to get re-elected. In addition to the district leader, the other prominent casualty was Sagara Senaratne, one of the most active UNP members of the previous WPC and a person who was tipped to win. In addition to that, Kithsiri Fernando, Nimal R.Peiris, Harishchandra Costa, Shahul Hameed Mohamed, Vellamma Sellasamy and Sunil R.Magammana were among the WPC members who failed to get re-elected. Two other UNP stalwarts and former parliamentarians who were wiped out at these elections were Premaratne Gunasekera and Jayantha Ketagoda.
Nimal R.Peiris, was a parliamentarian from 1989 to 94 and was later in the provincial council. With this defeat, his political career has effectively been terminated. Sunil R, Magammana was a close protégé of Ranil Wickremesinghe and he too has been wiped out. Another long time Wickremesinmghe protégé wiped out is Suranimala Rajapakse of Gampaha, a former parliamentarian and non-cabinet minister. Losing and making comebacks was the norm rather than the exception in the days before 1977, when the first past the post system prevailed. Under the present proportional representation system however, the possibility of making a come back after losing, is slim. The high turnover of veterans at the WPC elections has sent shockwaves throughout the entire UNP. On the one hand, middle and grassroots level politicians and activists of the UNP were joining the government and others were being tossed out by the voters themselves. There is no doubt of high turnover within the UPFA as well. But the turnover within the UPFA does not weaken the UPFA and may on the contrary strengthen it even more. All three of the candidates in the Colombo district who got the highest number of preference votes on the UPFA list were newcomers from outside - Duminda Silva, Tilanga Sumathipala and Udaya Gammanpila. This has not weakened the UPFA but immeasurably strengthened it. So the negative effects of turnover are felt mainly by the UNP.
High turnover of politicians
Of the 15 UNP members elected from the Colombo district to the WPC, seven are newcomers – Rosy Senanayake, Manju Sri Arangala, Mohamed Muzammil, Kumar Gurubaran, S.Rajendran, Mohamed Mushin, and Srinath Perera. The election of Srinath Perera, will be useful for the UNP not because he is a leading lawyer, but because he is one of the few in the party who can lead a demonstration effectively. His performance in the demonstrations that toppled the Chandrika Kumaratunga governments in 2001 was better than that of most in the UNP. With the departure of individuals like Rajitha Senaratne and Gamini Lokuge from the UNP, they are badly in need of people who are streetwise. One of the great disappointments was the failure of Shiral Laktilleke to make it to the WPC. Of all the newcomers, he and Mohamed Muzammil were the two who projected themselves best in the propaganda campaign. Yet once again, it has been proved that propaganda is not everything and that attempts to skim off some votes from every electorate on propaganda and publicity alone, is not going to work.
Laktilleke’s mistake was that he decided to enter politics at the last minute. Some preliminary work at the grassroots level would have been helpful before he announced his candidature at the elections. We hardly saw any advertisements or media projections of Manjula Arangala, the Homagama organizer of the UNP, but it was plain from the beginning that he would be a winner – because he has worked with his constituency over a period of time. There is no reason for the constituents to feel any loyalty towards those who parachute in at the last moment. Laktilleke was the only candidate to advertise a video clip of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe extolling his virtues and even that did not work. Usually an appeal by the party leader asking the constituency to vote for one candidate or the other, works. Does Laktilleke’s failure to get elected indicate the extent to which Wickremesinghe’s own stock has plummeted?
Another surprise was the UNP Borella organizer Jayantha Silva’s poor showing. In 2004, Jayantha Silva was second on the list after Duminda Silva, but this time Jayantha Silva had come down to eighth on the list. It appears that a good part of Jayantha Silva’s supporters among the underclass in Colombo city, were lured away by Thilanga Sumathipala. So even though the UNP managed to win in the Colombo city area with all five electorate within the city being retained by the UNP, they did not emerge unscathed. The majorities by which the UNP won the Colombo city were so slim that the majorities of all five city electorates put together wouldn’t even come close to covering the majority by which the UNP lost a single electorate like Kaduwela, Kesbewa or Maharagama.
One of the surprises in this election was the phenomenal number of preference votes received by Duminda Silva, Thilanga Sumathipala and Udaya Gammanpila. The present columnist said last week that given the fact that both Silva and Sumathipala were defectors from the UNP and new to the UPFA set up, that it would be creditable if they could get 50,000 votes each. Yet they both polled over three times that. Neither of them could have got that many preference votes had they not been able to skim off some votes from the UNP as well – which explains the vastly reduced majorities of the UNP in the Colombo city area. The JHU’s target was to get 60,000 votes in the Colombo district – just enough to be able to get one parliamentary seat in the Colombo district next time. Yet Gammanpila polled nearly twice what. H.N.G.B.Kotakadeniya, the JHU candidate in the Gampaha district, who also came in with 47,000 votes polled. This means that the JHU may be able to get two parliamentary seats from the Colombo and Gampaha districts next time, depending on who the candidates are going to be.
One those on the UNP list who performed better than expected was Sujeewa Senasinghe the Kaduwela organizer who has almost trebled the number of preference votes he got in 2004. Mohan Lal Grero has also increased his vote by nearly 20,000 and come into second place from the fourth place in 2004. Niroshan Paduka the Kesbewa organizer came in at fifth place in 2004 with over 28,000 votes, but has fared poorly this time coming just above the last on the UNP list. The other provincial councilor from Kesbewa., Harischandra Costa, had not got elected. Kesbewa was an electorate which the UNP lost with a margin of more than 40,000 votes. The defection of Gamini Lokuge, the popular UNP parliamentarian for the area, could be a reason for the erosion of the UNP’s base in the area.
SLMC at the crossroads
Another major casualty of the WPC elections is the SLMC. They had three elected councilors in 2004 in the Colombo district and now they are down to one. They failed to get a member elected in the Kalutara district despite the fact that Mano Ganesan’s party had thrown Tamil votes behind the SLMC. The reason why the SLMC decided to contest separately in the Colombo district is because they felt that they would be at a disadvantage if they contest on the UNP list because their candidates would have to obtain a large number of preference votes to get elected and that while their votes may strengthen the UNP, it would not reciprocally increase the chances of their candidates being elected on the UNP ticket. They thought that by contesting separately, their preference votes would be for their own candidates and therefore, they stood a better chance of getting more elected. This argument seemed to hold water as they had two elected members in the Kandy district, but one of them got eliminated at the last CPC elections because he failed to get a sufficient number of preferential votes. But contesting separately has not helped the SLMC either This weakening of the SLMC is going to have far reaching repercussions for the UNP and for Ranil Wickremesinghe. Mano Ganesan’s party did better in the Colombo district by contesting on the UNP list. They managed to get their three candidates Prabha Ganesan, Kumar Guruparan and S.Rajendran elected.
The biggest surprise of all was Rosy Senanayake’s performance, getting the highest number of preference votes in the Colombo district, beating her nearest competitor Mohan Lal Grero by over 20,000 votes. Ms Senanayke was one of those who initially refused to contest the WPC elections and was compelled to do so because of the ruling that all electoral organizers who were not elected representatives had to contest. Among the reasons for her initial refusal to contest had been that the PC elections were beneath her, if she was not designated the chief ministerial candidate. Even though she considered herself suitable for chief ministerial candidacy, it was perhaps wise on Wickremesinghe’s part not to designate her as such because Rosy Senanayake epitomizes the bourgeois, English speaking alienated upper class image that the UNP leader has been pilloried for. Making her the chief ministerial candidate may have precipitated yet another crisis within the party.
Rosy ready and willing
Now that Rosy Senanayake has got the highest number of preference votes in the Colombo district, she cannot be denied the opposition leadership of the western province. There were rumours circulating that Ruwan Wijewardene was to be made opposition leader, but these it turned out, were just rumours. Not that there are no other contenders. Sujeewa Senasinghe is one of those eying the post. At a meeting held at UNP headquarters on Thursday, he was heard to speak of the need to cultivate the Sinhala Buddhist vote. (Rosy Senanayake is a Christian) This had been countered by Wickremesinghe who had said that Duminda Silva who had got the highest number of preference votes on the other side, was also a Catholic. It was announced at this meeting that the political affairs committee would take the final decision about appointing the opposition leader of the WPC. This may in fact be a sign that some powers over key appointments are in the process of being transferred to the political affairs committee which will be headed by Karu Jayasuriya and not the party leader as decided earlier.
Senanayake according to sources, worked on a low campaign budget of less than one million rupees and had to face the usual undercutting from other contestants. Pocket meetings organized for her had been inexplicably called off at the last moment and many such obstacles placed in her way. Despite that she made it to the top. Senanayake feels that this is a result of being associated over a long period of time with the UNP and the work she has put in during that period. She had been active in the Seva Vanitha movement from the time of Mrs Elina Jayewardene and had done the rounds with Mrs Premadasa as well. She had also been a member of the UNP’s working committee since 1997. She says that the average UNPer knew she was a true UNPer and that was what stood her in good stead.
On a broader canvass, she feels, that her role as a TV talk show hostess had given her the opportunity to discuss many issues with public participation on TV and that this also gave her an edge in the contest. A lot of people still tend to see Senanayake as a beauty queen and that seems to blur everything else at least as far as the men folk are concerned! Asked about this, Senanayake says that she became a beauty queen 26 years ago and that people pass through various phases in life and that she has done much more than simply winning a beauty pageant. She has been a goodwill ambassador for the UN and rubbed shoulders with the likes of Michel Douglas, Angelina Jolie, Mohamed Ali and others. She also says that she has been on every UNP platform and demonstration over the past many years, has faced tear gas attacks, and that she is not just a former Mrs. World, but a veteran UNP activist. Asked whether she would be up to the task of leading the opposition in the WPC, given the present weak position of the UNP, Senanayake was confident of her ability to hold her own against the government juggernaut. Asked whether she sees herself as a grassroots level politician despite her socialite image, Senanayake answers tentatively; "I think so!"