Many political analysts have pointed out that the much-vexed 13th amendment to the constitution of Sri Lanka was forced on the political leadership of the country as a consequence of the Indo- Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. The bona fides of the Indian government in the naked intervention in the domestic politics of Sri Lanka have been widely questioned.

A solution to the issue of power sharing in Sri Lanka was not the primary objective of the Indian intervention. The Accord was a convenient entry to impose outrageous conditions on Sri Lanka, which was done through the "Exchange of Letters" to coerce a small country to submit to the strategic objectives of India. It was an unwarranted intrusion aimed at imposing Indian hegemony in South Asia. The Indian opposition political parties criticized the interference as an effort to divert the growing hostility to the Congress party in the domestic sphere. Most of the conditions, which were to prevent US influence in Sri Lanka, have no relevance today. India is now a most favoured nation of USA. The Accord itself became a dead letter when India failed to make the LTTE accept it. Most importantly, it was also not an agreement between the Tamil community and the government of Sri Lanka.

The book by former High Commissioner of India J. N. Dixit titled ‘Assignment Colombo’ reveals the pressures, threats and coercion used to get President Jayawardane to accept the agreement and its by product, the 13th amendment. Dixit, who was also a prime mover in this despicable intervention, records the almost unanimous and intense opposition to the Indian proposals by the Cabinet of ministers. Dixit recounts how the final draft of the Accord was hatched at India House (residence of the Indian High Commissioner) between himself and one minister of the Jayawardane Cabinet. When the draft was discussed with the rest of the Cabinet, the Cabinet members raised their strong doubts and vehement objections, which were haughtily dismissed by Dixit. He describes with glee how he bludgeoned the Sri Lankan ministers into submission. He reveals that there was no approval of the Cabinet, which left the decision on it solely to the President. What can be concluded from the references by Dixit to the discussions with the Cabinet and the individual ministers is that they had been totally one- sided, where he (Dixit) was not agreeable to effecting even minor changes to the Indian proposals.

A few days after the signing of the Accord, in the first public statement made by Prabhakaran on August 4 1987, he stated very clearly, "This agreement did not concern only the problems of the Tamils. This is primarily concerned with Indo-Sri Lankan relations. It also contains within itself the principles, the requirements for making Sri Lanka accede to India’s strategic sphere of influence. It works out a way for preventing the disruptionist and hostile foreign forces from gaining footholds in Sri Lanka. This is why the Indian government showed such an extraordinary keenness in concluding this agreement." There is no doubt that this statement of Prabhakaran was a carefully thought out one, formulated by the so-called intellectuals supporting the LTTE.

Rodney Tasker; Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, August 13, 1987, pp.8-9, under the caption "Rajiv’s gunboat peace", reported that, "Jayewardene has allowed Gandhi to extend Indian hegemony beyond its shores. In an exchange of letters between the two leaders attached to the accord, Jayewardene has granted New Delhi the right to vet his country’s strategic stance – including any foreign military presence on the island."

The opposition to the Rajiv – Jayewardene Accord came from all corners of the Sinhalese polity long before the LTTE weighed in against it, because this Accord was, in the words of the opposition SLFP’s critique, "hatched under a veil of secrecy and signed in haste under a nationwide curfew followed by tight press censorship, a ban on meetings and a military presence which prevents people affected by it from expressing their views publicly." [Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug.13, 1987].

The legitimate question people ask at this juncture is, where is the morality and the justification of continuing with the Accord and its derivative the 13th Amendment. It is noted that the Accord was thereafter approved by Parliament, which was itself not one elected by a popular vote but continued in power through the device of a highly questionable referendum.

The following record of a press interview held immediately after the signing of the Accord quoted in Chapter 34 of the on line publication titled "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story", reveals the intense pressure brought on Parliament and the warning of dire consequences if the passage of the legislation relating to the Accord was be blocked by Parliament.

President: "Well, when I bring legislation to Parliament and Parliament does not pass it, then I’ll dissolve Parliament.

President: "Well, everybody is free to oppose. When it comes to the stage of opposing to the extent of defeating those in authority, either those in authority must go or others must go."

The public opposition to the Accord and the 13th amendment was violent and widespread. It is estimated that over 40,000 lives were lost in the government efforts to control the violence in the ensuing years. It cannot be over-stressed here that the LTTE and the major Tamil political parties rejected it outright.

When the 13th amendment was challenged in the Supreme Court, four out of nine judges of the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the 13th amendment were inconsistent with Articles 2,3,4 or 9 of the constitution.

The recent statement by the former CJ Sarath N Silva confirms the problems of hastily grafting certain provisions in an alien constitution into a totally different local situation. "The 13th amendment is not a document that was formulated with much thought. It is one that was put together in haste to go with the Indo-Lanka Accord. This amendment compiled by taking parts of the Indian constitution, doesn’t suit Sri Lanka at all. As India is a large county they have to decentralize power. However, practically, it is not possible in our country. Specially, devolving police and land powers is not practical at all."

On the statement of the former CJ on the size of India, it must be noted that the average population and the average geographical area of a state of India are more than 18 times the population and the physical area of a Province in Sri Lanka.

There is no doubt that the inspiration for the 13th amendment was derived from the Indian constitution and under the unequivocal auspices of the Indian government. There is no gainsaying that the text of most Articles and the schedules so transposed, are identical with those found in the Indian constitution. According to Dixit (Page 181-‘Assignment Colombo’), the authors of the proposals in the 13th amendment were the Indian ministers Natwar Singh and Chidambaram. It would appear from Dixit’s book that the proposals for the devolution of powers and the related constitutional procedures called "the 19th December Proposals" had been discussed by the two Indian ministers with President Jayewardene and the Cabinet at least six months before the Accord was finally signed. There is no mention by Dixit that there were discussions with a broad section of the Sri Lanka stakeholders in the formulation of these proposals. As stipulated in Article 2.15 of the Indo Sri Lanka Accord, the Agreement was made conditional to an acceptance of these proposals finalized by December 1986. Residual matters not finalized had to be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing the agreement. Here again the conclusion can only be that the India had a predetermined ‘made in India package’ and was bent on ramming it down the throat of a distraught government of Sri Lanka.

Legal luminaries like H.L.de Silva and R. S. Wanasundera have pointed out that it violates the unitary status of the constitution. Although Tamil parties consider that the 13th amendment does not meet Tamil aspirations for self-government, it is on record that Rajiv Gandhi, who was the chief architect of the Indo- Sri Lank Accord, had given an assurance to Prabhakaran that "the newly-created North-Eastern Province for Tamils will enjoy as much powers as Tamil Nadu enjoys in India" (Triumph of Truth: The Rajiv Gandhi Assassination-Investigation by Kaarthikeyan and Radhavinod Raju Karthikeyan).

The current public debate on the 13th amendment is focused on the following issues:

1. Implementation of the 13th Amendment in the present form in full.

2. Implementation of the 13th amendment, less powers on police and land.

3. To go beyond the 13th amendment – 13th amendment plus.

4. Adopt the Indian constitution on devolution of power.

5. In a holistic approach, re-examine the 13th amendment in the context of the current political environment and adopt a homegrown solution that guarantees equity and justice to all communities.

There has been a vigorous debate on items 1, 2 and 3. Discourse on item 5 is yet to come. This essay focuses on item 4 and is an attempt to show that the 13th amendment is Indian constitution plus by drawing attention to the following:

1. Some important provisions of the Indian constitution relating to central government power have been omitted in the 13th amendment to the constitution of Sri Lanka.