It was Myanmar’s democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi who famously pronounced that it is fear and not power that corrupts the human. Accordingly, absolute fear corrupts absolutely.

The undemocratic ruler fears for his power. It is his nagging anxiety to perpetuate his grip on power and his fear of losing it, that render him corrupt, degenerate and tyrannical. On the other hand, it is the fear of the despotic ruler that makes the ruled corrupt. The fear that they could lose their status and positions in life, for instance, by challenging and confronting undemocratic rulers, makes the ruled servile towards their rulers and renders them vulnerable to the lure of material inducements coming their way from power wielders.

This invaluable insight into corruption by Suu Kyi, should enable the observer of Third World politics to understand how astronomical levels of corruption, both in the public and private sectors, thrive alongside political repression and undemocratic rule. The venality of some of the ruled and their servility, could not be understood in isolation from the pathological anxiety of the ruling class to prolong its hold on power. In the process of ‘dismantling democracy’, the rulers of the Third World, heap on particularly their officialdom and bureaucracies, material and monetary inducements, which sections of such personnel have no compunctions in accepting. This gives them a taste for the ‘good things in life’ which they would from then on fearfully cling to. It is this fear that keeps the ruled in subjection.

We in Sri Lanka have seen this process of fear breeding corruption in numerous forms taking hold in the polity, since 1977, when the ‘dismantling of democracy’ began to take place in earnest with the installation of the local hybrid system of government. It is no secret that corruption of mind-boggling proportions is today badly disfiguring even the local private sector.

In the majority of countries in the South and South-east Asian regions, it is the economically dominant groups that have an entrenched interest in market liberalization, which are currently wielding political power. Contemporary scholars on the political-economy of the Third World, characterize this social group as the Transnational Capitalist Class or the TCC. It is, of course, of no concern to the TCC that economic globalization has not helped generate economic equity or been in any way effective in bridging the income gap in these countries. Self-aggrandizement is their preoccupation and they would brazenly use the governing apparatus to further this end.

Thus, political repression, which generates widespread fear and thrives on it, usually accompanies the liberalization of economies and this is one way in which current developments surrounding Suu Kyi in Myanmar could be understood.

Today, as a prominent economic actor in the ASEAN region, Myanmar is in the process of integrating its economy with the rest of the world but it would fall short of liberalizing its political system. Myanmar proves the case that economic liberalization need not necessarily accompany positive political change in the direction of greater democratic freedoms. The continuing repressive restraints the ruling junta insists on imposing on Suu Kyi, are striking evidence that democratic change would not come easily to Myanmar. At the time of writing, Suu Kyi has been sentenced to yet another long spell of house arrest, apparently aimed at preventing her from contesting at a general election, a few months from now.

Here is clear proof that the ruling junta would in no way preside over a substantial democratization of Myanmar. This development also substantiates the point that a Third World ruling class could not be coaxed into willingly renouncing its economically predominant position in a body politic. For, democratization, if pursued in earnest, could lead to greater economic equity and the latter, to a diminishing of the economic predominance of the ruling stratum.

For knowledgeable observers, Suu Kyi’s travails would bring to mind the callous victimization of Benazir Bhutto by the military regime of General Zia ul Haq in the late seventies and early eighties. As in the case of Suu Kyi, Bhutto too was subjected to repressive control by the military rulers of the day and was denied contact with the people. There could be no greater threat to a repressive regime than a popular, pro-democracy political leader.

However, in marked contrast to the Pakistan of those days, where sections of the country’s clergy were staunch backers of the Zia regime, a considerable number of the Buddhist clergy in Myanmar seem to be opposed to the ruling junta of their country. This was borne out by the bloody civil unrest in Myanmar in 2007, in which the Buddhist clergy figured prominently. If sections which are considered conservative, are today opposed to the Myanmarese rulers, it only establishes the degree to which repression has heightened in the country.

In these times in this region, where there seems to be a heightened awareness of state sovereignty and its implications, there are bound to be many who would argue that Myanmar should be left alone to handle its domestic political issues. ‘Hands off Myanmar’, would be the cry of nationalist groups in South Asia. In fact some sections in Sri Lanka, viewed the Myanmarese generals’ handling of the political agitations two years ago, with approval.

However, it needs to be remembered that peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators anywhere are not ‘terrorists’. Nor can the use of repressive measures to put down these protests be met with approval by those claiming to espouse democracy. Accordingly, a duty is cast on the democracies of South Asia, such as India, to engage Myanmar with a view to ensuring a peaceful resolution of the issues relating to Suu Kyi. Besides, the international community is obliged to involve itself proactively in efforts to bring about peaceful, democratic change in Myanmar.