Recently, a court in the UK granted an unprecedented warrant for the arrest of Tzipi Livni, a former Israeli Foreign Minister over alleged war crimes committed by the Jewish State during the last major military offensive in Gaza last January.

Livni, now the Opposition leader, had no option but to cancel a scheduled visit to the UK at the eleventh hour to avoid being taken on a war crimes charge. The controversial order followed an application by pro-Palestinian lawyers. She has been the Opposition leader since a new government took office in March.

Although Livni represented the Opposition, the Israeli government reacted angrily and went to the extent of summoning the UK’s top diplomat in Tel Aviv, Tim Phillips. Denouncing the attempt to arrest the lawmaker, Israel said that their ties with the UK had been badly damaged.

Israel’s President, who is also a former foreign minister, condemned the British action as "one of the greatest political mistakes" that could be done while urging the UK to quickly change her laws. International wire services quoted Livni as saying the British action placed other world leaders and countries at risk.

Earlier this year, Defence Minister Ehud Barak, a decorated Israeli solder had to claim diplomatic immunity to avoid arrest.

The situation faced by Israel is relevant to Sri Lanka today, particularly to incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who gave unparalleled political leadership to a bloody offensive which brought the LTTE to its knees in May.

Whether the SLFP-led ruling coalition liked it or not, alleged excesses by Sri Lankan forces will continue to be a major issue internationally. And Rajapaksa brothers would definitely be targeted by the Tamil Diaspora and their British lawyers.

Former Army Chief General (Retd) Sarath Fonseka, too, would be high on the targeted list though he now faced President Rajapaksa at the January 26 polls. The bottom line is that whatever the Rajapaksas and Fonseka may say now on political platform, their past association cannot be denied.

As they could rightfully share credit for Sri Lanka’s triumph over LTTE terrorism, they would also have to take the blame for any excesses on the part of the security forces. That is the reality, though both parties try to distance themselves from each other for political reasons at the expense of national security and the very survival of the Sri Lankan State.

At the beginning of the fourth phase of the Eelam war, the LTTE had control of about 15,000 square km in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. But the forces waged war for almost three years until Major General Kamal Gunaratne’s 53 Division troops killed LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon in May.

Last week we discussed formation of an extraordinary political alliance comprising the UNP, JVP, SLMC and a section of Tamil political elements backing Fonseka’s candidature as well as his right to challenge the President regardless of the war veteran being part of the President’s ‘A’ team credited with executing a three-year-long offensive.

For Rajapaksa, the EU decision to withdraw GSP plus facility could not have come at a worse time. It came the day before the Elections Secretariat accepted nominations for the presidential election. Had he given up the military option and returned to the negotiating table even at the expense of national security, GSP plus would not have been an issue.

Whatever reasons the EU may give for its anticipated announcement, the fact remains that Colombo could have retained this particular trade concession only at the expense of an outright battlefield victory over the LTTE. Although the EU had periodically warned of damaging consequences of offensive action against the LTTE though it was proscribed by the EU itself, the President resolutely pursued the military option.

Rajapaksa made this clear shortly after the navy sank a floating LTTE warehouse off Kalmunai in September 2006. Addressing senior Colombo-based diplomatic representatives of the then Co-chairs to the Sri Lankan peace process at Temple Trees, the President warned that any attempt to smuggle in weapons would be countered on the high seas.

The navy kept the President’s promise by destroying eight merchant vessels, four of them with the help of intelligence provided by the US Government. Although, Sri Lanka had been at odds with the US over excesses by forces battling the LTTE, the navy received the much needed support from the world’s solitary super power.

To the credit of President Rajapaksa, he had managed through his good offices to secure required armaments even from the US to fight the war. A case in point is the enhancement of firepower of navy’s Fast Attack Craft (FACs) by deploying Mark 44 Bush Master Cannons, a quality US product.

Acquisition of US-built Beechcraft aircraft for surveillance operations was another example of how Sri Lanka gradually built her capabilities to meet the LTTE challenge.

Acquiring arms, ammunition and equipment for rapidly expanding Sri Lankan forces had been a daunting task due to international opposition to Sri Lanka’s offensive. Could anyone deny the President and the Defence Secretary the credit they richly deserved for ensuring a steady supply of arms despite a deteriorating economic situation against the backdrop of a global economic meltdown?

The President went to the extent of personally phoning leaders of some of the countries supplying Sri Lanka with arms to expedite the process and boldly raised the issue of the LTTE receiving armaments of Chinese origin through North Korea. He authorized a Sri Lankan delegation to visit China to block the Chinese arms much to the amusement of the UNP and the JVP.

The Opposition laughed off the government action though subsequent investigations established not only the Chinese-North Korean link but another route involving Eritrea, arranged by Norway, a charge vehemently denied by the peace facilitator.

The President on the advice of the Defence Secretary also strengthened relations with South East Asian countries, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia as part of Sri Lanka’s overall strategy against the LTTE. In fact, this exercise had been of critical importance to Sri Lanka’s efforts to locate, track down and destroy LTTE arms shipments.

Sri Lanka’s strong relationship with the region had allowed the country to seize Kumaran Pathmanathan aka ‘KP’ and seize three LTTE ships off Indonesia after the end of war. The government has relentlessly pursued intelligence operations both here and abroad to targeting LTTE ‘assets’ to thwart the Diaspora.

The President had also ensured that local and domestic politics would not in anyway hinder the war against the LTTE. Acting as a team, the President and the Defence Secretary had fashioned Sri Lanka’s foreign policy to meet the LTTE challenge.

The government position was effectively articulated by several politicians and officials, including Dayan Jayatilleke, Rajiva Wijesinha, Mahinda Samarasinghe, Rohitha Bogollagama, G. L. Peiris, Palitha Kohona and lawyers Gomin Dayasri and S.L. Gunasekara.

Shortly after winning the last presidential election in November 2005 amidst allegations that the LTTE had ordered Tamil speaking people not to exercise their franchise after being bribed by the Rajapaksa camp, he had to face the LTTE.

In December, the LTTE triggered claymore mine attacks on the security forces. The following month (January 2006) they blew up a Fast Attack Craft off Trincomalee setting the stage for the final battle which did not begin until the second week of August.

But what the LTTE really did not know was the President’s clever move to bring New Delhi to the picture. Briefing the Indian leadership of the planned LTTE action, Colombo called for Indian military assistance to go after the LTTE in the event of war.

Rajapaksa also survived a near fatal attack on his political career over transferring a huge amount of funds received for tsunami relief work into a private account. The judiciary threw out the case against him paving the way for contest between him and Ranil Wickremesinghe, who could have even won the election had the LTTE not interfered with the poll. Rajapaksa won by a narrow margin of less than 190,000 votes.

After failing to win the allegiance of almost 40-strong JVP parliamentary group elected at the April, 2004 parliamentary polls, the President engineered the single biggest crossover in Sri Lankan political history. Subsequently, more Opposition MPs switch sides for personal benefit as the government gradually increased its power within Parliament.

The President also lured many media personalities who had immensely benefited by the UNP by offering them a range perks and privileges while suppressing media hostile to the war effort. Today, the President commands a strong media group representing both print and electronic media comprising the state media and a section of the privately-owned media.

At the last presidential election, he did not even command the full support of the state media and the SLFP machinery. But once he took power with the help of the JVP which tirelessly campaigned for him, he never looked back though many believed the UNP could cause some defections and destabilize the President. Had that happened, the LTTE would have had an opportunity to overwhelm the government.

Although India did not want to get involved in the conflict for domestic political reasons, New Delhi had no option but to support the Sri Lankan offensive. Whichever the party in power in New Delhi, no one would want to allow Colombo to totally depend on Chinese and Pakistan arms, ammunition and equipment for obvious reasons.

In keeping with post-Gandhi assassination era policy, India bolstered Sri Lanka’s OPV (Off-shore Patrol Vessel) capability to go after the LTTE fleet. Although, the LTTE continued to receive assistance from some quarters in India, particularly in the Southern Tamil Nadu State, the Centre ensured the required military and political muscle needed to take on the LTTE.

Sri Lanka also received Indian radar as part of the overall counter-measures taken to meet the LTTE air threat. New Delhi went to the extent of deploying her personnel along with mobile radar stations even in the war zone. That Indian personnel manning the radar stations received injuries in an LTTE artillery attack on the Vavuniya SLAF base at the height of the war must not be forgotten.

As far as the radar was concerned, New Delhi stepped in with their equipment to prevent the deployment of state-of-the-art Chinese radar across the Palk Strait but eventually Colombo acquired the Chinese equipment.

The President had an uncanny knack for making friends. His decision to enhance relations with South East Asia and Iran among other countries made things easier on the ground. Contrary to the advice of some of officials, Rajapaksa went all out to improve relations with Teheran though many felt that this could antagonize the western powers. But today Iranian financial assistance, particularly with regard to purchase of Sri Lanka’s fuel requirement is of critical importance.

Sri Lanka also sought closer relations with Myanmar to the chagrin of a section of the Opposition. Dissident SLFP MP Mangala Samaraweera has repeatedly accused the President of getting closer to dictators at the expense of the country’s foreign relations.

Despite some hiccups, the President remained committed to relations with Israel, one of the few countries which supported Colombo when then President JRJ needed assistance. The Rajapaksa administration had ordered six more fighting vessels for the navy from Israel. Of the three jet squadrons which played a critical role in the war against the LTTE, the Number 10 squadron comprises Israeli-built Kfirs, first acquired in 1996 during the CBK presidency.

He also acquired advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from Israel to enhance SLAF’s night surveillance capability as his forces gradually regained territory. Despite a tacit understanding that Colombo should be denied the wherewithal needed to prosecute war, the Rajapaksa administration stealthy bought in arms and ammunition. The amount of artillery and mortar rounds fired by the army deployed in the Jaffna peninsula in 2006, 2007 and 2008 was evidence the large stocks acquired under extremely difficult conditions.

Let me tell you, at one time, Sri Lankan troops had to use old stocks of some types of ammunition due to shortage caused by a particular supplier halting ship movements for about over six months.

Sri Lanka’s strategy saw a fleet of Israeli, Indian and one US Coast Guard vessel tracking down the LTTE fleet in less than two year period to the surprise of the international community which long believed that the LTTE could not be defeated militarily.

Unlike his predecessors, the President exploited any issue in support of the war effort. A case in point was the cunning use of Karuna factor not only to weaken the LTTE but to enhance political clout, particularly in the East. The way the President had managed to bring the breakaway LTTE faction and an influential section of the Eastern Province Muslims at the first elections to the Eastern Provincial Council revealed the strategist in Rajapaksa.

Although his critics would not accept it, a major reason for the President’s success was his readiness to allow experts to handle relevant issues. In keeping with this policy, his main political foe today, General Fonseka, was allowed to conduct the ground offensive as he thought best while former navy Chief Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda and SLAF Commander Air Chief Marshal Roshan Gunatilleke ably led their services.

The Defence Secretary ensured that the political and military leadership would remain on track until the country achieved what he once told this writer absolute military superiority over the LTTE at any cost. Basically, it would not be possible to discuss the President’s success leaving out Gotabhaya, the only Defence Secretary to be targeted by an LTTE suicide cadre. This was in December 2006, eight months after their abortive bid on Fonseka at the army headquarters premises.

At the behest of the Defence Secretary, the President ordered all INGOs/NGOs to vacate the LTTE held territory in September 2008 to facilitate an all out attack on LTTE bases in and around Kilinochchi. This directive revealed the President’s readiness to take tangible action even at the expense of foreign relations to achieve his target. Any other leader would have given up the military option when the LTTE launched indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, particularly public transport in Colombo and its suburbs.

The President also ignored the criticism and accusations levelled by INGOs/NGOs and a section of the media regarding excesses by his forces. The offensive, spearheaded by the army saw both covert and overt action directed at the LTTE not only in the Northern and Eastern Provinces but in Colombo and its suburbs as well.

Now that the battle lines are drawn with former CJ Sarath Nanda Silva and CBK throwing their weight behind war veteran Fonseka fielded by the UNP-JVP combine, an exciting presidential election is on the cards.

Although, no one could dispute the President’s leading role in defeating LTTE terrorism, the same could not be said about many other contentious issues particularly waste, corruption and irregularities in the public and private sector. But the Opposition too cannot claim clean hands on this issue.

The conventional war against the LTTE is over but a cohesive strategy is needed to curb corruption and it would be better if people reject corrupt politicians, including those who crossover for personal gain at the parliamentary elections, coming immediately after the presidential polls next month.