Let me begin my address by stating an already known fact to highlight it’s importance to the unfolding events in and across the narrow strip of water known as the Palk Strait, which separates India and Sri Lanka, two independent, sovereign states as legitimately recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. The sovereignty has links to a host of international conventions which each country complies with. In turn, it assures and affirms the inviolability of sovereignty of the state. It’s complement comprises the lawful constitution of each state which seals the responsibility of its institutions of governance. It is in the latter context, that the Palk Strait has had a history of irritation due to incidents of smuggling and illicit immigration between India and Sri Lanka. It’s background has however been inept policing and corrupt practices which therefore failed to arrest the "seemingly harmless" level of activity taking place therein. On the other hand, the level of concern upped when the strip of water became a battleground for livelihood between competing fishing communities in South India and Sri Lanka.

In the above backdrop, when the Indian Government announced in the 1960s that it was to launch a proposal to build a canal across the Palk Strait, a concerned Permanent Secretary of the then Ministry of Nationalised Services, was quick to alert the cabinet. It was argued that the canal, if constructed, will result in all ships serving Sri Lanka having to abandon Colombo Port and sail via the canal. Accordingly, approval of the cabinet was sought, to construct a major port in Kankesanturai (KKS). However, an expert committee which examined the matter concluded that the canal will not happen, and recommended that there was no necessity to build an alternate port in KKS. The matter rested there, until a revived Sethusamudram Canal Project resurfaced in the 1990s, when the media reported that the then Indian Minister of Defense had inaugurated it. This drew no attention in Sri Lanka, because after its previous deliberations in the 1960s, the matter had receded to the backwoods of Sri Lanka’s policy domain as a file." Nonetheless, public interest prevailed when some scientists and engineers reported in the media that a comprehensive inventory of implications is likely to arise from changes in the ocean currents caused by the excavation of a canal in the Palk Strait. This alert was dispatched to Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in New Delhi in February 1999, urging that "bi-lateral consultations be fostered regarding the proposed deepening of the Palk Strait." It evinced a typical response which stated that, "once the Foreign Ministry instructs me on any further action on this matter, I will be pleased to inform on same." Thus, with no pro-active interest by Sri Lanka, the 1990s also passed with the canal project solidly in the backwoods of Sri Lanka’s policy domain.

In June 2004, there arose a media-hype when it was affirmed that the Common Minimum Programme of the newly elected coalition Government of India had included the Sethu Canal Project in same. It catalysed a heightened public concern on the negative impacts of the project, led by interest-groups in both countries, which renewed the focus on the Palk Strait. On Sri Lanka’s side, the government’s response was to appoint an Inter-Ministerial Committee to monitor the project and to keep the cabinet informed. The matter was also included in the agenda of discussion between the apex leaders of the two countries. Further, it was hotly debated in Sri Lanka’s Parliament in July 2005. On India’s side, the chosen alignment of the canal eventually caused a religious dissent of huge proportions which culminated in its Supreme Court. The advise of the Court to the Government in 2008 was to examine the prospect of an alternative alignment, which meant that the partially dredged canal was put on hold pending the completion of the current (2009), General Election to elect a new Union Government. It is however pertinent to note that India’s main opposition political party, the BJP, had reportedly kick-started its campaign in the country’s south, by announcing that it will implement the Sethu Canal Project without hurting the religious sentiments, if it was voted into power. In this context, it can be concluded that the canal will continue to dominate and its nexus with ground reality in the Palk Strait, will be known before long with the convergence of its influence in the domestic, bi-lateral and regional spheres. It is therefore appropriate to quote a leading Indian Journalist who stated that:

"Like every other independent sovereign country in the world, India has its own plans for national integration, which no other country could question or cast aspersions, but perhaps in a global economy when countries are inter-linked to one – another, the potential side effects cannot be ruled out".

It is also appropriate to quote Sri Lanka’s then Foreign Minister who informed Parliament that:

"we can use the Sethu Canal Project not as a hindrance or threat to each other, but as an opportunity for joint activity which could be economically beneficial to both countries."

Meanwhile, if I can request you to revert your attention back to the 1970s, it was a period when both countries realised the need for demarcating a maritime boundary in the Palk Strait, due to a combination of factors arising from;

i. Illicit immigration and smuggling;

ii. Extension of the limit of the territorial sea to twelve miles, and other development consequent to the international maritime law emerging at UNCLOS; and

iii. Sovereignily over the islet of Kachchativu.

The achievement in 1974 of the resolution of sovereignty over Kachchativu in Sri Lanka’s favour and the subsequent delineation in 1976 of the maritime boundary in the Palk Strait-Palk Bay between India and Sri Lanka, are now matters recognized under international law. However, the disappointment of Tamil Nadu State over the final resolution by New Delhi to ‘hand over Kachchativu’ and of the fishing around it, is yet simmering. The state government has even requested that the waters in around Kachchativu along with the islet itself be granted to India at no charge on a perpetual lease. Nonetheless, in the absence of a meaningful resolution, a notable Indian Scholar has referred to the actions taken subsequent to the bi-lateral agreement as being, "a fire fighting excersise; when the fire breaks out one tries to extinguish the fire." On the other hand, the then Secretary of Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his publication on Kachchativu, has excellently dispelled the misconception that India gifted ‘or ‘ceded’ the islet to Sri Lanka. Yet, the fact remains that sovereignty over it has not resulted in Sri Lanka exploiting the opportunities which should have followed thereafter. The then secretary later attributed same, "not due to any uncertainty in the agreement, but due to our own ineptitude, lethargy, the terrorist problem, and our priorities." In the meantime, poaching by fishermen of both countries has continued across the IMBL, resulting in shootings and detention of these people. It has prompted the previously mentioned Indian scholar to advocate that, "the issue of Kachchativu and fishing by Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan waters be taken into consideration when the outer edge of the continental margin is deliberated in exchange for granting concessions to Sri Lanka."

 The importance of the continuing crisis faced by fishermen across the Palk Strait was reflected in an agreement between the two countries in October 2008, "to put in place practical arrangements to deal with bona fide Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing the IMBL." Meanwhile, more recently, the opposition BJP was reported as having stated at an election rally in South India, that "it would successfully get back the islet through a bi-lateral Agreement." Hence, Kachchativu remains a ‘hot potato’ on matters related to the Palk Strait.

 The aforesaid backdrop has been compounded by the 25-year ‘ethnic conflict’ in Sri Lanka. It’s polarization in the north of the island had profited from the loosely guarded Palk Strait. The nexus between the LTTE and it’s smuggling across this strip of water became an established fact. It’s initial impact was not a bother to India’s defense establishment. An Indian Navy chief indicated in a media interview that, "India is wary of the Sea Tigers, but they don’t prevent us from doing what we want to do."On the other hand, following the subsequent LTTE air attack on the Katunayake SLAF Base, the Commanders of the Indian Coast Guard’s eastern region stated that, "the Coast Guard will now have to look afresh at the threat perception from the Tamil Tigers from northern Sri Lanka." Consequently, it stepped up air surveillance of the Palk Bay by conducting daily sorties from Chennai and Rameshwaran. The Indian Navy had also installed nine radars along the coast of Palk Bay and the Palk Strait. An outcome of same was the establishment of co-ordinated naval patrolling with Sri Lanka in the Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar, to cope with the emerging threat from the LTTE. Furthermore, the Indian government decided to declare the airspace above its most sensitive nuclear installation at Kalpakkam, as a no-fly zone.

It is however noteworthy that inspite of the above measures, it was recently reported by a leading Indian newspaper that two Sri Lankan refugee boats had arrived undetected in the coastal belt of Andhra Pradesh. This had raised questions in the minds of the Indian public on the effectiveness of the Indian Coast Guard in securing its borders from a terror threat.