When the LTTE triggered Eelam War IV by taking over the Mavil Aru sluice in July 2006, the government accepted the Tigers’ military challenge. The army deployed in the Batticaloa –Ampara sector had to be relieved immediately to launch an operation at Mavil-aru. The absence of the army commander, Lieut. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, recuperating following an LTTE suicide attack had increased pressure on the government struggling to face up to Prabhakaran’s challenge.

Had the LTTE succeeded in its attempts to assassinate Fonseka, who was promoted General on the successful completion of the offensives in the eastern and northern theatres, and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the outcome of the war would surely have been different.

On a directive from the Defence Ministry the elite Special Task Force (STF) relieved the army in parts of the Batticaloa district including the town area, Kallady and the Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa road up to Mailanbawalai. ASP Varuna Jayasundera, the then Acting Area Commander, Batticaloa, had received instructions to meet the army brass in Batticaloa and work out an emergency plan. After turning down a move to take over Trincomalee, the STF within 24 hours took over several major SLA bases.

As the STF moved in the SLA moved out in convoys. The SLAF also deployed Mi 17 transport helicopters to move troops to staging points for the assault on Mavil-aru.

Under the able leadership of the then Commandant DIG Nimal Lewke, the STF acted swiftly and decisively to facilitate the withdrawal of the SLA. Lewke, presently the Senior DIG in charge the Northern Region, took over the command in September 2003 (During the CFA) and continued till March 2008. During his tenure the STF played a critical role in anti-terrorist operations. My friend DIG Lionel Karunasena who functioned as the Commandant for nine years beginning 1986, too, did a lot for the service.

Subsequently, the STF took over more areas in the Ampara-Batticaloa sector as the SLA pulled out additional troops needed to go ahead with offensive action. In keeping with a new SLA re-deployment plan, the STF moved in to Vavunativu and Leprosy Island, Batticaloa about a month after the outbreak of fighting at Mavil-aru. Vavunativu had been a hot spot since the killing of ‘Colonel’ Ramanan, Deputy Head of LTTE forces in the Batticaloa district. The SLA sniped Ramanan, a veteran LTTE commander who had experience in fighting the IPKF while he was inspecting the LTTE fortifications at Vavunativu on May 21, 2006.

Once Fonseka returned to lead the military campaign against the LTTE there had been no turning back. The tough talking war veteran, undoubtedly country’s most successful service commander, had inspired the fighting forces to go all out against the enemy. As the army went on the offensive slowly but steadily causing massive losses on the LTTE in the Eastern theatre, the STF gradually took over security in newly liberated areas.

Lewke’s successor DIG K. M. L. Sarathchandra yesterday told The Sunday Island that about 1,000 fresh commandos would join the service shortly. "They’ll move to Batticaloa and Ampara districts and also strengthen our deployment in the Vavuniya region," he said. Sarathchandra who had served the STF for 22 years previously, including six as its Director Operations, returned to the service in late March 2008. He said that as major combat operations had been brought to an end, the STF could review its plans to meet any future challenge.

The STF is guided by the motto attack is the best form of defence. Over the years, the para-military wing of the Police Department had earned the respect of both friends and foes alike and today the force is undoubtedly one of the formidable fighting units with a battle-field record second to none. The loss of about 460 officers and men in action since its inception didn’t reflect the STF’s contribution to the overall war effort. About 1,000 had been wounded in action.

Early this year, the STF took over Vavuniya-Nochchimoddai-Omanthai-Puliyankulam-Kanagarayankulam road stretch from the army.

The setting up of Special Strike Force (SSF), in the early 80s, to meet the emerging threat posed by Tamil terrorist groups paved the way for the formal establishment of the STF on March 1, 1983. Although the SSF died a natural death due to negligence on the part of the then administration and police top brass, its successor (the STF) rapidly developed to an extraordinary fighting force. To the credit of JR Jayewardene and successive UNP administrations the STF received much needed State backing.

The SSF had its initial training at the Kondawattuwan Army Camp in the Ampara District. Of some 50 men who had received military training before being deployed in the Jaffna peninsula in support of regular police, eight remained with the STF. Among them were SSP R. W. M. P. Ranawana, Chief Inspectors P. K. Piyadasa, R. E. Nandasena, M. L. R. Chandrasiri and Sub Inspectors A. Wickremasinghe, P. L. Piyatilleke, I. R. W. S. Bandara and W. A. Gunasiri.

The STF commemorates its fallen comrades on September 1 remembering four constables - Chandrapala (2539), Ekanayake (4100), Nanayakkara (3928) and Sumanasekera (13089) killed in a landmine blast at Tikkam, Jaffna on March 1, 1984.

The STF was erroneously considered pro-UNP due to its formation during JRJ administration. The close relationship the National Security Advisor Ravi Jayewardene, the president’s son, had with the STF fuelled talk that the force was part of the UNP. That was certainly not the case.

In late 1984 the JRJ administration shifted the STF out of the Jaffna peninsula. It replaced the army in Ampara and Batticaloa South. The deployment began with the setting up of bases at Kiran, Kallady, Kaluwanchikudy and Akkaraipattu. The STF also set up bases towards Valaichenai. The re-deployment facilitated the rapid growth of the STF. Had it remained in the Jaffna peninsula, the STF wouldn’t have been what it is today.

Until the deployment of the Indian Army under the July 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, the STF held the upper hand in both Ampara and Batticaloa districts. Trained by former British Special Air Services (SAS) men, it quickly gained a reputation as daring fighters who wouldn’t hesitate to take any challenge. The heli-borne assaults on Kokkadicholai and Komari jolted the Indian trained Tiger terrorists.

"We were dropped from five helicopters to secure Komari. We achieved the target," a veteran who took part in the operation told The Sunday Island. The assault on LTTE stronghold at Kokkadicholai displayed the discipline and tenacity of commandos.

At the time of the first deployment of the STF in the Ampara and Batticaloa districts, the EPRLF had been the dominant group. The PLOTE and EPDP, too, had posed a formidable challenge before the rise of the LTTE in the East. These groups quickly gained the upper hand in both provinces due to their superior tactics and fire.

"They introduced the rocket propelled grenade and the grenade launcher. We were flabbergasted," another veteran said. Douglas Devananda was on top of the hit list, he said.

The eruption of the second JVP inspired insurgency in August 1987 prompted JRJ to bring the STF to the South where the JVP was on the rampage. It played a pivotal role in crushing the insurgency and facilitated the restoration of civil administration in areas outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The JVP grenade attack on Parliament in August 1987 caused JRJ to invite Israel to train Sri Lankan personnel in VIP security. The STF immensely benefited from the Israeli experience and today the unit ranks among the best in the world. The invitation extended by the People’s Republic of China to involve it in security arrangements for the Olympics and an Indian VIP security contingent undergoing training at the state of the art STF training wing at Katukurunda were recent examples of its reputation.

But like any other security arm or intelligence services it wasn’t free of controversy, trouble and mishap. The STF had been accused of extra judicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and indiscriminate action both in the East and the South. Over the years the force has improved discipline among officers and men but a series of killings in Colombo during the late Lionel Karunasena’s command caused an irreparable damage to the STF’s reputation.

The 1995 episode dubbed the Bolgoda killings prompted the then President CBK to shift Karunasena, one of the best Commandants the force ever had, elsewhere. A meticulous planner and strategist, he played a critical role in developing the force and his contribution shouldn’t be downgraded due to the Bolgoda killings.

During the Premadasa-LTTE honeymoon (May 1989-June 1990) the government involved the STF in the transfer of arms, ammunition and equipment to the LTTE. It was a monumental mistake on the part of President Premadasa who himself was blown up by ‘Babu’ an LTTE agent who even had the rare opportunity to fly in SLAF choppers in the company of the President’s staff.

The assassination was a stunning blow on the STF which was responsible for Premadasa’s security. Had his security bosses correctly assessed the threat on Premadasa, they would have snared the assassin who befriended the President’s valet Mohideen and a section of his STF bodyguard through devious means.

President JRJ considered deploying the STF to quell an attempt to overthrow the Maldivian President in late 1980s. The assignment envisaged taking both the Male airport and the Palace after the Indian trained PLOTE landed there. JRJ’s move had to be aborted when the Indian government declared it would rescue the Maldivian government.

The Indian message was delivered by the then Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit who walked into the Ward Place residence of JRJ when the President was discussing the final plan for the assault on the PLOTE.

The STF had been successful on the battlefield and a range of other tasks including intelligence gathering, covert operations and bomb disposal. But its success had never contributed directly to an overall security strategy. Instead the STF action and even operations conducted by other services had been conducted in isolation. But the Eelam War IV had brought in unprecedented changes to overall strategy where the three services, the Police, the STF and the Civil Security Force had worked towards one objective.

The annihilation of LTTE bases in the East had been their first task to which each service contributed. The STF’s role had been significant. Operation Niyathai Jaya conducted by the STF in early January last year delivered a kidney punch to the enemy. This operation reduced the threat on Siyambalanduwa, Lahugala, Hulannuge, Bakmitiyawa, Pannalgama and Manthottama. The dismantling of the LTTE high security zone in the Kanjikudichciaru jungles facilitated the overall security forces action to defeat the LTTE.

The break-up of the LTTE in early March 2004 made things easy for the forces but the defeat of the LTTE in the East couldn’t have come at a better time. The victory in the East gave the government a realistic chance to destroy LTTE bases in the Vanni.

During the Eastern campaign Army LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols) operated from several STF bases. The army caused chaos in the LTTE-held territory before ground forces moved in with the support of armour and artillery fire.

The STF also conducted operations south of Thoppigala and played an equally important role in settling the internally displaced persons in the Ampara and Batticaloa districts. To the credit of the STF it handled the resettlement of civilians in the Batticaloa district tactfully. Almost 100,000 civilians were allowed to return to their villages after the STF screened them. The screening process launched in May 2007 facilitated the resettlement of civilians in the Vellaweli area and the programme was completed quicker than expected.

As part of overall change in deployment of troops to enhance security in areas vulnerable to LTTE attacks, the government recently shifted the STF from the Ampara district to Padaviya, Kebitigollewa and neighbouring areas. The focus was the overall improvement of security in the East, particularly in the Ampara district paving the way for re-location of a section of the STF strength.

Although it wouldn’t be possible to mention all officers involved in successful STF operations let me mention the names of SSP M. R. Latif, SP W. M. Wimalasena, SP Banduma Bandara, ASP T. F. Hadji, ASP Vidura Dissanayake, ASP P. K. Kulatunga, ASP P.G. S. Rathepitiya, ASP M. G. S. K. Muruthetuwegama and ASP W. M. K. S. Pandivita who led troops in Niyathai Jaya