KP confident despite differences among Tamil Diaspora over post-war strategy
At one point Prabhakaran wanted to replace Balasingham

July 30, 2010, 12:00 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The Tamil Diaspora is sharply divided over a post-war strategy with one influential section led by the late LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s successor, T. S. Pathmanathan aka KP exploring the possibility of working with the Sri Lanka government.

Although the progress is slow, both parties are confident of reaching a workable agreement, which will enable Sri Lanka to capitalize on her war victory over the LTTE in May last year. In line with controversial political and military strategy, the government has paved the way for KP to join the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement process.

Recently KP was given an opportunity to meet some of the ex-LTTE combatants undergoing rehabilitation in the Vavuniya region.

In an exclusive interview with The Island last Wednesday, KP said that he was under intense pressure from those who still believed in an armed struggle to change his stance on Sri Lanka, thereby making his task difficult. He asserted that his team was being targeted by hostile elements bent on subverting what he called reconciliation efforts.

Of the nine persons who had recently visited Sri Lanka on a government invitation to take a firsthand look at the ground situation, one quit due to pressure from influential elements. "But that would not deter our efforts," KP said sounding confident that they could build a partnership on a solid foundation.

While KP remained in Colombo, his team continued to work abroad under the guidance of Paris-based Velummailum Manoharan, formerly of the LTTE International Secretariat.

Sri Lankan agents apprehended KP last August in an operation carried out in a foreign country and brought him to Colombo. The operation was mounted close on the heels of the final battle on the Vanni (east) front, where the Army wiped out the last organized resistance, killing KP’s predecessor, Prabhakaran.

Excerpts of the interview:

Q: How did you follow the battle-field progress during August 2006-May 2009 period? Did the LTTE keep you informed of the ground situation first in the East and the Vanni region?

A: Although I was far away from the war zone, I knew what was going on in the Eastern and Northern battlefields. Our cadres were constantly under pressure and had no option but to gradually retreat as the Army advanced further into LTTE-held territory. As I pointed out earlier, the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks had prompted the international community to take entirely a different stand on the Sri Lankan war. I knew it was militarily IMPOSSIBLE to stop the army, but unfortunately Prabhakaran simply ignored the rapidly changing ground situation. The rest is history.

Q: You are a veteran in this game. What went wrong with your strategy on the North and East battlefields?

A: Prabhakaran was blind to the ground reality. Had he carefully studied 9/11 as well as President Rajapaksa’s advent to presidency and the gradual change in Sri Lanka’s strategy, the LTTE could have survived. Prabhakaran was a simple man, who pursued his goals ruthlessly and sometimes blindly paying no heed to consequences. A case in point was his decision to undermine the then Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government.

Q: What was your role during July 1987-March 1990?

A: I was away moving in and out of various countries, including Thailand, Cyprus and Malaysia.

Q: You have been working abroad for many years and following international developments? Would you comment on the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq?

A: Afghanistan and Iraq are in crisis with international forces still trying to dominate hostile territory. Foreign intervention will only aggravate domestic problems and the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq are not an exception.

Q: Recently Karuna said that you would not enter politics as you have no political experience. What would you say to this? Did you meet LTTE negotiating teams led by Anton Balasingham during the Norwegian-arranged talks overseas?

A: Karuna is free to express his opinion. I have nothing to say about his opinion of me or what I am doing now. The need of the hour is to ensure the speedy implementation of post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement process.

Prabhakaran appointed me as a member of our delegation led by Anton Balasingham for discussions with the Sri Lankan government. But some opposed my appointment on the basis it would give me an opportunity to visit various countries in the guise of meeting government representatives. They feared I would capitalize on talks in various capitals to engage in other business other than negotiations.

At one point Prabhakaran even wanted to replace Balasingham, as he didn’t approve of the way Anton handled the talks.

Some accuse me of working with the government and the military. What can one do without the help of the State apparatus to bring relief to the long suffering people? What do they expect me to do? Obtain assistance from the moon or work with the government to bring relief to war affected population. I will not be deterred by critics bent on picking holes …

Q: Did you try to persuade LTTE leader to refrain from suspending talks in April 2003?

A: Lack of trust caused the breakdown of talks. This was evident when I discussed CFA issues with Prabhakaran. Negotiating peace is not easy and can be more difficult than war. We also felt the absence of competent negotiators. Except Balasingham, LTTE negotiators were ordinary and simply failed to match the skills of government representatives. The government had Prof. G.L. Peiris and several other expert negotiators while we lacked experienced men.

Q: Was the CFA a ruse to develop your fighting capability in five years and then go for an all-out war?

A: Some have accused the LTTE of making such plans.

Q: Even after losing all its major bases in the East by mid 2007, did the LTTE believe it could regain the initiative and how?

A: Once the army had the initiative and the upper had on the Vanni battlefield we never could have changed the ground situation.

Q: Some analysts believe that Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE would not have been possible without the navy blocking the sea supply routes. Would you agree with that assertion?

A: Blockade of sea supply routes had been a major obstacle.

Q: Now that the war is over would it be possible for the once warring parties to sit down for talks and work on a common programme for the benefit of all communities?

A: I responded to a similar question earlier.

Q: There is no doubt that the LTTE had carefully studied the Sri Lankan political scene and taken timely decisions to advance its strategy? What made the group deny the northern voters their right to vote at the November 2005 presidential election, thereby paving the way for the then Prime Minister Rajapaksa’s election?

A: Prabhakaran may have felt that Wickremesinghe could not have had the strength to pursue negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Concluded. Part I and Part II of this interview appeared in The Island on July 29 and 30.