It was left to no less a person than US Defence Secretary Robert Gates to give the world a sense of the deepening policy quagmire the US is finding itself in, in Afghanistan: ‘As I have said many times before, very few of these problems can be solved by military means alone. And yet, from the military perspective, we can and must do better.’

These were some of Gates’ words on concluding his recent visit to Afghanistan, which reports said, was aimed at ascertaining at first-hand, what preparations were on to implement President Obama’s ‘counter insurgency strategy’. It was of considerable importance that Gates’ visit coincided with the removal of Gen.David Mckiernan as Commander of the US forces in Afghanistan and the appointment of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to his position. This change at the top of the US forces was accompanied by the induction of 21,000 more US troops to Afghanistan, reportedly to ‘confront the Taliban more forcefully this spring and summer.’

The Obama administration has given sufficient indication that it would be deploying a multi-pronged approach in Afghanistan to blunt the edge of the Taliban resurgence in the country, but Gates’ comments point to the military approach having the edge over political means, in the administration’s policy mix for the chronically unstable state.

However, the question which arises is, has not the military option, thus far, always held sway over any substantial US political initiatives in Afghanistan. If this poser elicits an unreserved answer in the affirmative – and this is certainly the case – the conclusion to be drawn is that the military approach has drawn a blank in Afghanistan for the US. It would be deeply engrossing to find out how, indeed, the US can ‘do better’ from ‘the military perspective’ from now on, with a change in personnel at the helm of the military effort, combined with a greater influx of troops.

The American military involvement in Afghanistan would perhaps prove to be even more instructive for this part of the world than its classic ‘quagmire’ in Vietnam. For, in Vietnam, the US was not up against ‘terror’, to use a popular characterization which the US itself made famous particularly in South Asia. The US’ ‘enemy’ in Afghanistan, besides being an unconventional military formation, would have no scruples about taking civilian lives or about deploying them as ‘human shields’. This, the Taliban is already doing and to the extent to which it is doing so, it is making the task of the US in Afghanistan agonizingly difficult. How could one get at the ‘enemy’ without snuffing out civilian lives in the process in the dozens or more? This is one most befuddling dilemmas for Washington. In taking military counter-measures, scores of Afghan civilians are dying and in proportion to which this happens, popular opposition to the Western presence in Afghanistan would relentlessly mount; an excruciating poser for ‘liberators’ indeed.

The implication of identity issues in the Afghan imbroglio could greatly compound the task of the US. It is not only ethnic identities which need to be factored in; religious identities should be taken cognizance of too and a mix of these factors makes quelling ‘terror’ in this part of the world a steep, up-hill undertaking, as the US is already learning. Currently, mounting civilian casualties in US military operations in Afghanistan could open the US to the charge of attempting to fight ‘terror’ with ‘terror’. In other words, the consistent, undiluted application of the military option in Afghanistan by the US would prove enormously costly in human, military and political terms.

Not surprisingly, the Pakistani political leadership evinces a surer grasp of these South Asian complexities. As indicated in this column last week, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has called for a Marshal Plan for Pakistan, a country which is seen by the West as a ‘frontline state’ in its fight against ‘terror’. In other words, what better way to fight ‘terror’ than through equitable development? Certainly, a multi-pronged approach is called for, but a state needs to know when the military approach should give way to a wide-ranging political initiative which would ensure popular political participation of the affected population groups in particular – points countries such as Sri Lanka need to bear in mind.

Iraq may currently be relatively stable, but it is not the US-led military initiative in its entirety which made this happen. The Sunni militant formations, which at one time chafed at any suggestions of shunning militancy, are today in the political mainstream, and this more than any other factor has contributed towards Iraq’s comparative calm. An identical approach to problem-solving needs to guide the Obama administration in Afghanistan if it is in earnest about putting an end to ‘terror’; that is, the disaffected need to be brought into the political mainstream.

Unfortunately, Obama has to, apparently, deliver on a huge pre-election promise of eliminating the Al-qaeda leadership, which he believes is holed out somewhere in Afghanistan. How far this could be achieved only time would tell but it would prove extremely difficult as long as the US-led forces in Afghanistan are seen as aggressors.

At this juncture it would be also of importance to bear in mind that South and South-West Asia have been regions where the US has always considered it important to have more than a foothold in, over the decades. Prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, US interests in the Gulf region were protected by the late Shah of Iran. Since the ousting of the Shah, the US has striven hard to establish and maintain a steady military presence in the oil-rich Gulf region. It is this consideration that compelled it to militarily bolster the Afghan Mujahadin in its efforts to fight the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan in the decade of the eighties. Then as well as now, the support of Pakistan was sought and obtained.