‘Dilemmas at war’s end: Thoughts on hard realities’ by Prof. Michael Roberts which was published in this newspaper on Feb. 11th, seems to have triggered a degree of debate as was evidenced by a talk he gave at the ICES, Colombo, on May 29, by way of clarifying some of the positions taken by him in the article. Titled ‘Killing Civilians in War: An Analysis of Moral Reasoning’, the power point presentation by Roberts at the ICES was followed by what could have been described as a ‘brain-storming presentation’on the finer moral issues in civilian casualties in war by ICES economist Nishan de Mel.

While it could be argued, apparently with some justification, that in ‘total war’ situations ‘some’ civilian casualties or ‘human collateral’ may be unavoidable and that therefore civilian casualties could not have been entirely avoided by the Sri Lankan military in its final assault on LTTE-held territory a few weeks ago, one cannot avoid the impression that the general drift of Roberts’ article, ‘Dilemmas at war’s end….’ is that one should not have been unduly concerned about the civilian population among whom the remaining LTTE members took cover in their final hours because the majority of these civilians were in a number of ways, according to Roberts’ reckoning, connected to and in league with the LTTE.

For example, while elaborating on the control which the LTTE came to exercise on the civilians of the North, Roberts says: ’These institutional developments reached their fullest fruition after the LTTE set up a de facto state from mid-1990 onwards. Though segments of the Tamil population still remained outside this realm in parts of the Jaffna Peninsula and in the Vavuniya locality and were ruled by what many Tamils regard as an "occupation army", from 1990 to 2008 the LTTE controlled a substantial swathe of territory and governed a considerable population who were mostly loyal to its goals’. On what basis, one wonders, is Roberts making out that that the populace in question was ‘mostly loyal’ to the LTTE’s aims? Where is the statistical data, for instance, to back his claim?

Later on in the article, while speaking of the difficulties in distinguishing between Tamil civilians and whom he calls ‘Tiger war-personnel’, on account of the diktat the LTTE established over the population segments under their control, Roberts says: ‘It is probable that a significant proportion of these people are loyal-faithful, but one would need to have an army of flies on many walls to estimate how many were happy to do so and how many hostile to such demands.’ It is precisely because reliable, unambiguous information on how many civilians cooperated willingly with the LTTE and how many did so out of fear of the LTTE, is lacking, that one needs to be cautious in projecting the totality of the civilians under Tiger control, as willing collaborators of the LTTE. The observer who dabbles in ‘guesswork’ and vague assumptions on these issues could very well be making a case for the indiscriminate and callous victimization of these civilians, many of whom were simply coerced into following the dictates of the LTTE. This, we who have been observing the conflict in Sri Lanka from Sri Lanka, over the past 30 years, could state with confidence.

However, unlike those who bayed for only a military solution to the conflict, the Lankan state, beginning from 1983, took a more balanced and farsighted view of the conflict and the issues arising from it. It has carefully distinguished between the LTTE and the Tamil civilians and has to the best of its ability fended for the latter, despite being aware that the succour and material help it continuously sent the civilians ended-up in LTTE hands, mainly on account of the coercion the Tigers exercised over considerable sections of the civilians. The state thus prevented the majority of the civilians from identifying with the LTTE.

One could confidently say that the majority of Tamil civilians did not identify rigidly with the LTTE because the release of the civilians in mid May, among whom the LTTE were taking cover, by the state security forces, was not as disquieting as expected. In those final hours of the LTTE, one did not find civilians in any considerable numbers fighting the security forces, shoulder-to-shoulder with the LTTE. Instead, they preferred to find refuge in the camps for the IDPs.

Clearly, the LTTE ‘sharks’ were not swimming in a Maoist sea of popular support. For a considerable number of Tamil civilians, the LTTE were no ‘saviours’. The civilians, apparently, were only too relieved to get out of the clutches of the LTTE. This was no classical liberation struggle – for instance, on the lines of Vietnam – where the militants found ample support among the civilian populace. Might ruled in the main in the LTTE-dominant areas and this was borne out by the closing stages of the war.

Roberts and those of his ilk who have been advocating what may be called a ‘total war’ solution also need to remember that Second World War case studies may not be entirely relevant to present times and in the new international political order which came into being on the smouldering ruins of the Second World War. Today, member states of the UN need to be cautious in carrying out military campaigns which could impinge adversely on the well being of civilians because the prosecution of war needs to conform closely to humanitarian concerns embodied in a number of international treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.